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ABSTRACT
HAVING A PEOPLE:
BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM AND ESSENTIALISM
IN RESISTANCE TO INTERLOCKED OPPRESSIONS
FEBRUARY 1996
LISA TESSMAN, B.A., CARLETON COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ann Ferguson
This dissertation draws on the Aristotelian and contemporary communitarian belief
that humans are socially constituted, and analyzes the manifestations of this belief in
contemporary identity politics and in the concept of ‘culture’ that often underlies identity
politics. While I argue that it is important to maintain a communitarian conception of the
self, I depart from Aristotle and the communitarian tradition by rejecting the assumption
that a constitutive community is characterized by unity and homogeneity. I then claim that
identity politics has inherited both the virtues and the problems of communitarian theory.
Just as communitarians claim that the self is never free from social constitution, so identity
politics have taken the self s identity to be formed along lines of socially defined group
differences, and like communitarianism, some identity politics has entailed a call for unity.
In the case of identity politics, the requirement for membership in the community may be
sharing certain essential characteristics of identity; difference can result in marginalization,
forced assimilation to the group norm, or expulsion. Because identity politics often relies
upon the concept of ‘culture’ to ground group identities, I also examine this concept.
When a community’s unity derives from its members understanding themselves to share a
culture, the maintenance of the culture itself can be conservatizing; the culture can remain
closed off from changes as it preserves the “traditional” or “authentic”; furthermore, it can
come to be treated as an object outside of the people who live it and as such the changing
vi
lived realities of these people-particularly changes that cross lines of identity-do not serve
to continually offer new, changing, and ambiguous ways of conceiving of what is shared
between members of the community. I argue for the development of group identity that
recognizes intersecting group differences, and can permit hybridity or mixed identities. I
end by suggesting that for a constitutive community to remain truly constitutive without
harming its members through marginalization, forced assimilation to a norm or a shared
essence, or stagnation, members must give up the sort of control that maintains the
community as a unity.
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INTRODUCTION
If not with others, how?
—Adrienne Rich
Who are my people?” is a question which has surfaced frequently within the
discourse about strategies for resistance to oppression. Asking the question, as well as
giving any answer to it, is always a political matter. That is, whether or not one makes a
conscious political choice about how to answer the question, one’s answer always depends
upon politically relevant ideological assumptions and always has political consequences;
furthermore, answering the question one way or another—and structuring one’s community
of sense accordingly—can in itself be a purposeful political act. I am interested in reaching
an understanding of what it is to have “a people” in the hopes that this understanding will
provide a conceptual framework within which those who resist interlocked oppressions can
both have “a people” and maintain complex identities.
Posing the “who are my people?” question as one that makes sense implies that
there is such a thing as having a people, that is, having a sense of collectivity to one’s self.
Furthermore, asserting that it behooves one, as one struggles to sort out how best to act in
the social and political world, to consider who one’s “people” may be and to affirm them as
one’s own implies that to have such a communitarian sense is indeed desirable. But
answering the “who are my people?” question (and thus trying to maintain a communitarian
sense about one’s political life) proves problematic when one refuses to answer by
endorsing distinct categories of identity, whether they be gender categories, racial
categories, ethnic categories, or so on. The “who are my people” question has been raised
as a problematic question by people who are marginals, on the edges or the outside of
communities, people who recognize their community identifications as multiple,
intersecting, and conflicting; it has been raised, for instance, by women of color and
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Jewish women writing within the discourse of feminist theory or the discourses of racial or
cultural movements, when such theory assumes a simple “we”: “we” who are women or
“we” who are Black, and so on. Listen, for instance, to the following varied musings on
the complications of having “a people”:
Once when I walked into a room
my eyes would seek out the one or two black faces
for contact or reassurance or a sign
I was not alone
now walking into rooms full of black faces
that would destroy me for any difference
where shall my eyes look?
Once it was easy to know who were my people.
--Audre Lorde (“Between” 1 12)
In a troubled voice, my grandmother asked me the last time I saw her before
she died, “How can you live so far away from your people?” In her mind,
“my people” were not synonymous with a mass of black people, but with
particular black folks that one is connected to by ties of blood and
fellowship, the folks with whom we share a history, the folks who talk our
talk (the patois of our region), who know our background and our ways.
Her comment silenced me. . . . My silent response was tacit agreement that
only misguided confused folks would live away from their people, their
own.
—bell hooks (Yearning 90)
Oh, I would entertain the thought of separation as really clean, the two
components untouched by each other, unmixed as they would be if I could
go away with my own people to our land to engage in acts that were cleanly
ours! But then I ask myself who my own people are. When I think of my
own people, the only people I can think of as my own are transitionals,
liminals, borderdwellers, “world”-travellers, beings in the middle of
either/or.
-Maria Lugones (“Purity” 469)
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Liberals and pacifists often challenge the notion of “one’s own people.”
Liberals “don’t like labels”; pacifists say, “face your enemies with love.”
Both say, “people are people.” I think Jews are haunted-intelligently so~
by specters of cattle cars packed to the top with our people. Some of who I
am roots in the knowledge, as early as I can remember: there are people
who did not want us to exist-millions of them. For these people, there is
no love. It’s easy for me to think in terms of “my people” and “our
enemies.”
-Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz (77-78 )
In asking and trying to answer the question of what it might mean to “have a
people” (politically speaking) I will, in this dissertation, both a) affirm the communitarian
possibilities implied by the question; that is, I take it that it is desirable to “have a people,”
to have a collectivity from within which one constitutes one’s self, develops social
meaning, and can engage in resistance, and b) reject accounts of what it is to “have a
people” which reify categories of identity or which depend upon the illusion of unity within
socially constructed categories of identity, and which thus cannot countenance oppressions
as interlocked. I will argue that while the implications of these two intentions may be in
tension with one another, resisting domination calls for their resolution.
* * *
The question of what it means to have a people arises out of two debates along
different axes: it arises both out of a debate between liberalism (which cannot countenance
having a people at all) and communitarianism; and out of a debate between essentialist
accounts of identity and accounts which recognize oppressions as interlocked and identities
as inseparable mixtures. While I will in later chapters discuss extensively what is implied
by liberalism and by communitarianism, I will say briefly here that I take liberalism to
include a principle of non-interference in each individual’s freedom to choose his/her own
conception of the good, and to include the belief that one’s values and ends are in fact the
products of one’s private choices rather than the result of being socially constituted
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amongst a people; I take what I will call traditional communitarianism to depend upon a
view of the moral self as socially constituted or formed in community, so the
communitarian self is always a self with certain values, never a choosing subject which
could exist prior to making a choice of values or ends. The communitarian self cannot be
understood without reference to there being “a people” amongst and as one of whom the
self is constituted. While communitarianism provides a way of rejecting liberal
individualism, the sense of community-of having a people-which communitarian theory
offers has tended to rely upon their being some shared or common identity among members
of the community. Communitarian theory has portrayed constitutive communities as
distinct from one another, as clearly bounded, and as internally homogeneous-that is, as
not cut across by group differences. Although contemporary political movements have
challenged some of the traditional communitarian notions of who makes up a community,
some of the communitarian assumptions have been retained; significantly, the discourse
and practices associated with these movements have tended not to recognize that
community members may be constituted within several communities, and that any given
community is itself cut across by relevant group differences. Political movements which
are communitarian in the sense of their being movements of particular peoples whose social
identities are constituted together, not just of collections of individuals—for example, the
women’s movement, el movimiento (the Chicano movement), and so on-have called for
unity based on some essential characteristic of identity: being a women, being Raza
,
and so
on. And yet when the unity is challenged by the recognition of intersecting group
differences, there is the danger of being left without any way to conceive of the “we” of a
political movement. Lack of a priori unity is taken to imply that no collectivity or
“peoplehood” is possible; I think this has been one effect of recent critiques of essentialism-
-many feminists, for instance, have come to think that rejecting essentialism means giving
up the possibility of collectivity in feminist movement. My claim is that community is
crucial to the self; however, community must not be bought by sacrificing complex
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identities, simplifying them into essential core identities. What is needed is an account of
having “a people” which does not make this fatal sacrifice. Vital political movement, then,
will require developing a constitutive community that is not based on one unified identity; it
will require learning to engage in meaning-making together without necessarily making
only one meaning.
Creating such a sense of collectivity while rejecting both abstract individualism on
the one hand and essentiahsm on the other requires walking a line between two options: the
first (individualist) option is seeing just anyone-regardless of all features of social identity-
-as equal candidates for being each other’s “people”; and the second (essentialist) option is
ruling out someone or including someone automatically as “one’s own” (politically
speaking) just because of a feature of social identity. I hear echoes of the first option in,
for instance, June Jordan s insistence that since “partnership in misery does not necessarily
provide for partnership for change,” it must instead be that “the ultimate connection must be
the need that we find between us” (“Report” 82) and that we will be “carried there by the
personal strength of what we can do for each other one by one” (“Report” 84). Elsewhere
she asks Where is the love?” (like “who are my people?”) and answers that the love that
fuels political change has at least the possibility of developing anywhere, regardless of lines
of social identity:
If I am a Black feminist serious in undertaking self-love, it seems to me that
I should gain and gain and gain in strength so that I may without fear be
able and willing to love and respect, for example, women who are not
feminists, not professionals, not as old or as young as I am, women who
have neither job nor income, women who are not Black. And it seems to
me that the strength that should come from Black feminism means that I
can, without fear, love and respect all men who are willing and able,
without fear, to love and respect me. (“Where Is” 174-176)
The first option, then, downplays the relevance of the social constitution of identity, and
underestimates the effect that socially constructed features of identity (gender, race, etc.)
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have on forming our experiences, positions in the world, perceptions, motivations, and,
we might say, possibilities of seeing each other as “our own .” It infers from the claim that
gender, race, and so on do not simply determine our possibilities of solidarity that in fact
they have no bearing on it at all.
The second of the two options makes the opposite assumption: race, gender, and
other features of social identity do exhaustively determine who our people are. Melanie
Kaye/Kantrowitz expresses this sentiment in places. It is as if she is answering June
Jordan’s question of “Where Is The Love?” by saying “no, it cannot be just anywhere,”
when she writes: “there are people who did not want us to exist-millions of them. For
these people, there is no love. It’s easy for me to think in terms of ‘my people’ and ‘our
enemies (77-78). This second option, then, takes the sharing of a social identity to imply
too much: my people’ are simply determined by a shared enemy. 1 But beyond critiquing
these two options, recognizing the complexity of socially constituted identities requires
developing a new account of what sort of constitutive community grounds the self. Is it
possible to both affirm that there is a “we” and yet refuse essentialist definitions of who the
“we” is?
As Marfa Lugones has argued, white women theorists’ response to Lorraine
Bethel’s “What Chou Mean We, White Girl?” question has been to say that there can be no
“we” to feminist theory; the response has been that if the “we” is not “we who are
essentially women,” then there can be no “we”-no collectivity to the politics of feminism-
and we must instead speak only out of our own experience. This response solves “the
problem of difference” in feminist theory without solving the problem of their being a lack
of true solidarity in feminism, a solidarity which can happen only when white women
Although I have used June Jordan’s and Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz’s words in illustrating the two options I
described, I think that for each of them, the words I have chosen represent only strands of their thoughts,
and not their whole positions. Each of them do express more ambivalence than I have shown them to
about who may or may not be among “their own.” I choose these particular passages not to critique each of
these authors, but to illustrate two different reactions to the “who are my people?” question.
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really see women of color (and similarly along other lines of privilege).? The response that
there can be no “we” is harmful; it is like saying to anyone who does not have their identity
completely exhausted within one distinct constitutive community that they are sentenced to
lonely individualism. And so it becomes clear to me that it is important to ask and try again
to answer the question: who is the “we”?
I attempt to do this in this dissertation by first making sense of the concept of
"having a people" at all; I begin with Aristotle’s account of the self as a social animal and
then examine some contemporary communitarians’ development of the idea of having “a
people.” I then go on, having established that it makes sense to think of the self as socially
constituted amongst “a people,” to consider what some problematic ways of describing this
self have been. I focus on the conceptions of “having a people” that have been prevalent
within radical political movements, both to critique them and to try to develop an account of
having a people that can ground the possibility for collective resistance to oppressions as
interlocked.
^This is a loose interpretation of Lugones’ argument in “The Logic of Pluralist Feminism” in Feminist
Ethics , ed. Claudia Card. 35-44.
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CHAPTER I
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY
A. Introduction
In developing an account of having “a people” who are positioned to resist
oppressions as interlocked, I am going to begin in what might appear to be an unlikely
place. Aristotelian ethical theory. I begin here because I want to start with a solid
conviction that it does make sense to speak of having a people, of being socially constituted
by a community or polis. Aristotle provides a thorough account of what it means to be
constituted in this way, and his description of humans as political animals constituted in
community with others is useful for a rejection of the liberal ideology that says that there is
no such thing as having a people. However, not just any conception of having a people
will do for thinking about how to resist oppressions as interlocked. I thus begin with
Aristotelian theory in part to draw on it and in part to critique it; by beginning with an
Aristotelian version of having “a people”—that is, having fellow participants in a true polis—
I can then complicate this account by asking in what ways it is inadequate for describing
social identities as complexly constituted, given intersecting group differences, and for
developing an account of constitutive community that does not erase such identities.
* * *
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics were intended as a necessary part of or prelude to
his Politics . As he tells us,
... if politics makes use of the other sciences, and also lays down what we
should do and from what we should refrain, its end must include theirs; and
this end must be the good for man. For even if the good of the community
coincides with that of the individual, it is clearly a greater and more perfect
thing to achieve and preserve that of a community; for while it is desirable to
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secure what is good in the case of an individual, to do so in the case of a
people or a state [polis] is something finer and more sublime.
Such, then, is the aim of our investigation; and it is a kind of political
science (NE 1094b5-l l). 3
In keeping with fineness and sublimeness, then, this chapter is a political reading of the
Nicomachean Ethics
My assumption is that one must read Aristotle’s ethical and political works together;
we must look at his ethical theory for its political implications, and look at his political
theory with an understanding of how it is informed by his view of morality. This is not
just a comment about how these two works of Aristotle’s should be read; rather, it reflects
my recognition that politics are informed by morality, and that questions of morality are
always political. To read the Ethics as something other than a grounding for a political
theory, or to look at the Politics without an understanding of Aristotle’s ethical theory
would be to depoliticize morality and to pretend that politics can be empty of moral content.
More precisely, it would be to claim that one could somehow construct a state (or any other
form of political organization) not based on any particular conception of the good. As I
will point out, liberal theory tries to separate ethics and politics by imagining that the state
can and should remain neutral on the question of the good; liberal theory sees ethics and
politics as separable because it denies the fact that particular conceptions of the good inform
every arrangement of the state.4 Aristotle, however (and I agree with him on this point),
sees the two as inseparable. His political theory, then, suggests the impossibility of the
liberal state, the state which according to liberal theory has no influence or effect on its
members’ conceptions of the good or on the possibility of attaining this or that version of
human flourishing.
All references to the Nicomachean Ethics , except where otherwise noted, are from the J.A.K. Thomson
translation.
4See, for instance, John Rawls’ argument in A Theory of Justice , where he intends for the state not to be
based on any particular given conception of the good; he stipulates that parties in the “original position,”
who deliberate about the best form for society, do not know what their conceptions of the good are. The
form of society they decide upon is supposedly not based on any particular conception of the good.
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I am interested in Aristotle politically because I think that his ethical and political
theory is potentially useful for political theorists who are radical and whose radicalism is
directed towards questions of community. I say potentially useful because Aristotle
himself does not take his theory in the direction of what I would call a radical construction
of community, of communities that would strive to be free from relations of domination
and subordination and that would promote the full and varied flourishings of all
Aristotle s extreme inegalitarianism and his reliance upon homogeneity makes him quite
problematic for radicals who oppose hierarchy and who respect diversity. However, one
can question Aristotle s inegalitarianism and his refusal to recognize or encourage diversity
and at the same time find much that is valuable in his theory for radical thinking about
community.
I will be looking, then, at several components of Aristotle’s ethical theory that have
important political implications and that are valuable claims for radical communitarians. I
will consider, for instance, his recognition of the sociality of human existence; his
argument that the purpose of a polis is the good life and that members of a polis must share
a conception of the good so that they might aim at it together; and his belief that moral
virtue depends upon the passions, which are constructed or trained in the context of the
polis. I will argue that these claims could serve as a basis for thinking about the following
important question (which Aristotle, of course, does not address): how is it possible for a
group of people who are diverse with respect to their experiences and social locations to
form what Aristotle would call a true polis- that is, a community that is not a mere
conglomeration of separate individuals, but rather one where human flourishing or the
good life is the aim of the community? I will consider how Aristotle avoids seeing this as a
relevant question in part because he fails to see a certain sort of diversity within the human
species; he is committed to the claim that one has an essential purpose as a member of a
species, so members of the human species all have one purpose, which is to attain the
ultimate good for man, that is, eudaimonia. Meanwhile, however, he only takes certain
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people to be fully human and to therefore have the possibility of reaching eudaimonia. In
his considerations of the good life, then, Aristotle feels justified in only addressing certain
well-trained free men, those whom Aristotle already considers to be most disposed
towards moral virtue and therefore most capable of reaching eudaimonia. I will argue that
Aristotle has not conceived the polis to be a place where political struggle takes place over
the question of what the good is, for those who may differ on the question of the good life
are excluded from participation in politics. It is not relevant, for Aristotle, that people in
different social locations may have different conceptions of the good, for among the
participants in political affairs there is significant homogeneity. It is when there is
heterogeneity among the political participants in a community that what the good is must be
politically contested in order for members of a community or polis to come to a shared
understanding of the good towards which they might strive together.
B. Political Animals
One of Aristotle’ s most central claims is the claim that man is by nature a political
animal [politikon zoon ] (Pol 1253al-2). 5 Aristotle is so strongly committed to this claim
that he does not even consider someone to be quite human if he does not live in political
relation with others; he writes, “.
. . he who is unable to live in society, or who has no
need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god; he is no part of a
state [polis]" (Pol 1253a 27-29). Aristotle is looking, in the Ethics , for the supreme good
for man, and recognizes that this good is something “self-sufficient.” But he has a social
sense of the self involved here: “By self-sufficient we mean not what is sufficient for
oneself alone living a solitary life, but something that includes parents, wife and children,
friends and fellow-citizens in general; for man is by nature a social being” (NE 1097b8-
^ All references to the Politics are from the Benjamin Jowett translation.
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12). His search in the Ethics for what human flourishing is, then, is a search for what it is
for a man to be flourishing in community .^
While liberal theorists may assume that a state is formed because self-interested
individuals rationally arrive at the belief that by forming a state they can better achieve their
individual self-interests,7 Aristotle is clear that this does not accurately characterize the
motivation for forming a polis-, the sociality of human existence is deeper than humans'
practical need for one another. As he says in the Politics,
. . the state \polis) comes into
existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a
good life” (Pol 1252b 28-30). Because man is a political animal, “men, even when they do
not require one another's help, desire to live together” (Pol 1278b20-21). Aristotle's
account of the polis in the Politics indicates that he has a sense of the importance and
One could argue that Book X, chapters 7-8 of the Ethics stand in contradiction to Aristotle’s earlier
argument that the ultimate good for man can only be attained in a polis. In these chapters he claims that
the contemplative life is in fact the happiest life (NE 1 177al2-19 and 1 177bl5-25) and that “the wise man
can practice contemplating by himself’ (NE 1 177a34-35). Aristotle admits that “no doubt he [the wise
man] does it better with the help of fellow-workers,” but maintains that “for all that he is the most self-
sufficient of men” (NE 1 177a35-bl), seemingly employing a different sense of “self-sufficient” than he does
earlier (NE 1097b8-12). Aristotle does call into question, however, whether the contemplative life is truly
a human life or whether it is divine, requiring of humans that we “put on immortality” (NE 1 177b35); he
claims here that moral virtue is secondary precisely because “activities in accordance with it are human” (NE
1 1 78a8- 1 0). He also writes that the contemplative life “will be too high for human attainment; for any
man who lives it will do so not as a human being but in virtue of something divine within him” (NE
1 177b26-28). He does, on the other hand, argue that contemplation “will be the perfect happiness for man"(NE 1 177b23-24), and although he thinks contemplation requires that we “put on immortality,” he says
this in the context of arguing that “we ought not to listen to those who warn us that ‘man should think the
thoughts of man,’ or ‘mortal thoughts fit mortal minds’” and that we should “do all that we can to live in
conformity with the highest [i.e. the divine element] that is in us” (NE 1 1 77b3 1 - 1 178al). So he seems to
be arguing both that the contemplative life is not a truly human possibility and that we should try to live
the life of contemplation in spite of its being in the realm of the divine, for the divine element is within us.
In any case, we can see that it is debatable whether or not, even in these chapters, Aristotle is maintaining
that human happiness is attainable only in a polis. And, it is clear throughout the rest of the Ethics that he
thinks that the community is what makes the good life possible, and that self-sufficiency cannot mean
solitude. For instance, he asserts that “it is also surely paradoxical to represent the man of perfect
happiness as a solitary; for nobody would choose to have all the good things in the world by himself,
because man is a social creature and naturally constituted to live in company. Therefore the happy man also
has this quality. ... It follows, therefore, that the happy man needs friends” (NE 1 169b 18-23). It is
beyond the scope of this paper to fully discuss the inconsistencies between Book X, chapters 7-8 and the
rest of the Ethics ; I am, throughout this paper, favoring Aristotle’s claims that self-sufficiency is a social
state and that human flourishing is attainable only in community.
7In much contract theory, this is the standard reason given for why humans form a state. See Hobbes’
Leviathan
,
chapter 14; Locke’s Second Treatise of Government , chapter 8, § 95; or Rousseau’s The Social
Contract
.
Book I, chapter 2. John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (a central text for contemporary
liberalism), also makes similar assumptions about human society (chapter 1).
12
centrality of the relations between members of a polls. Members of a polls have relations
which can be characterized as a type of friendship, although the intensity of the friendship
between fellow-citizens may or may not be high (NE 1 159b25-l 160a8). In discussing
friendship, Aristotle mentions that “friendship also seems to be the bond that holds
communities together” (NE 1 155a22-23). He describes concord (or unanimity), which is a
sort of a friendly feeling, as “friendship between the citizens of a state [polls]" (NE
1167b 2-3). A pohs is not just a gathering of people with no relation between them, then;
there is expected to be friendliness between citizens: “friendship and justice seem ... to be
exhibited in the same sphere of conduct and between the same persons; because in every
community there is supposed to be some kind of justice and also some friendly feeling”
(NE 1 159b 25-28). In this way, Aristotle’s polls is neither like what in contemporary
terms is called a state nor a city; the contemporary term ‘community’ better connotes the
presence of the sort of relations that are indicated by Aristotle's use of the term 'polls .' 8
Ideally, members of a polls (and here Aristotle refers only to citizens; women and slaves
are not a part of the polis, although they are necessary for it9 ) all know one another: “if the
citizens of a state [polis] are to judge and to distribute offices according to merit, then they
must know each other's characters” (Pol 1326b 15- 17). The polis, thus, must be small
enough in size that citizens all know one another, for when this is not the case, “both the
election to offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong. When the population is very
large they are manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly ought not to be” (Pol 1326b 17-
8For this reason. I will sometimes use the term ’community’ as a parallel term to Aristotle's ’polis. ’
However, the terms are also quite different from one another. For instance, 'community' is seldom
considered to be a unit of political organization the way a state is. However, as will become clear, I am
more interested in the possibilities for the deep political and social relations which we find in communities
than 1 am in the political structure of (liberal) states. For this reason, I am interested in the ways that
Aristotle's theorizing about the polis is relevant to issues of community, rather than issues about the state.
9For instance, note that Aristotle claims that “. . . in a state [polis] or any other combination forming a
unity not everything is a part, which is a necessary condition. . . . And so states require property, but
property, even though living beings are included in it . is no part of a state” (Pol 1328a 21-36, my
emphasis). And elsewhere he states, “a slave is a living possession [i.e. a piece of property]” ( Pol
1253b31). He also states that a polis is a “community of equals,” (Pol 1328a37) and clearly, slaves and
citizen class women are not the equals of citizen men; thus, slaves and citizen class women cannot be
considered to be a part of this community of equals.
13
20). "> A polls is not just a collection of living beings who all reside within a certain
territory. To say that a collection of people constitute a polls is to say more than that they
live in some proximity to or association with one another; rather, they have significant
relations to one another.
It is not just the fact that there are relations between all members of a polls that make
the pohs more than just a collection of people residing in proximity; it is also the fact that
these people share an aim-the good life-which they can aim for only as a polls. Aristotle
claims that a polls is “a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible” (Pol
1 328a37-38). He emphasizes this point: “a state [polls] is not a mere aggregate of persons,
but a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life” (Pd 1 328b 1 6- 1 7). I would like to
highlight several points embedded in these claims, namely that Aristotle is demanding that
1 ) the polls be made up of equals, 2) that these members of the polls have a shared aim,
and 3) that the purpose of the polls (and what its members are aiming at) is the good life.
As I will suggest, one of the reasons that Aristotle requires that there be a community of
equals could be that he believes that without this there cannot be true friendship—the
deepest kind of relation that there is. I will also discuss what Aristotle considers to be the
implication of his claim that members of a polis aim together at the good life-namely, that
they must share a conception of what the good life is.
It is possible that Aristotle’s motivation for requiring that the only people to be
counted as lull members of the polis be free (i.e. not slave) men lies in his belief that there
can only be the desirable degree of depth to the association if this requirement is met. If the
basis for political community is a sort of friendship (NE 1 1 55a22-23; 1 1 59b25-28; 1 167b2-
3), and the best sort of friendship takes place between good men (NE 1 156b7-24), one can
see how Aristotle’s description of a polis as a “community of equals, aiming at the best life
possible” (Pol 1328a37-38) might spring from his desire for there to be significant
1
°Similar claims have been made by communalist anarchists, who argue for politics being done on a local
enough level so that there can be relations between all members of a political community. See, for
instance, Colin Ward’s “The Organization of Anarchy” in Patterns of Anarchy , or Murray Bookchin’s “A
Note on Affinity Groups” in Post Scarcity Anarchism .
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relations—friendships—between citizens, and for these citizens to have the possibility of
aiming for the good life together. I will look later at what I take to be problematic about his
requirement that deep association (that of friendship, including fellow-citizenship) require
likeness (or, more precisely, like goodness, or likeness and goodness). What I want to
point out here is that his motivation for such a requirement may be, in part, his belief that
this is necessary for the purpose of achieving depth in the sense of community (the
relations with others) which constitutes the polls. While I will reject Aristotle’s argument
that likeness is required for such deep relations, I will agree with Aristotle that an
association should count as a polis (or a community) just in case there is depth to the
relations which constitute the association. A liberal state (such as the U.S. or any state or
city whose organizing principle is liberalism, including abstract individualism) does not, in
that sense, constitute a polis because it prohibits the sort of depth of relations that consists
of understanding oneself to be morally formed in relation to others rather than choosing
one s values by exercising an individual will. 1
1
So I start with this point of agreement with
Aristotle, there are goods for humans (Aristotle would more likely say “a good” for
humans) that are attainable only in community; theorizing about human flourishing should
involve thinking about someone attaining such flourishing in a social context, in a fabric of
relations to others.
1
'This critique of liberalism will be much more fully developed in the next chapter. Briefly, though,
consider the example of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in which parties to the “original position” elect
principles of justice which are meant to ensure that the institutions of their society will allow each
individual member to, as fully as possible, pursue their individual conceptions of the good. Such
institutions are not intended to, nor do they guarantee, that a member of society could hold and pursue
collectivity (or the social constitution of self-identity) as a conception of the good—for such a good is not
conceivable as a product of individual choice. It is not among the “primary social goods” that the principles
of justice are aimed at maximizing. Furthermore, institutions based on the conception of justice—of
individuals’ approaching one another through a framework of rights and justice-may actively inhibit the
possibility of relations like friendship. Michael Sandel argues this point in Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice
, p. 35.
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C. Aiming Together at the Good I ife
I also begin with another assumption that Aristotle shares: that considerations of
what the best form is for the polis depends upon our being able to give an account of
human flourishing-or, one might say, that politics depends upon ethics (NE 1094b5-l 1).
That is, the purpose of the polis is to create and promote human flourishing(s), given some
particular understanding(s) of what the good is for humans. Just as an association only
counts as a polis if there is some depth to the relations of its members, so an association
also is not truly a polis unless it concerns itself with the virtue, including the justice and
injustice, of its members. Aristotle illustrates this point by contrasting the social
intercourse of men with that of other “gregarious” animals: the difference lies, in part, in
the fact that there is moral content to the social relations between men, while there is not for
other animals:
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other
gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in
vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of
speech. ... the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and
inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is
characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just
and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this
sense makes a family and a state \polis 1 ( Pol 1253a 7-18, my emphasis).
If an association is constructed without moral content-that is, without concern for the
virtue and vice of its members--then it is not a truly human political community, that is, a
polis. Aristotle writes:
Those who care for good government take into consideration virtue and vice
in states. Whence it may be further inferred that virtue must be the care of a
state [polis] which is truly so called, and not merely enjoys the name; for
without this end the community becomes a mere alliance which differs only
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in place from alliances of which the members live apart; and law is only a
convention.
. . and has no real power to make the citizens good and just
(Pol 1 280b4- 11).
In order for a polls to serve the purpose of enabling its citizens to be good and just, there
must be a particular conception of the human good toward which the polls aims. A polls
that failed to concern itself with the project of directing its citizens towards a particular
conception of moral excellence and flourishing would fail to truly be a polls; in order to be
a polls, an association cannot just leave its members alone in this respect, doing nothing but
keeping members from interfering with one another. “It is clear that a state [polls] is not a
mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and
for the sake of exchange” (Pol 1280b30-32). In agreeing with Aristotle on this point, I am
going against two major assumptions of liberal political theory, namely the assumptions
that 1) it is possible for the state to remain neutral on the question of the good life and 2)
that it is desirable to live under such a neutral state, rather than in a community that does
concern itself with the moral state and with the possibility of “happiness” or flourishing
of its members.
There is a connection between believing that humans are, in a strong sense, social
beings and believing that the state/community/po/A should act to promote a particular sort
of human flourishing. It is only when one thinks of the state as an entity that at its best
refrains from interfering in individual affairs that one imagines it as staying away from
meddling in any individual's conception of the good life, of human flourishing. A neutral
state is a state designed to (supposedly) keep out of individuals' lives, to prevent
interference between members of the state rather than to foster relations which involve
members concerning themselves with each other’s virtues and vices and thus with each
other’s possibilities of attaining human flourishing. Having a more social sense of human
existence-that is, believing that the self is constituted in relation to others-leads one to
want more than non-interference, more than neutrality, from a community. Aristotle does
believe that our selves are constituted or formed differently depending upon the social
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context we are in; for instance, our moral dispositions develop differently in contexts where
we are permitted to engage in vicious acts than they do in contexts where we are required to
perform virtuous acts; it is the constitution of the polis that affects our moral constitution
(NE 1 103al4-l 103b26). Assuming that the social context we are in serves to constitute
our selves, attention to the form and values of the community is attention to the social
context in which we ourselves are constituted. Thus, rather than demanding non-
interference from the state or community, I would like to recognize that the community
does form us morally and that given this, it is active engagement in (rather than
independence from) the constitution of the community that allows one agency in one’s own
moral formation.
What the values of the community are-and what conception of the good underlies
the reasoning to construct a community in such a way that this or that kind of person might
thrive in it—should be, as I will argue, contested ground. It should be politically contested
ground, and the politics of it depend on who gets to come to the table to discuss it. That is,
it depends on who the members of the polis are and what informs their conception of the
good. As I will argue, Aristotle does not consider how the political contestation of the
good might take place, largely because he does not allow that political participants could
differ significantly, so he does not consider how people’s different social locations might
inform their conception of the good and thus how different groups of political participants
may come to hold opposed conceptions of the good. I will consider later what the effects
are of Aristotle's refusal to see the conception of the good as politically contested. What I
want to point out here is that, unlike liberal theorists, Aristotle at least is after a polis which
is acknowledged to be designed according to a particular conception of the good and meant
to promote the continued development and enactment of that conception of the good. At
least the polis is, for Aristotle, meant to be a training ground for [some] humans to develop
moral excellence and experience happiness or flourishing. For contemporary radicals who
are communitarians, Aristotle's idea of the polis may be in many ways a better starting
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point than the liberal state: a state that does not acknowledge itself to be aiming at any
particular conception of goodness or happiness. The failure to acknowledge that the state is
not neutral but rather does effect members’ moral constitutions leads believers of liberal
ideology to fail to see the importance of active engagement in determining how the state
concerns itself with the virtue and vice of its members; they cannot both call for
engagement and insist that the state is not concerned with promoting some version of
human flourishing. The liberal state is intended (although of course it fails to carry out this
intention) to stay out of our way; as it is conceived by liberal theorists, it is not truly the
social realm, the realm of relations with others recognized to be the context in which our
selves are forming according to some particular conception of the good life.
I am starting then, with Aristotle, with the social self and with a concern for
knowing what conception(s) of the good life—of human flourishing—should inform the
construction of a community or polls. I share the belief that it is in the realm of the social-
in the community or polls —rather than in individuals' private lives that the question of
moral excellence and of human flourishing should be addressed.
D. The Training of the Passions
One additional claim of Aristotle's that radical communitarians ought to be excited
about is the claim that our emotions can and should be influenced by reason and be trained
differently in different social contexts. Such a claim supports the notion that, desires being
socially constructed rather than “natural,” one has the possibility of ridding oneself of
desires which stand against radical transformation of the status quo, for if desires are
constructed there is the possibility of their being reconstructed differently in a different
social context; so, for instance, one can attempt to change one’s desires to be in accordance
with a conception of the good in which one believes, by attempting to change the social
context which constructs one’s desires. I will look, now, at how Aristotle conceives of the
19
training of desrre by looking at the role that des.re and reason play in moral excellence for
him.
An action, for Aristotle, can only be a good action if it was chosen for the right
reason and in accordance with the right desire. It is not the consequences of an action
which determine its rightness, but rather it is the character of the agent. Aristotle makes
this clear when he states, “virtuous acts are not done in a just or temperate way merely
because they have a certain quality, but only if the agent also acts in a certain state, viz. 1) if
he knows what he is doing, 2) if he chooses it, and chooses it for its own sake, and 3) if he
does it from a fixed and permanent disposition” (NE 1 105a30-34). Right reason alone
cannot be the efficient cause of an action, for it is desire that moves humans to act.
Because of this, in thinking about how to produce a right action, one must think about the
desirative faculty of the soul. Right desire alone can be the efficient cause of an action,
but not of a good action, for an action may be voluntary but not chosen, and an action can
be a right action only if it is a chosen action, and choice requires both reason and desire
(NE 1 1 1 lb4-l 1 12a 18). Aristotle defines choice as “a deliberate appetition of things that lie
in our power” (NE 1 1 13al0-12). Reaching the point of choosing a right action, then,
requires both right reason and right desire.
Thus according to Aristotle one must be concerned with desire, for without proper
desire there can be no good action. Since pleasure compels us to do things (and reason
alone cannot compel us to act), one must be concerned with whether one feels pleasure at
the right things. That is, it is not enough to know what the right action is; one must feel
pleasure at the thought of doing it so that one feels the desire to do it (NE II, iii ). Thus in
speaking of training oneself to be virtuous, one is really speaking of training in how to
properly feel desire.
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Training the desires is a matter of influencing them through rationality-through the
exercise of which one can know what actions are right (but which, by itself, cannot move
one to do those actions)~and then acting on them repeatedly until they become habit (NE II
u-m ). One must tram the desires, for the wrong desires may-depending on how one
stands against the passions (i.e. depending on whether one is continent or incontinent)-
serve to lead one towards the wrong end. As Aristotle states in the Metanhvsics - “the
apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good is the primary object of rational
wish” (Met 1 072327-29).! 2 Thus untrained (or improperly trained) desires might lead one
toward the wrong end, toward what is only the apparent good (NE 1 1 13a24-30). Properly
trained desire leads one to pursue the right ends, the real good. Thus a right action is the
action which would be committed by a man whose desirative faculty is properly trained or
healthy, a man of good character (NE 1 105b5-8). Such a man “judges every situation
rightly; i.e. in every situation what appears to him is the truth” (NE 1 1 13a29-30).
It is important to notice that if feeling the passions correctly were not in one’s
control, then (assuming that right desire is necessary for right action) moral theory could be
nothing more than a description of which people are virtuous and which are not. It is only
if one is taking the training of the passions to be in a person’s control that one can take
moral theory to be prescriptive, and it is only then that one can hold people responsible for
their character. Setting aside the question of whether Aristotle's classification of actions as
voluntary/non-voluntary/involuntary is justified as a basis for deciding which actions
someone is responsible for, one can still agree with Aristotle that one's character (and thus
the actions that one chooses because of one's character) is something for which one is
responsible.
The sense of responsibility here, however, is not an individualistic one; since we do
not train our desires all by ourselves, but rather do so in the social context of the polis, a
man's character is understood to be his own responsibility only if one understands “his
* 2W.D. Ross translation.
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own to mean his own social self-his self in its relation to others. In this sense, the whole
polis is resPonsible for each man's character; there is a collective responsibility. When
Aristotle claims that “those who care for good government take into consideration virtue
and vice in states” (Pol 1280b5-6) and when he asserts that good legislators play the role of
making their citizens good by developing in them the proper habits (NE 1 103b3-5), I am
taking him to be saying that the polis has the responsibility of forming each member’s
moral character, of developing each member’s habits so that they are pleased by the proper
actions. Aristotle sees good statesmen as taking responsibility for fellow-citizens’ moral
characters: the true statesman is thought of as a man who has taken special pains to study
this subject [the nature of virtue]; for he wants to make his fellow-citizens good and law-
abiding people (NE 1 1 02a8- 1 0). Thus questions of morality—of producing men of good
character, men whose desirative faculties are healthy—become questions of how to properly
train the desires; and these are questions to be addressed as a polis (cf. NE 1 179b32-
1 180b27).
Because men s dispositions are formed through habit, the polis must concern itself
with its members’ activities and the habits that are acquired through them. Habits are
acquired through practice, and thus it matters what sort of acts a polis allows its members
to practice. “We become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate
ones, brave by performing brave ones” (NE 1 103b 1-2). So, for instance, a polis whose
members can enact cowardly activities will not train these members for courage, whereas a
polis whose members must perform courageous acts will produce members with
courageous dispositions. “Legislators make their citizens good by habituation; this is the
intention of every legislator, and those who do not carry it out fail of their object. This is
what makes the difference between a good constitution and a bad one” (NE 1 103b 3-6).
As Aristotle sees it, a constitution is either good or bad depending on how members of a
polis with such a constitution are trained. A polis with a good constitution is one which is
habituating its members to aim at the right good by acting in accordance with virtue.
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Implied by this is the claim that the constitution of a polis has an effect on the emotional
constitution of its members. Learning to feel pleasure at the proper things is a matter of
habit, and these habits are acquired depending on the constitution of the polis under which
one lives.
One can think of Aristotle’s polis, then, as a training ground, a context in which
one s desires are trained in accordance with some particular conception of the good. To put
this in contemporary terms, Aristotle's claim that the polis is a training ground for how we
feel the passions amounts to the important idea (central to much feminist and other political
theory) that desires are socially constructed, and that the particular institutions of a society
construct our desires in particular ways. Since desires are socially constructed, the claim
continues, we can reconstruct our desires by changing the social setting which forms or
informs our desires. So, for instance, emotions that people have been trained to feel in a
misogynist and racist society are not in accordance with a feminist conception of the good.
As Alison Jaggar puts it in her article “Love and Knowledge”:
Within a hierarchical society, the norms and values that predominate tend to
serve the interest of the dominant group. Within a capitalist, white
supremacist, and male-dominant society, the predominant values will tend
to serve the interests of rich white men. Consequently, we are all likely to
develop an emotional constitution quite inappropriate for feminism.
Whatever our color, we are likely to feel what Irving Thalberg has called
“visceral racism”; whatever our sexual orientation, we are likely to be
homophobic; whatever our class, we are likely to be at least somewhat
ambitious and competitive; whatever our sex, we are likely to feel contempt
for women. (159)
The emotions that a society trains us to experience are those emotions that support that
society’s status quo version of the human good—a version that may exclude certain
members of society from ever experiencing the good life. Jaggar continues, “[b]y forming
our emotional constitution in particular ways, our society helps to ensure its own
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perpetuation" (159). However, if emotions can be trained and re-trained, then there is
reason to reorganize society so that it fosters emotions that will lead us to act in pursuit of
ends which we can endorse, which may very well mean acting in resistance to the
conception of the good that informed the community in which we had formerly been
“trained.”
What this points to is how much is at stake when one is deciding upon or trying to
change the constitution of the polis-or the institutions and practices in a community-which
will serve to tram our emotional constitutions. As Aristotle conceives it, it is the activities
in which one engages—the activities which are condoned or encouraged or required in a
polis-which form in us certain dispositions, that is, which form in us the habits of feeling
pleasure at this or that thing. Aristotle argues that:
like activities produce like dispositions. Hence we must give our activities a
certain quality, because it is their characteristics that determine the resulting
dispositions. So it is a matter of no little importance what sort of habits we
form from the earliest age— it makes a vast difference, or rather all the
difference in the world (NE 1 103b21-26).
The construction of desires, then, can be purposeful in the sense that when one
decides upon or tries to change the constitution of a polis, or the institutions and practices
that will comprise a community, one is making decisions about how one wants desires to
be constructed. The claim that desires can be purposefully constructed and reconstructed is
an important claim for people who want to radically change the way we have been
constituted by the current institutions and practices of our society, a society which has
developed in most of its members emotions such as greed and possessiveness, jealousy,
the desire to control or be controlled, a deference to authority, an aesthetic appreciation of a
very small range of body types, and so on; this claim goes against the argument that such
emotions are natural and not changeable. If something can be changed by habituation, it
makes no sense to call it ‘natural.’ Since, as Aristotle argues, moral goodness is a result of
habit, it cannot be said that any particular moral state is a natural one: “none of the moral
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virtues in engendered in us by nature, since nothing that is what it is by nature can be made
to behave differently by habituation” (NE 1 103al8-20). The question of what form a polls
or community should take is tied to the question of what sort of emotional constitution its
members should develop. In considering what the emotional constitution of the members
of a community should be, one is really asking: what conception of the good life should the
community aim at?»that is, should we train our emotions so that we feel pleasure at
striving towards this conception of the good life or at that conception of the good life? I
will go on to investigate how Aristotle has determined what the good life is, and how this
might be done differently.
E. Consulting with Aristocrats
Aristotle commits himself to the claim that a man's desires are trained—and thus that
his character is formed to be a particular way-in accordance with the particular influences
on him (NE 1 103b 1-6). One implication of the claim that different upbringings result in
different characters is the conclusion that it is possible to purposely set up a particular
upbringing in order to construct a man whose character will be in accordance with a
particular conception of the good life. Aristotle thus acknowledges that nobody just so
happens to have certain desires: desires are constructed in particular ways depending on the
circumstances one is brought up in, and these circumstances can be purposely arranged so
as to create men with desires that lead them to act in accordance with this or that conception
of human flourishing. If a man was trained in a certain way, one should not be surprised
that he has desires that reflect this training—training that is based on a particular conception
of the good life. Thus when Aristotle calls for “well-trained” men to be his students, he
must acknowledge that he is calling for men who have been trained in accordance with a
particular idea of what it is to be morally virtuous.
I will look at the passages in the Ethics where Aristotle does this. In Book I,
chapter iv, Aristotle writes:
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We must start from what is known. But things are known in two senses:
known to us and known absolutely. Presumably we must start from what
is known to us. So if anyone wants to make a serious study of ethics, or of
political science generally, he must have been well trained in his habits. (NE
1095b 1-6)
In this passage, Aristotle recognizes that he cannot begin with a universal as a first
principle, but must begin with what is known to “us,” the students of ethics and politics. I
will problematize in a moment who the “we” is and how this affects his study of ethics.
What Aristotle overtly tells us here about the "we" is that it must consist of men who have
been well trained, who have been habituated to feel the proper pleasures for the proper
reasons. His aim here is just to point out that his lectures on ethics are intended for those
who are already prone towards virtue-they have proper habits and they want to be good-
and who merely need to study how to be good men so they can correctly act on their desire
to be good. He argues later that “the mind of a pupil has to be prepared in its habits if it is
to enjoy and dislike the right things ... we must have a character to work on that has some
affinity to virtue” (NE 1 179b24-31). In hand-picking this set of [citizen] men for his
students, however, Aristotle is selecting a group who have been trained in accordance with
a particular conception of the good. An invitation from Aristotle to study ethics and
politics, then, is not an invitation to engage in contestation over the question of what the
good is; it is an invitation to learn how to become good given the conception of the good
which Aristotle has developed. In choosing men who have been well trained, Aristotle is,
in effect, choosing a group which is homogeneous in a certain respect: they already share a
disposition towards a certain conception of eudaimonia. Their similar emotional
constitutions makes them tend towards the same good.
I am not arguing, here, that Aristotle develops his account of the good life by
consulting and adopting the perceptions of these well trained men without acknowledging
that these men have already been trained in accordance with a particular conception of the
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good; on the contrary, Aristotle does not rely upon anyone’s already existing perceptions or
habits in the process of coming to give an account of eudaimonia (NE I, vii ). Rather,
what I am pointing out is that he is inviting to the discussion or study of ethics and politics
only men whom he considers to be well trained and disposed towards his account of the
good; in so doing, he creates for himself a homogeneous student body, rather than a group
who would come together for the purpose of struggling over a conception of the good.
Although Aristotle does not rely on consultation with well trained men in
^-veloPin£ hls account of the good life, Aristotle does check with men’s perceptions of the
good life to see if his account is in harmony with them. This is a strange move, since
Aristotle ought to recognize that the men with whom he consults have already been trained
in a social context whose basis is a particular conception of the good. Thus it matters
greatly which people Aristotle consults with and how these people have been trained;
whether or not commonly held notions of what the good is will be in harmony with
Aristotle’s account has everything to do with what sort of training has been had by the
people whose beliefs Aristotle examines. And yet he does not problematize this process of
checking with men’s actual beliefs, beliefs which have already been formed in accordance
with training they have had.
It is towards the end of Book I of the Ethics that, after carefully developing an
account of the ultimate good for man, Aristotle confirms this account by checking it against
men's actual beliefs. He writes:
We must examine our principle not only as reached logically, from a
conclusion and premisses, but also in the light of what is commonly said
about it; because if a statement is true all the data are in harmony with it,
while if it is false they soon reveal a discrepancy. (NE 1098b9-12)
Aristotle is concerned, then, with whether his account of the good life corresponds to
“what is commonly said about it.” We need to wonder, however, whose voice Aristotle is
listening to; when he checks to see if “all the data are in harmony” with his account of the
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good life, is he checking only the perceptions of those who have already been well trained
in accordance with his conception of the good? He knows there is no one whose
perceptions have not been formed according to some particular conception of the good and
yet he does not question what sort of training has been had by the people whose
perceptions he consults. He does not, for instance, purposefully consult with the
perceptions of a diversity of beings. Quite the opposite: we can be sure that there are some
sorts of humans—male and female slaves, for instance, and citizen class women—whose
conception of the good is not considered to be relevant for Aristotle.
There are questions to ask, then, about Aristotle's choice of who belongs in the
we who are the students of ethics, who are included in whatever discussion there is to be
about the question of the good life. It is clear that it is only free men who are even
considered to be possible candidates for the well-trained-men-pool-of-potential-students-of-
ethics. More than this, we can assume that some free men were, in Aristotle's eyes, more
likely than others to have been properly trained. Aristotle is not setting up a political
context in which differently trained beings-people whose emotional constitutions have
formed in different social contexts-might struggle over an account of the good life and
might thereby have a basis for struggling over the question of what constitution is best for
the polis. By including in his group of students-and in the group of people whose
perceptions he considers to be relevant-only well trained men (i.e. men who have been
trained according to his account of human flourishing) Aristotle ensures a certain sort of
homogeneity among political participants. What would the serious consideration of a
diversely trained group of humans do to Aristotle's process of checking to see that “all the
data” are "in harmony" with his account of happiness? What would happen if Aristotle
paid serious attention to the conceptions of the good that were held by a diversity of human
beings, and if he constructed the political realm to be a place of struggle over what it means
to reach eudaimonial I will keep these questions centrally in mind as I go on to look at
how human diversity is addressed by Aristotle.
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F. The Good for Man and the Good for Fish
Aristotle is an objectivist-in the sense that he does think that we can make true and
false claims about, say, what the good is-and he is also a relationist-in the sense that these
true and false claims are true and false in relation to certain beings in certain circumstances.
So, for instance, there is a particular good for humans; Aristotle would not agree that the
good for each person is whatever that person takes it to be, or that happiness is, for each
person, whatever makes that person happy (NE III, iv). A man might think he is happy
(eudaimonous ) but actually not be, for he may have the wrong conception of what
happiness (eudaimonia ) is. On the other hand, happiness is relative to different sorts of
beings; for instance, happiness is different for humans than it is for gods. What Aristotle
does not allow is that there be different ultimate goods for different humans.
A relationist objectivist stance such as Aristotle’s is potentially a good one for
radical communitarians. Unlike liberals, such communitarians have rejected the possibility
of neutrality on the question of the good life. That is, it is acknowledged that no state is
neutral in this respect, and it is recognized that the construction of any community
(purposefully or not) promotes some particular conception of the good life. If it is given
that one is always working from a particular conception of the good (say, for instance, a
conception that includes the claim that any form of oppression, of dominance and
subordination, diminishes human flourishing and is thus not a part of the good life), one
needs objectivism in order to label claims about what promotes human flourishing as true
or false claims. So, for example, I want to say that the proliferation of racist propaganda is
not an exercise of freedom of speech; it is not just an expression of someone’s conception
of the good, where anyone’s conception is as good or true as anyone else’s. I want to say
in this case, “it is a true claim that this propaganda is racist and that it works against human
flourishing. It is not just that it is racist for me, given my conception of racism; rather, this
is what racism is, and racism is not a part of the good life.” Another example: as long as
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there are some women saying that they like pornography, liberals cannot make the claim
that pornography is harmful to women; instead, they are stuck claiming, “well, if some
women feel it is good for them then it is good for them.” Radicals who are interested in
collective formation of values, and who share a conception of human flourishing that
excludes dominance and subordination, will not want to agree that whatever someone says
is good for them is necessarily good for them. One might want to be able to say, instead,
“they may think it is good for them, but perhaps they think this only because their
emotional constitutions have been formed by participation in misogynist practices and they
have thus become habituated to feeling pleasure when faced with violence against women;
thus although some women may experience pornography as pleasing, actually, the
pornography industry is working against women’s flourishing.” Of course, there might be
a real disagreement over whether or not something does promote the good life. So in this
example, for instance, there could be political contestation over the question of whether or
not pornography is harmful to women. But notice that one would not end such a political
struggle by saying, “well, you keep your opinion and practice it in the privacy of your own
home, and I’ll keep my own opinion”; rather, one would engage in the struggle over which
claim is right. This struggle can be an interesting place: in the fact that each person would
be arguing that what she or he believes is right (not just that it is right for oneself) there is
the sense that participants in the struggle are aiming to come to a shared understanding; at
the same time, however, it is important to not over-value the state of being in agreement at
the cost of ignoring or erasing anyone’s conception of the good . 13 In this way, people can
engage with one another in discussion or struggle over what they believe, neither taking the
liberal path of maintaining individual opinions without engagement, nor taking the
13 In such a struggle over which claim is right, it would also be important to consider the complicated
questions of epistemic privilege. I may think I am right about something, but meanwhile question my
own judgment because I recognize that someone else is in a better epistemic position. The contestation
must be informed by a recognition that many different features of our social positions affect our perceptions
and epistemic abilities, but what the effects are will seldom be clear or simple, so relying on
“epistemological privilege” seldom is an easy way to resolve a struggle, and may itself be problematic.
See, for instance, Bat-Ami Bar On’s “Marginality and Epistemic Privilege” in Feminist Epistemologies ,
eds. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter.
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totalitarian, homogenizing path of needing to be in a state of agreement. One could say that
the aim is to be in this place of engagement. The liberal rejection of objectivism in favor of
complete relativism prevents one from making any political (in Aristotle’s sense of the
word—i.e. having to do with a true polis, and not just a mere association of people) claims
at all. It prevents a certain level of political engagement.
One also needs relationism in order to make claims about social and political
phenomenon such as oppression, phenomenon which function relative to social position.
Aristotle recognizes that virtues must be determined in relation to the person and the
circumstance; however, unlike Aristotle, I would like to complicate this by saying that
many times they must also be determined in relation to significant social categories (e.g. of
race, class, gender, and so on). For instance, one might speak of having the habit of
inspiring resistance (i.e. to the status quo), or the ability to expose hidden assumptions of
oppressive ideologies, or the tendency to have a radical imagination as examples of virtues
for oppressed or subordinate people who are engaged in struggles of resistance, even while
they are not necessary or even desirable virtues for those actively involved in dominating
others . 14 Furthermore, I want to recognize that what the good is can be politically
contested, and that people’s social locations might affect their sense of what the good is;
that is, it might place them in a particular spot in the political struggle over what conception
of the good life ought to inform the construction of the community or polis. In this sense, I
want to recognize that people’s conceptions of the good life may be constructed in relation
to their social position. If one were to include all people (including people of different
social locations) in the political realm—unlike Aristotle, who only includes free (not slave)
men—then the polis would have to be a context in which contestation would take place over
which conception(s) of human flourishing the polis is designed to create and promote, for
different people would bring to the political arena different conceptions of the good. As I
14Ann Ferguson suggests “being uppity” as another virtue for the oppressed but not for dominators. She
also notes that to the extent to which one person is both oppressed and an oppressor, which of the virtues
apply may be complicated.
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have pointed out, Aristotle does not conceive of the polis as a place for this sort of
contestation, for he does not allow for heterogeneity (with respect to social positions or life
experiences which would form in people diverse emotional constitutions) within the
political realm . If there were diversity within the political realm, the struggle over a
community s shared conception of the good life would need to be informed by reflection
about the effect that social position has on the formation of values. If, unlike Aristotle, one
wants a diversity of people to be full members of a community-full political participants-
then one needs a way of not only seeing variation within the human species but also of
aiming together at a shared conception of the good without simply taking (as Aristotle does)
some select group to be representative of all humans. First, however, I am going to look at
the ways in which Aristotle does recognize variation among humans.
To begin with, Aristotle does recognize that how the different virtues are to be
exercised varies depending on who the person is and what the circumstances are. In this
way, not all humans-not even all humans who are capable of moral virtue-are alike. This
is a piece of Aristotle’s relationist stance. In a discussion of the general rule that virtue
always lies in the mean, Aristotle makes it clear that what the mean is varies for different
people. He writes: “.
. .virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to
us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to
determine it” (NE 1 106b36-l 107a3, my emphasis). Although one might read the “relative
to us” as “relative to us as human beings,” that reading is not supported here, for
Aristotle’s illustrative analogy clearly shows that he means we must each find the mean
relative to our individual selves:
Supposing that ten pounds of food is a large and two pounds a small
allowance for an athlete, it does not follow that the trainer will prescribe six
pounds; for even this is perhaps too much or too little for the person who is
to receive it—too little for Milo but too much for one who is only beginning
to train. . . In this way, then, every knowledgeable person avoids excess
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and deficiency, but looks for the mean and chooses it-not the mean of the
thing, but the mean relative to us. (NE 1 106a35-b8)
It is because virtue is relative to the person and is also context-dependent that one cannot
give rules for moral conduct which could be automatically applied in all circumstances:
'‘questions of conduct and expedience have as little fixity about them as questions of what
is healthy” (NE 1 104a 4-5). Because of this, “the agents are compelled at every step to
think out for themselves what the circumstances demand” (NE 1 104a8-9).
Despite the fact that Aristotle sees enough variation among those people who are
capable of virtue to argue that virtue must be determined relative to each person and
circumstance, he does not follow through very far on this recognition of diversity. He
does not, that is, admit there to be variation in what the ultimate good is for humans. 15 In
considering what the good life is, Aristotle is clear that this varies depending on species .
Book I, chapter vii of the Ethics is a search for what the proper purpose of man is, and it
turns out to be happiness, as a virtuous activity of the soul. The methodology of this
search involves differentiating all humans as belonging to a certain species, where all
members of a species share a certain essential purpose-but different members of one
species do not have different essential purposes. Aristotle writes: “.
. . the goodness that
we have to consider is human goodness, obviously; for it was the good for man or
happiness for man that we set out to discover” (NE 1 102a 13- 15). Even while he asserts
that “what is wholesome or good is different for human beings and for fish” (NE 1 141a22-
15This is not entirely true. As becomes evident in Book X, Aristotle does present two different, competing
accounts of the ultimate good; one account claims that happiness is a contemplative activity, the other that
it is the exercise of moral virtue. Thus one could argue that the philosopher (who contemplates, or
theorizes) and the politician live according to different conceptions of the good life. I have two responses to
this argument. The first is that Aristotle’s argument in Book X, chapters 7-8 is problematic enough (see
footnote #6) that I am not convinced that we can really take him to be claiming that humans—who are, as
he has argued again and again, political animals-can really live the contemplative life, a life which does not
require [political] relation with other people (NE 1 177a27-l 1 77b 1 ). Secondly, even if Aristotle is
recognizing these two accounts of the good life as human possibilities, my point is that the question of the
good life is not contested within the political arena , for the philosopher, to the extent to which he engages
only in contemplation, is not a politician, i.e. one who participates in politics; he is not present jn the
political arena, an arena which thus remains full of homogeneous beings. So I am not arguing that
Aristotle necessarily does not recognize the existence of different accounts of the good life; rather, I am
arguing that he does not design the polis to be an arena in which political struggle over the question of the
good life takes place.
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25), he does not make the sort of divisions within a species which would allow him to
recognize different goods for different humans. Rather, the one ultimate good for humans
is that which is aimed at by the man with a morally virtuous disposition (NE 1 1 13a25-30).
It is clear that Aristotle is favoring a homogeneous political community here, for it is only
in such a community that there would be one standard measure of what the proper
pleasures are; if there were heterogeneity then differently trained people would be
emotionally constituted so as to feel pleasure at different things. But Aristotle’s good man
is the standard measure: “the man of good character ... is a sort of a standard and
yardstick of what is fine and pleasant” (NE 1 1 13a32-33).
Meanwhile, however, it is not that Aristotle sees no variation among humans with
respect to the good, for he certainly does see different humans as significantly different in
their relation to the good life; however, it is not that Aristotle believes that eudaimonia is
different for different humans, but rather that he thinks different sorts of humans are
differently placed vis-a-vis the possibility of reaching the one yardstick version of
eudaimonia. Thus when he is thinking about human flourishing, he is really only thinking
about it with respect to a select group of humans, those whom he considers to be fully
human, those who live fully human lives. Aristotle makes this clear when he mentions that
“no one assigns to a slave a share in happiness-unless he assigns to him also a share in
human life” (NE 1 1 77a8-9). 16 He virtually eliminates diversity when it comes to a
consideration of who can reach eudaimonia. Since Aristotle only recognizes diversity in
terms of hierarchy, when he discusses the good for humans, he feels justified in looking at
the good for one (the best, most virtuous) group of humans; the “diversity” disappears
because we see that he does not quite take all humans to be fully human, to have the
16
I am using the W. D. Ross translation here, for it emphasizes that it is because slaves do not live human
lives that they cannot reach eudaimonia. (The J.A.K. Thomson translation reads: “nobody attributes a part
in happiness to a slave, unless he also attributes to him a life of his own” [~NE 1 1 77a8-9]
.) It is clear that
Aristotle thinks that slaves do not lead lives of their own—lives in which they exercise choice, which is
necessary for moral virtue— in the way that fully human people do. He says in the Politics : “a state exists
for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the object, slaves and brute
animals might form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice
[i.e. a life of their own]” (Pol 1 280a3 1 -34).
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purpose that “humans” have, that is, reaching eudaimonia. In fact, in discussing pleasures,
Aristotle explicitly states that pleasures experienced by some select people are truly human
pleasures, but pleasures experienced by others cannot be considered to be fully human; he
acknowledges that pleasures differ for different people, but then dismisses this diversity by
asserting that “whether the perfect and supremely happy man has one activity or more than
one, it is the pleasures that perfect these that can properly be described as human” (NE
1 176a26-29).
Thus Aristotle sees humans as diverse, but this diversity is not within the political
arena, for any variation in someone’s placement vis-a-vis possible eudaimonia is a
hierarchical variation which takes them out of the political arena of the polis altogether-in
fact, it makes them not quite human. Among the polites, who are the only people who are
potentially eudaimonous, there is significant homogeneity.
Furthermore, anyone who is not the right sort of being—a citizen man—or who is
the right sort of being but who is not good (or well trained) is excluded from the realm in
which any possible discussions of the good life would take place. The circle is closed:
being well-trained (i.e. trained to have a disposition towards virtue, trained to be pleased by
striving towards a particular version of the good) is a pre-requisite for being in the political
realm where any discussion about the good life would take place, but it is precisely because
only similarly trained beings are participants in politics that politics is not a matter of
struggling over which conception(s) of the good life should inform the construction of the
polis and the training of its members. Those who have no potential for reaching
eudaimonia (given a particular account of it), that is, women of the citizen class and all
slaves (male and female) are among the people who are excluded from the political arena;
they are not members of the polis . 17 Their conception of the good is not relevant for the
17See footnote #9 about how they are necessary for the polis without being a part of the polis. It could be
argued that in being a part of the household, where households are what make up the polis (Pol 1253a39),
citizen class women and all slaves are a part of the polis. However, I think we need to look at the claim
that it is households which make up the polis in light of Aristotle’s claims that a slave is a piece of
property (Pol 1253b31) and “states require property, but property, even though living beings are included in
it, is not part of a state” (Pol 1328a35-36), and his definition of a polis as a “community of equals” ( Pol
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polls. Among the people who remain as political participants, there is no diversity with
respect to the conceptions of the good life at which people aim, or Aristotle sees none."*
Thus the following question does not arise for Aristotle: how is it possible for a diverse
group of people to all be members of a polls (in the true sense of the word) in which human
flourishing is a contested issue; that is, how can there be engagement, among a diverse
group of people, in a discussion of what to strive for together, of how (accordingly) to
construct the community, of how to train the passions? But this is a question that I think
should be raised.
G. Friends Who Are Mirrors
There is another way in which it is clear that Aristotle favors a homogeneous
composition of the polls. I have noted that Aristotle conceptualizes community to be related
to friendship (NE 1 155a22-23; 1 159b25-28; 1 167b2-3). So looking at Aristotle’s view of
friendship will be instructive in seeing what he values about community.
Aristotle recognizes the existence of many different types of friendship; there is
friendship based on utility, friendship based on pleasure, and friendship based on
goodness (NE 1 156a6-22). Furthermore, there are friendships between equals and another
type of friendship between unequals (NE 1 158b 12-28). Friendships can also differ in
intensity (NE 1 1 59b29- 1 1 60a8). However, despite Aristotle’s recognition of a variety of
sorts of friendships, there is only one sort of friendship which is properly so called, and
that is friendship between good men who are similar in their goodness and whose
friendship is for the sake of the good: “friendship in the primary and proper sense is
between good men in virtue of their goodness, whereas the rest are friendships only by
analogy” (NE 1 157a3 1-32). Aristotle calls this friendship perfect: “only the friendship of
those who are good, and similar in their goodness, is perfect” (NE 1 156b7-8). These
1328a37). Considering these claims, I think we cannot interpret Aristotle’s statement that households
make up the polis to mean that all members of the household are political participants in the polis.
18Again, since philosophers—whose idea of the good life is that it consists in contemplation-are not, to the
extent to which they are really leading the contemplative life, political participants.
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friendships are characterized by equality, for good men are, by virtue of their similar
goodness, equal to one another; friendships which lack equality are only called friendships
to the extent to which they develop a sort of equality through proportionate love (the
inferior party must love more than he/she is loved) (NE 1 158b24-28). Thus anyone who is
inferior to good men (e.g. children, wives, etc.) cannot be said to have perfect friendship
with good men; they can only approximate equality in the friendship by having the parties
love proportionately (NE 1 158b 12-28).
What Aristotle emphasizes in his discussion of friendship is the importance of the
parties similarity (qua good men). Good men who are friends provide reflections of one
another; Aristotle argues that friends who are good also please one another “because
everyone is pleased with his own conduct and conduct that resembles it, and the conduct of
good men is the same or similar” (NE 1 156bl6-17). Aristotle describes a good man’s
friend as a second sell to him ’ (NE 1 170b7), i.e. someone just like himself.
Aristotle thus requires homogeneity among true friends. And, the homogeneity
found in true friendship extends into the sort of friendship that can be called concord
(unanimity) or “friendship between the citizens of a state” (NE 1 167b2-3); that is,
homogeneity serves to hold a community together just as it holds a pair of true friends
together, and again, this homogeneity is based on the participants’ (in the political arena of
the polis ) being good men and thus (because they do not hold a variety of conceptions of
the good but rather share one) being similar in their goodness. Aristotle writes:
This sort of concord [i.e. friendship between citizens] is found among good
men, because they are in accord both with themselves and with one another,
having (broadly speaking) the same outlook. For the wishes of such people
remain constant and do not ebb and flow like the tides; and they wish for
what is just and advantageous, and also pursue these objects in common.
But bad men cannot be in concord (just as they cannot be friends) except to
a very limited extent. . . .(NE 1 167b5 -9)
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It becomes very clear in this passage that Aristotle's inclusion of no one but good or well
trained men ensures homogeneity; they all share a conception of the good and their concord
or friendship is based on this similarity. By excluding anyone who holds and acts
according to a different conception of the good-that is, anyone who in Aristotle’s eyes is a
bad man (or, we might add, not a free man at all)-Anstotle creates a homogeneous political
community. Furthermore, such a community-where there is concord based on similarity-
cannot be a place where the conception of the good is contested, for such concord is at
odds with political contestation.
H. A Vision of Community: The Polis RevkpH
Aristotle has developed a valuable account of how a polis can be constituted so that
it is truly a community with relations of moral engagement between its members, and not
just a collection of people living in the same area. He has presented a description of the self
which is social in the most profound ways. He has argued that the community, the realm
of social relations, is not just a place of exchange and mutual benefit; rather, it is the realm
in which members emotional constitutions are developed; it is a training ground for moral
virtue; and it is the context in which men are able to aim together for the good life. For as
Aristotle puts it, living together (as friends do) is, for humans, quite unlike “being pastured
like cattle in the same field” (NE 1 170b 13).
For those of us who live in a social and historical context in which the term
“community” is so overused that it has lost its meaning—so that any collection of people
with some incidental tie to one another is said to be a “community’’-Aristotle’s description
of what a polis is may sound promising. His polis is just the sort of community we are
likely to be lacking if we live in associations structured according to liberalism, where non-
interference in each other’s lives and neutrality on the question of the good are the
premisses of the state. In such a context, the possibilities for collective action and for the
profound participation of community members in one another’s lives—in the formation of
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one another’s dispositions and values-are obscured. In the attempt to uncover these
communitarian possibilities, Aristotle’s description of the true polis appears to be valuable.
The descriptive claim about how a self is socially constituted is a necessary basis for the
normative claim that members of a community ought to actively engage in the public realm
in the collective development of a conception of human flourishing which can inform the
creation of a community constituted to promote such human flourishing.
But as I have argued, there is another side to Aristotle’s polis. Aristotle creates, in
his discussions of ethics and politics, a tie between the possibility of a true polis and the
existence of homogeneity among its members. The deepest sorts of relationships-
fnendships—in the polis are possible, Aristotle has argued, only when members are similar
to one another, when they share and reflect one another’s goodness. Furthermore, since
those who are to be favored for inclusion in the political realm are men who are well-trained
according to a given conception of the good, the polis can be thought of as a place of
concord, not of political struggle over which conception(s) of the good should guide
collective action. Differences in life experiences and social locations are not welcomed as
the basis for collective thought about what human flourishing could be; rather, these
differences are the basis for exclusion from the political arena. The true polis, for Aristotle,
is achieved only through the significant homogeneity of its members; it is not meant to be a
context for the contestation of the conception of human flourishing on which the
community (and all of the social relations within it) are based.
The link between the concepts of “community” and “homogeneity” is still strong, at
least in the U.S. today. Although the term “community” is seldom used in any strong
sense at all, when it is used, it is quite often in reference to a group of people who are
thought to be similar in some respect. For instance, one may think of a community as a
place of shared culture, and take culture to be a unifying set of practices, both in the case of
mainstream communities and in the case of communities of marginalized groups.
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One can, of course, think of cases in which, within what is called a community,
there is a professed commitment to diversity.« However, when it is a liberal “community”
(an association which merely enjoys the name “community”) which is diverse, the diversity
depends upon each individual’s (or group of individuals’) staying out of each other’s way,
leaving one another to hold separate, different values without interference. The strong
sense of community is lost. There is not a commitment to the diverse group of members
engaging with one another to form each other’s values or participate in the development of
one another’s dispositions; there is not meant to be a shared, collective struggle over the
meaning of human flourishing.
Communitarians who are drawn to Aristotle’s account of a polis (precisely because
of the strong sense of community in it) and who are radical in the sense of opposing
hierarchy and thus opposing Aristotle’s inegalitarianism and his requirement of
homogeneity need to develop an account of how a community could struggle to aim
together at some good without presupposing homogeneous members and thus similar
conceptions of what the good is. The critique of Aristotle’s polis suggests some things
about what such a community might look like; to begin with, it makes it clear that to even
begin imagining such a community, one needs to break the conceptual link between
“community” and “homogeneity,” but that in doing this one must retain the strong sense of
community (polis) that Aristotle has developed. One leaves oneself free, then, to imagine a
polis in which the shared conception of the good is open to collective formation. The idea
here is that a conception of the good life is something to be discussed or developed in
community
, not something to be presupposed before the members of a polis come together.
Such a collective formation of values would mean leaving oneself open to be
constructed in one’s relations to others unlike oneself. It would mean being willing to call
into question whatever conceptions of the good one might begin with. It would mean
*^Even in these cases, however, there is often an emphasis both on the community’s unity and on its
diversity. For instance, the “women’s community” is often described by feminists as a place where there is
unity—as women—amongst members but also diversity-as, e.g. people of different races, cultures, or
economic classes.
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paying attention, during the process of engaging with others, to the reasons why different
people have developed different virtues and aim at different conceptions of the good.
Finally, it would be a process in which the link between members of a community could be
even more significant than Aristotle imagines there to be between fellow citizens in * polls.
For Aristotle s citizens do participate in developing in one another the tendency towards
virtue, but they do not engage in the sort of collective formation of value that I am
describing. This engagement, I would like to suggest, requires a very difficult and very
profound sort of knowing or experiencing of fellow members of a community, for
knowing other members is not like looking in the mirror, as it is for the good men who are
friends in Aristotle’s polls. In a diverse community, knowing other members means
crossing into worlds of sense unlike one’s own, and understanding those worlds of sense
to such an extent that they enter into the formation of one’s self and of the community. The
conception(s) of the good life at which the community might strive together, then, can only
emerge out of a process of real engagement between members of the diverse community.
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CHAPTER II
THE CONTEMPORARY POLIS: CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNITY
A. Introduction
The Aristotelian ethical tradition takes its contemporary shape, among other places,
in communitarian theory. The communitarians draw on Aristotle’s account of the polis in
developing a description of community rather than drawing on contract theorists’ accounts
of the state or on deontologists’ accounts of human relations as built upon duties and
rights. At the base of communitarian theory, then, is a conception of community and of
human nature and thus human relations which is fundamentally different than those found
in liberal theory. John Rawls, in developing his (liberal) theory of justice, takes up and
revises Kant’s deontological theory, dropping Kant’s dependence on the transcendental
subject and replacing it with what Michael Sandel refers to as the unencumbered self of the
original position, a self much like the abstract individuals in contract theory who, prior to
having any relation with one another, nevertheless are able to choose to make a contract to
form a state which will regulate their relations. In a parallel way, communitarians such as
Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre take up and revise Aristotelian theory, dropping (to
a greater or lesser extent) Aristotle’s dependence on the existence of a given human telos
and replacing it with the idea that human purposes or ends are given by or developed in
particular histories and communities which “encumber” the self with particular values and
conceptions of the good. While Aristotle’s polis serves as a training ground for how its
members will develop their virtues and vices, and thus determines the possibility of a
member reaching the end of endaimonia, the communitarian community not only “trains” or
socializes its members but it is also the place where human ends and conceptions of the
good actually develop—unlike the Aristotelian telos, they are not a “natural” given prior to
their development through history.
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While liberal theory such as that of Rawls has no way of making sense of the idea
of having “a people ” communitarian theory sees having a people as central to having a self;
the self is constituted as a self with a history of a people and a community of a people.
Thus communitarian theory suggests at least some understandings of what it is to have a
people, to have a sense of collectivity about one’s self-constitution and about one’s ability
to develop values and act on them, and so this body of theory seems a potentially fruitful
place to begin trying to answer the question I am pursuing; what understanding of “having
a people describes the sense of self and of collectivity that could empower political
resistors? I am interested in finding a description (and further, a prescription or at least a
normative suggestion) of a self who has a collectivity within which to work on morally
constituting or training the self with habits of resistance to oppressive status quos, but I
want to insist that such a community cannot require homogeneity as Aristotle’s polls does.
The communitarian model of the community as constitutive rather than merely cooperative-
to use Michael Sandel’s terms-gets to the core of some of what I am looking for; it meets
my demand that politics be collective rather than individualistic.
However, just as Aristotle relied upon a sense of community as homogeneous, so
the contemporary communitarians, I will argue, also tend to fail to recognize the
community as made up of beings who differ from one another based on their multiple,
intersecting group memberships. They find it to be too easy to answer the “who are my
people?” question, for the question is not complicated, for most of them, by the recognition
that community membership is not static, and that communities are not clearly bounded
entities. They might say, “my people are those with whom my identity—my self—is
formed; it is those who share my history and thus my values,” without noticing that their
identities are fluid, that their selves may be multiple, or that their histories can be told in a
variety of perhaps inconsistent ways. That is, the communitarians see the self as
constituted by membership in particular social groups, see identities as the result of
particular histories, as moments in a narrative that has taken place over time and which
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includes other people; however, they sidestep the crucial questions: which narrative do we
tell to explain our identities? Which of the many histories and moments of social
occurrences form our identities? Where in the intersections of different social groups do our
identities congeal and then again when do different groups and group identities come in and
change our identities? I will argue that to state that we are constituted by our locations in
particular histories and communities is not enough, for it is crucial to go on to ask, which
of our many possible histories constitute us? What story do we tell; what story are we a
character in? Which of our communities constitutes us and what is its hold on us when our
communities are multiple? How does one account for the self that is constituted in
community and yet is resistant to that community’s values; that is, if the self is exhausted
by the description of itself as it is developed in one single community-as it is whenever
one fails to recognize complicated mixtures of community or group identities—then
communitarian theory has no way to account for where the resistant self springs from.
Thus, agreeing to an extent with the communitarians, I will argue that yes, one
must recognize the collectivity of the constitution of our identities, but I will add the claim
that it is essential not to ignore questions such as the one Gloria Anzaldua poses when she
writes: “the mestizo, faces the dilemma of the mixed breed: which collectivity does the
daughter of a dark skinned mother listen to?” (Borderlands 78). This chapter will thus
examine and critique communitarian theory, with the aim of seeing how the claim might be
made that indeed the self is constituted in community, amongst a people, but who the
people are and what the self becomes constituted as must be more complicated than the
communitarians recognize. How one is constituted in the community depends on who one
is in the community. So while one member may be constituted in the community so as to
internalize, accept and animate the community’s values, another member may be constituted
in the community as a rebel, someone who experiences and perhaps internalizes and yet
may reject the community’s values. Such a member may choose to leave the community
and form an intentional (also constitutive) community, but, I will argue, the choice is made
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as the particular person she is, not as an unencumbered self. Sandel argues that the
unencumbered self (contrary to the claims of liberal theory) cannot possibly exercise
choice, for the “choosing” self cannot exist prior to its ends, and thus the right (i.e. the
right to choose one’s ends) cannot be conceived of prior to the good. But he seems to
believe that the encumbered self is also hampered in her ability to exercise choice.
However, I will argue that the encumbered (encumbered with-but not exhausted by-a
conception of the good) self does retain agency, for instance, the agency required to change
or even leave a community.
The insistence that the encumbered self can exercise choice is essential to
developing a communitarian political theory which is radical, for without recognition that
the self can move in relation to its constituted values, one cannot account for how radical
change might be brought about. Since a radical politics of resistance is about change (e.g.
change in what a community values and how it acts on these values), it is essential that one
be able to conceive of the communitarian self as capable of resistance, of bringing about
change. One also cannot think about radical change without the idea of the encumbered self
and the constitutive community, for unencumbered selves (were they to exist) would be too
independent, too unaffected by each other and by their social context to possibly change
one another, and a merely cooperative (as opposed to constitutive) community promises to
be a place where nobody would interfere with or try to change one another’s values. The
point of radical, communitarian politics, I will argue, is to make the community a place
where it is appropriate to engage in changing one’s own and others’ values, and to form a
collectivity out of which members can act on these values.
So I will turn now to communitarian theory, to make sense of the claim that our
selves Me encumbered or collectively constituted. The concept of the collectively
constituted self will become useful, then, for the assertion that our political selves are
collective (that is, that there is such a thing as having a people, politically speaking), and
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for the further claim that the possibilities of whom that collectivity might be made up of are
numerous.
IL Michael Sandel: A Rejection of the Unencumbered Self
Michael Sandel draws an illuminating distinction between the liberal sense of
community and the communitarian sense of community, dubbing them “cooperative
community” versus “constitutive community.” The difference lies in the relation of the self
to others in the community, and the conception of the role of the community in relation to
its members.
Liberalism, Sandel argues, emphasizes the priority of the right over the good. That
is, the purpose of a “community” of people under liberalism is to ensure that individual
rights are protected, not to provide a way towards achieving some particular conception of
the good. Central among the rights that an individual must have is the right to choose
his/her own ends or conception of the good. Thus the right to decide what the good is (and
to pursue it, as long as one does not interfere with others’ like rights) is secured
independent of and prior to there actually being any conception of the good that is already
held by the individual or by the community. The principles which regulate individual
rights, then, cannot be justified by reference to any particular conception of the good; the
procedure by which these principles are arrived at must be a neutral one, a procedure which
does not favor any one conception of the good over another one. How to make this
procedure a fair one, is, of course, a great pre-occupation of liberals, and I will not discuss
in detail the failings of all such attempts. Many communitarian authors, including Sandel,
have exposed the failings of the arguments of liberal theorists such as Rawls. Rather than
delve into the problems with liberal theory here, I want to discuss the liberal senses of
community and of the self only to contrast them with the communitarian sense.
In order to conceive of the liberal community as regulated by neutral principles of
justice, there must be a corresponding conception of the individual subject as capable of
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choice (so he/she can choose a conception of the good) prior to having any conception of
the good, any values. Sandel calls such a self an “unencumbered self’-a self who is not
encumbered by any particular values or conception of the good-for it is only such a self
who would call for a neutral state as providing a realm of free individual choice. It is this
unencumbered self, Sandel claims, which Rawls must have in mind for the parties in the
original position, the fair position from which regulative principles of justice are to be
chosen. The original position is Rawls’ attempt to justify the right prior to the good.
However, Rawls must make an assumption about persons in order to make sense of this
fair position from which principles are chosen, and that is that “there is always a distinction
between the values I have and the person I am” (Sandel, “Procedural...” 18). The parties
to the original position must be able to exist (conceptually, that is) without having values,
or in fact any other distinguishing characteristics. Such a self is unencumbered, free as a
choosing subject to select any possible conception of the good.
Sandel’s claim is that the unencumbered self is a conceptual impossibility; a person
cannot exist, even conceptually, except as a person with particular values and
characteristics. But the unencumbered self is thought to be a self which exists prior to its
ends: “For the unencumbered self, what matters above all, what is most essential to our
personhood, are not the ends we choose but our capacity to choose them” (“Procedural...”
19). What such a self calls for, then, is only the right to choose its ends, and it is only a
self conceived as unencumbered which would ground an argument for this right. As
Sandel puts it, “[ojnly if the self is prior to its ends can the right be prior to the good. Only
if my identity is never tied to the aims and interests I may have at any moment can I think of
myself as a free and independent agent, capable of choice” (“Procedural...” 19). Thus the
possibility of choice— i.e. the possibility of choosing one’s own values—depends upon the
separation of who I am (a moral agent capable of choice) from what my values are; for if I
am the person who has certain values, then it does not make sense to speak of a subject
(without values) choosing these values.
47
One may think, then, of the unencumbered self as possessing a set of (chosen)
values, but not as consisting of a person with those values. The possessed values could
change without disrupting the identity of the person. Sandel comments:
In so far as I possess something [e.g. a conception of the good], I am at
once related to it and distanced from it. To say that I possess a certain trait
or desire or ambition is to say that I am related to it in a certain way-it is
mine rather than yours
-and also that I am distanced from it in a certain way-
-that it is mine rather than me. The latter point means that if I lose a thing I
possess, I am still the same T who had it; this is the sense, paradoxical at
first but unavoidable on reflection, in which the notion of possession is a
distancing notion. (Liberalism. 55)
The subject s chosen values can be possessed and dispossessed without disruption of the
identity of the subject, for the identity existed prior to and independent of the acquisition of
values. The actual identity of the unencumbered self, then, is never open to constitution or
reconstitution in a community. The community, for an unencumbered self, is never a place
to develop or change one s identity, for in fact identity is secure prior to community.
“Where the subject is regarded as prior to its ends.
.
.
[t]he bounds of the self are fixed and
within them all is transparent. The relevant moral question is not ‘Who am I?’ (for the
answer to this question is given in advance) but rather ‘what ends shall I choose?’ and this
is a question addressed to the will” ( Liberalism... 58).
The identity of the subject, then, is not tied up with its community. In fact, if the
subject is unencumbered and the right is prior to the good, then whatever goes on in
community must stop short of “interfering” in the choosing subject’s conception of the
good, for nothing must impede the freedom with which the individual chooses a conception
of the good. As Sandel writes:
The Rawlsian self is not only a subject of possession, but an antecedently
individuated subject, standing always at a certain distance from the interests
it has. One consequence of this distance is to put the self beyond the reach
of experience, to make it invulnerable, to fix its identity once and for all.
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No commitment could grip me so deeply that I could not understand myself
without it. No transformation of life purposes and plans could be so
unsettling as to disrupt the contours of my identity. ( Liberalism. .. 62)
Given such a conception of the self as independent of others in his/her formation of values,
the self does not need the community for much, for it can exist (i.e. have an identity), at
least conceptually, independent of the community. The community of others might be
something which the unencumbered self will choose
-for instance, if companionship or co-
operative satisfaction of material needs were part of his/her chosen conception of the good-
but the choice itself is antecedent to the community. The choice is not informed by any
values the community may have already developed in the individual. Thus while the
unencumbered self may choose or even need the community to satisfy needs, the particular
character of the needs themselves are not created in the community. Sandel summarizes:
This notion of independence carries consequences for the kind of
community of which we are capable. Understood as unencumbered selves,
we are of course free to join in voluntary association with others, and so are
capable of community in the co-operative sense. What is denied to the
unencumbered self is the possibility of membership in any community
bound by moral ties antecedent to choice; he cannot belong to any
community where the self itself could be at stake. Such a community-call it
constitutive as against merely co-operative-would engage the identity as
well as the interests of the participants, and so implicate its members in a
citizenship more thorough-going than the unencumbered self can know.
(“Procedural” 19)
Subjects who co-operate, then, are very different than subjects who are constituted
together, for subjects who come together merely co-operatively must have been separate,
distinct subjects prior to their union. In co-operative community, “[w]e are distinct
individuals first, and then (circumstances permitting) we form relationships and engage in
co-operative arrangements with others” ( Liberalism. .. 53).
In contrast, subjects in a constitutive community have their very identities at stake in
the community. Sandel writes that:
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community would describe not just a feeling but a mode of self-
understanding partly constitutive of the agent’s identity. On this strong
view, to say that the members of a society are bound by a sense of
community is not simply to say that a great many of them profess
communitarian sentiments and pursue communitarian aims, but rather that
they conceive their identity—the subject and not just the object of their
feelings and aspirations-as defined to some extent by the community of
which they are a part. For them, community describes not just what they
have as fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose
(as in a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not merely
an attribute but a constituent of their identity. (Liberalism... 150)
Sandel conceives of the encumbered self, then, as in some sense given by the community;
it is not just that it is in community that the self is constituted, but in fact the self is
described as something which is “discovered,” as if already made within the confines of
some particular community. It is the play or tension between being a self who actively-
and yet collectively-constitutes her self and being a self who finds herself as a given, a
person who already has certain values and characteristics, that I would like to investigate
further. It is necessary to know more precisely what it means to be encumbered for
Sandel, and to think about whether Sandel’ s encumbered self is the only alternative to the
liberal abstract individual who is unencumbered.
C. The Self Too Encumbered to Move
In Sandel’ s move from the liberal, unencumbered self to the communitarian,
encumbered self, he fails to adequately account for the ways in which the self—without
being conceived of as an abstract individual—has the sort of moral agency which can allow
the self to change or resist. Sandel’ s move is not so much from individual to collective, but
rather it really is from unencumbered to encumbered; the difference is that there is a loss of
agency in his move, because he does not have a concept of collectively formed or acted
agency that can account for radical change. Thus he rejects the claim that we are ‘free to
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choose’ and replaces it with the claim that we are ‘not free to choose, because we did not
summon or command our history or character’; he does not see the possibility of rejecting
the idea that we are ‘free (from interference) to choose as an individual’ and replacing it
with the claim that ‘freedom is a social product, so we are capable of choosing or creating
collectively with others a history or context which we dp in part create.’ It seems as if the
only alternative which Sandel sees to the liberal individual is a self who is completely
encumbered by an identity given within a community-to the point of losing the kind of
agency required for change.20
The meaning of “encumbered” applies all too well to Sandel ’s account of the
encumbered self; the American Heritage Dictionary gives this definition of what it is to
encumber:
Encumber tr.v. 1. To weigh down unduly; lay too much upon. 2. To
hinder, impede, or clutter, as with useless articles or unwanted additions.
3. To handicap or burden, as with obligations or legal claims. [Middle
English encombren
,
from Old French encombrer, to block up.
.
.].
Sandel s encumbered self, it seems, is characterized as burdened with obligations or moral
commitments, hindered from changing in radical ways. Not only is a self thus
characterized harmful to radical imaginations (which need to see the possibility of resistance
in the self), but the self thus characterized is simply not bom out in reality: it is possible to
see evidence of collective change whenever one looks for it, one can see selves being
constituted and reconstituted—burdened but also breaking free from burdens—in ways not
accounted for when one recognizes only the effects that one single, bounded and consistent
community has on a particular self.
90zuAmy Gutmann makes a similar criticism of Sandel, although hers is coming from a liberal perspective.
She claims that Sandel’s method “invites us to see the moral universe in dualistic terms: either our
identities are independent of our ends, leaving us totally free to choose our life plans, or they are constituted
by community, leaving us totally encumbered by socially given ends. . . The critics thereby do a disservice
to not only liberal but communitarian values, since the same method that reduces liberalism to an extreme
metaphysical vision also renders communitarian theories unacceptable” (“Communitarian Critics of
Liberalism” in Avineri and de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism
. 130).
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It is not from a liberal point of view that I am rejecting the dictionary’s implication
that the encumbered self is to be understood as weighed down with obligations (for the
liberal, for different reasons, would shudder at the thought of this clutter of involuntary
obligations). In fact, one might argue that the word “encumber” was defined from the
point of view of liberal ideology, from which position any moral pull must be seen as an
obligation and any obligation must be seen as a burden on the free individual. A
commitment which holds moral weight does not have to be seen as a burden if we
understand that to be a person simply is to be a person in social relations with others and
thus with responsibilities or moral pulls (which the deontologist can only recognize as
duties or obligations”). It is not that having moral responsibilities are objectionable, but
rather what is objectionable is that these responsibilities burden in a way that prevents
movement or change or the exercise of agency in determining what the responsibilities are.
Thus I am not disagreeing with Sandel that in fact the self who is understood to exist and
have been formed within particular social relations does “come with” moral responsibilities,
but what makes Sandel’ s claim that we incur moral responsibilities simply from being
constituted in relation to others too simple is the fact that he does not see conflicts or
tensions in which commitments have moral weight for us; to see the social relations or
context in which one is constituted as complicated makes it impossible to see any one social
relation (out of context of other relations one might have or other features of one’s social
position which might pull on one in one way or another) as pulling on us irrevocably.
Such an irrevocable pull would be a burden, a hindrance, an impediment to change or
perhaps to move out of an oppressive situation. My claim is that Sandel sees the
encumbered self as being encumbered in just this burdensome way, precisely because he
mistakenly believes that the self is thoroughly constituted by one consistent set of values,
within one clearly bounded and homogeneous community, a community in which one
“finds” oneself, but which one does not create.
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Sandel emphasizes the involuntary nature of our moral commitments and
obligations. He writes:
But we cannot regard ourselves as independent in this way without great
cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in
the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as
the particular persons we are-as members of this family or community or
nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of that
revolution, as citizens of this republic. Allegiances such as these are more
than values I happen to have or aims I 'espouse at any given time’. They go
beyond the obligations I voluntarily incur and the ‘natural duties’ I owe to
human beings as such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice
requires or even permits, not by reason of agreements I have made but
instead in virtue of those more or less enduring attachments and
commitments which taken together partly define the person I am.
( Liberalism... 179)
Marilyn Friedman has pointed out that the sorts of communities which Sandel and other
communitarians have in mind are very traditional communities, and that the social relations
they acknowledge are traditional ones. She sees the communitarians’ philosophy as
problematic because they do not give much thought to which communities are or should be
the locations of our self identities. In particular, she thinks that communitarian philosophy
does not serve feminists well, for the communitarians do not see how traditional
communities form ethical thinking in non-feminist ways. Theorists like Sandel and
MacIntyre, Friedman argues, tend to take for granted that communities are based on given
structures such as those of family, neighborhood, school, church or even “nation.” These
traditional communities-which Friedman refers to as communities of place-tend to
embody traditional values, including values of (different kinds of) dominance and
subordination. She points out that “feminist theory is rooted in a recognition of the need
for change in all the traditions and practices which show gender differentiation; many of
those are located in just the sorts of communities invoked by communitarians, for example,
family practices and national political traditions” (281). Feminists, she argues, should
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therefore be wary of communitarian theory which assumes or claims that the self is
constituted only in these traditional communities. Friedman argues that within
communitarian theory, these traditional communities are accorded “a kind of morally
normative legitimacy” (279); in claiming this, the communitarians fail “to acknowledge that
many communities make illegitimate moral claims on their members, linked to hierarchies
of domination and subordination” (279). It is the recognition that such moral claims are
problematic for women-since the hierarchies of these communities subordinate women-
that motivates Friedman’s rejection of Sander s claim that these are the communities which
hold moral weight. While Friedman wants to retain the communitarians’ claim that the self
is constituted in community, she is motivated to reject their assumptions about what counts
as a community and about the “legitimacy of the moral influences which communities exert
over their members” (280).
However, it is not just that the oppression of traditional communities’ moral weight
on one is a motivating reason for critiquing communitarian theory, but it is also simply
false that traditional—homogeneous, clearly bounded, and relatively static—communities are
the only communities which form us. In fact, it is generally false that such homogeneous
communities exist, a fact which is obscured by the erasure of group difference. The focus
on traditional communities damages both the validity of communitarian theory and its
usefulness for a politics of resistance. Because the communitarians picture communities as
traditional and homogeneous, they imagine a member of a community as simply inheriting
a set of values, or discovering themselves embedded in and thus constituted by a set of
values. On the other hand, seeing group differences intersecting within communities helps
us explain how resistance to community values is possible—that is, it provides a way to
understand moral agency that is not individualistic. My claim is that, in fact, one does not
always learn or become constituted with only one set of values; there are always
oppositional values, even when there are also dominant values in a community.
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It has perhaps been more true in the past than it is in contemporary life that a person
would be likely to be born, live, and die surrounded only by others like him/herself in
significant ways. Isolated, rural communities could, in the past, have more control of the
ways in which individuals within the community were constituted. It is much more rare,
now, to find instances of such isolated communities. The communitarians seem, then, to
be basing their claims about community on some romanticized, out of date (one might even
say pre-colonial) version of what a community is. However, even if one were thinking
about traditional versions of what a community is, one would be mistaken in imagining
homogeneity of values even in these communities. All communities are, to some degree,
cut across by group differences which affect how members are constituted. There is
probably no community in which there are no conflicts of values created by group
differences (whether or not anyone conceives of the group as a group), however
suppressed these conflicts may be. There are, for instance, always or almost always
differences of gender, age, social role, and so on within the most homogeneous-appearing
communities, and different members of a community may experience day to day life in
different enough ways so that they develop different values . 21
One may speak of the “official” values of a community as a whole; for instance, in
(crude) anthropological fashion one might make statements like: “this community believes
in the sacredness of the cow”; or in doing ideological critique one may point to institutions
which define or control the values of the community, as in the claim: “heterosexuality is
institutionalized in this society.” However, pointing to the dominant values of a community
never reveals the whole picture. To claim that there is an identifiable value of a community
as a whole is not at odds with claiming that members, or groups of members, within the
community may not hold those values.
I am not claiming that there is some way in which individuals develop idiosyncratic
values (although it is also probably true that some characteristics of people would best be
21 Which group differences are socially relevant, which, if any, are socially recognized, and within which, if
any, there is a sense of community, are all dependent on changing historical and material conditions.
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called idiosyncratic, for not ad differences are socially significant group differences), but
rather that the presence of overlapping group differences means that it never makes sense to
speak of oneself as belonging to only one community or only one socially significant
category in which one’s self would be fully constituted. It is only when a community’s
dmmnant values are taken to be the only existing values in the community that there is the
appearance of a member of the community being constituted simply with those values. I
am arguing that resistance to hegemonic values always exists (even when unconscious), it
just may not always be visible; Sandel’s account of community indicates that it is not
visible to him.
Recognizing that people are constituted within the intersection of several group
differences maintains the communitarian claim that selves are constituted socially, in
relation to others rather than individualistically; however, it destroys the illusion that one
just finds oneself to be the inheritor of a set of given values. This is so because the
tensions or conflicts between the values of intersecting groups-when they are evident, that
is, when they are not thoroughly erased by a hegemonic value system-do not allow an
individual to be constituted only with one given set of values. The communitarian
assumption that a community’s values are “discovered” as a given is equivalent to saying
that some set of values is thoroughly hegemonic. The fact that there has always been
resistance, that beliefs, values, emotions, styles or ways of being not sanctioned by the
hegemonic value system have always existed, tells us that no set of community values ever
does achieve complete hegemony . 22
-"-Alison Jaggar has argued for this claim that although our values are socially constituted, there is never a
complete hegemony of one set of values: there is always the possibility of developing resistant values. She
speaks of these values in terms of the emotions we are constituted to feel, and dubs resistant emotions
“outlaw emotions.” She writes: “We absorb the standards and values of our society in the very process of
learning the language of emotion, and those standards and values are built into the foundation of our
emotional constitution. Within a hierarchical society, the norms and values that predominate tend to serve
the interest of the dominant group. . . Consequently, we are all likely to develop an emotional constitution
quite inappropriate for feminism.
. . By forming our emotional constitution in particular ways, our society
helps to ensure its own perpetuation.” However, the picture of dominant values thoroughgoingly
constituting us is incomplete: “it ignores the fact that people do not always experience the conventionally
acceptable emotions. . . In other words, the hegemony that our society exercises over people’s emotional
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There is a confusion that takes place in the rush to reject liberal individualism. The
critic of liberalism may mistakenly equate the liberal pre-occupation with preserving room
for “individuality” with the very different claim that intersecting group differences should
not be erased in community. It is not as an unencumbered individual (whose idiosyncratic,
“freely" chosen values cannot be accounted for once one recognizes that the self is socially
constituted) that a member of the community becomes a resistor of the community’s values,
but rather it is as someone who is socially constituted, but constituted by a complicated mix
of socially developed values. In rejecting the possibility that the unencumbered self
“chooses” individual values, Sandel has also thrown out the possibility that a person be
“encumbered" or constituted in a way that allows for-or calls for-exercising agency in the
pull between conflicting systems of values.
I have so far emphasized the way in which Sandel sees values as a given; in fact,
Sandel does also attempt to describe ways in which a person is “always open, indeed
vulnerable, to growth and transformation in the light of revised self-understandings”
(Liberalism... 12). This is his attempt to account for how change does take place for the
encumbered self. His description of how and how much the encumbered self can change
or move in relation to his/her constituted values is very limited, however. These limits
derive, I will argue, from Sandel’s failure to see intersecting group differences as a factor
in how the self is constituted. Without an understanding of intersecting group difference,
Sandel can acknowledge that the encumbered self moves a bit in relation to given values,
but he can only see this movement as extremely limited, as the encumbered self is seen as
weighed down or burdened with given moral weights but is not also seen as being fed or
sustained with collective, resistant values.
constitution is not total” (Jaggar, Alison. “Love and Knowledge” in Gender/Bodv/Knowledge
. eds. Alison
Jaggar and Susan Bordo. 159-160).
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Let us examine Sandel’s explanation of moral agency. He writes that:
to have character is to know that I move in a history I neither summon nor
command, which carries consequences none the less for my choices and
conduct. ... As a self-interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history
and in this sense to distance myself from it, but the distance is always
precarious and provisional, the point of reflection never finally secured
outside the history itself. A person with character thus knows that he is
implicated in various ways even as he reflects, and feels the moral weight of
what he knows. (Liberalism 179)
This passage is ambiguous, for he at once tells us that we “neither summon nor command”
who we are, and that through reflection and interpretation there is room for movement. It
is the nature of the reflection and the subsequent movement that needs analysis. I will
argue that while Sandel develops an account of agency and the role of reflection for the
encumbered self, the account is inadequate, for it erases the sources of real resistance and is
thus unable to explain how the encumbered self could be constituted as resistant.
Sandel seems to use his claim that one s distance from the history and community
which constitutes oneself is always precarious and provisional” to ignore the significance
of serious and successful resistance to a constitutive community’s values. Even if one
thinks of the most extreme examples of constitutive communities which try to exercise
complete control over their members’ identities (and where one set of values appears to
have complete hegemony), one can see resistance which involves enormous moral change,
or change in the moral constitution of the self. While such change may begin as something
“precarious and provisional,” one need not dismiss the significance of moral change just
because the ground its subjects stand on feels shaky. In fact, resistance to dominant
community values can often be characterized by the feeling of having the ground
continually pulled out from underneath one’s feet. 23
23Sandra Bartky calls this feeling “double ontological shock,” something which she notes that women
frequently experience as they go through the changes of values and of self-identity involved in coming to
have a feminist consciousness. Double ontological shock is “first, the realization that what is really
happening is quite different from what appears to be happening; and second, the frequent inability to tell
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As an extreme example of a community which would appear to constitute its
members with only one set of values, think of the cult communities in which ritual abuse
takes place; growing up in such a community means being subject to the community’s
attempt not only to have one’s identity thoroughgoing^ constituted by the community’s
sadistic “values,” but also to stamp out any possibility of resistance. However, survivors
of community-inflicted ritual abuse can and do resist their communities’ values and leave
the community, re-constituting their identities within other communities. The writings of
such survivors often stress that despite the enormity of the forces which have fragmented
them, programmed them for suicide or for perpetual loyalty to the abusive community, they
cm break with this history of sadism.24 While I am not denying the hold that the
community has on its members (including survivors who have “left” the community), for it
obviously does have a strong hold, I am just pointing out that Sandel looks only at the hold
the community values have on someone, and so he sees no resistance. He sees shaky
ground as preventing moral change; I would suggest instead that although walking on
shaky and unsure ground may be a condition of the lives of those who are resistors to the
moral status quos, this living with ambiguity can be a creative, even if painful and difficult,
source of resistance itself.
Furthermore, Sandel seems to characterize the hold the community has on its
members as a legitimate hold, for as he has said, any “person with character.
. . knows that
he is implicated in various ways even as he reflects, and feels the moral weight of what he
knows” ( Liberalism... 179). Sandel never suggests that there might be a problem with
knowing that one is implicated by one’s community; the moral weight is never
characterized as oppressive.
what is really happening at all” (Bartky, “Toward a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness,” in
Philosophy and Women , eds. Sharon Bishop and Marjorie Weinzweis, 256).
24As one survivor writes: “WE ARE NOT THE SUM OF WHAT’S BEEN DONE TO US. . . The
impulse to suicide is a programmed response to what’s been done to us; we are brainwashed to ensure the
protection of cult hierarchs by killing ourselves. As Audre Lorde wrote so eloquently: we were never meant
to survive. That doesn’t mean, however, that we can’t or won’t or aren’t surviving. Whole.” (Girl
Insurrection, “Some Notes on Abuse,” Valiev Women’s Voice . Fall 1993: 5)
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" Will be useful to explore Sandel's account of agency to see how much posstbiltty
there is for an agent to actually bring about change in how his or her identity is constituted.
Sandel draws a distinction between agency in the voluntarist sense and agency in the
cognitive sense. He explains that “if 1 am a being with ends, there are at least two ways I
might 'come by' them: one is by choice, the other by discovery, by 'finding them out'.
The first sense of ‘coming by' we might call the voluntarist dimension of agency, the
second sense the cognitive dimension” ( Liberalism... 58).25 He has rejected the
plausibility of the voluntarist sense of agency, for it requires that the choosing self exist
prior to having any ends, which, he has argued, is a conceptual impossibility. Sandel’
s
alternative explanation of the relation of the subject to its ends is that “the ends of the self
are given in advance,” in which case,
the subject achieves self-command not by choosing that which is already
given (this would be unintelligible) but by reflecting on itself and inquiring
into its constituent nature, discerning its laws and imperatives, and
acknowledging its purposes as its own In reflexivity, the self turns its
lights inward upon itself, making the self its own object of inquiry and
reflection. ( Liberalism... 58)
Thus the subject exercising agency in the cognitive sense is just asking “who am I?”, for
the answer to this question determines what ends the subject (already) has. Understanding
oneself-that is, understanding what ends one has been constituted to have-is what
comprises the exercise of agency: “For the self whose identity is constituted in the light of
ends already before it, agency consists. . . in seeking self-understanding” ( Liberalism...
59). It is through this process of self-reflection that a subject can “play a role in shaping
the contours of its identity” (Liberalism 152).
Sandel then moves to what could be a promising consideration of this process of
self-reflection; it appears promising because Sandel does recognize that this is a process of
is interesting that Sandel claims there are “at least” two ways. Does he leave room for there being
other ways, as I am arguing that there are?
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self-interpretation (with possibilities for multiple or conflicting interpretattons), that it is not
an individual process (others can participate in my deciding who I am), and that the result
can be a revtsion of my identity (the bounds of my self are not given in advance). He has
even gone so far as to tell us that “for certain purposes, the appropriate description of the
moral subject may refer to a plurality of selves within a single, tndtvtdual human betng, as
when we account for inner deliberation in terms of the pull of competing identities.
.
(Liberalism... 63). What I still find to be problematic in Sanders account is that while he
sees the process of self-reflection as collective in the sense that others participate with me in
it, he again fails to ask the relevant question: “which others?” This question can only
appear unimportant to him because he imagines the community as not cut across by socially
significant group differences. If there are significant group differences within a
community-differences which mean that selves are systemically (not idiosyncratically)
constituted with different values-then it matters very much whom I engage in the process
of self-reflection with, if this is the process through which my identity is shaped.
Sandel, then, has recognized that we “have a people”-and that it is these people
with whom we participate in shaping our identities-but he still does not recognize the
necessity of questioning who the people are or should be. For Sandel, participating in
constituting one’s self is not seen as including the day to day navigation of conflicting ways
of being constituted which arise out of the intersection of multiple communities; this
navigation involves gravitating towards some people and perhaps away from others. It
cannot be that he thinks that it does not matter which people I shape my identity with, for
he would not deny that who the people are (i.e. what their ends are) is what constitutes
who I am; so it must be that he sees who my people are as a given, something that is
completely antecedent to the constitution of my identity. Sorting out what my identity is,
then, is done with a people, but does not itself consist (even in part) in sorting out who my
people are, who the community is within which my identity is constituted. I can ask “who
am I?” but I cannot ask “with whom am I?”, for this is a given. Although Sandel
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recognizes that there is some agency in my shaping who I am, he does not acknowledge
that this agency must include shaping or deciding whom I am constituted with.
This last point becomes clear in Sandel’s discussion of friendship, where he
describes how it is that a friend can help me know who I am-that is, can help me know
what my ends are. Aristotelian thinking surfaces once more in Sander s theory; Sander
s
friend is quite like Aristotle’s friend: a mirror. I will now look at Sandel’s account of
constitutive friendship.
Sandel criticizes Rawls for being committed to the claim that others cannot really
participate in one’s act of “choosing” a good, and then points out that Rawls lacks a deep
sense of friendship, in which intimacy would involve participating in one’s friend’s self-
reflection and self-constitution: “If arriving at one’s own good is primarily a matter of
surveying existing preferences and assessing their relative intensities [as it is for Rawls], it
is not the sort of inquiry in which another, even an intimate other, can readily participate.
Only the person himself can ‘know’ what he really wants or ‘decide’ what he most prefers”
(Liberalism... 171). But friendship, Sandel argues, can be “marked by mutual insight as
well as sentiment” ( Liberalism... 180) if we understand friendships to be constitutive
attachments. It is only “for persons presumed incapable of constitutive attachments” that
“acts of friendship.
. . face a powerful constraint. However much I might hope for the
good of a friend and stand ready to advance it, only the friend himself can know what the
good is” (Liberalism. .. 180-181). He contrasts the limited, liberal conception of friendship
with a communitarian sense, according to which friends may participate in knowing and
shaping each other’s conceptions of the good. Having particular ends is, in this case, not
a matter of choosing them, but rather a matter of knowing what my character is: “In
consulting my preferences, I have not only to weigh their intensity, but also to assess their
suitability to the person I (already) am” ( Liberalism. .. 180). Since a friend (in the
constitutive sense) can know my character, a friend can know and shape what my ends are.
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Knowing what a friend wants, then, is the same as knowing who the friend is, that
is, what their character is given their history, and therefore what ends they have. But
Sandel stresses that understanding a friend’s character and thus their ends is a matter of
sharing a history with the friend, or being constituted together in the same community.
Where they have a shared history, friends know one another partly by knowing their
shared history, and thus their shared values or ends. Sandel writes:
For persons encumbered in part by a history they share with others,
knowing oneself is a more complicated thing [than choosing among existing
wants]. It is also a less strictly private thing. Where seeking my good is
bound up with exploring my identity and interpreting my life history, the
knowledge I seek is less transparent to me and less opaque to others.
Uncertain which path to take, I consult a friend who knows me well, and
together we deliberate, offering and assessing by turns competing
descriptions of the person I am, and of the alternatives I face as they bear on
my identity. (Liberalism... 181)
It is in this way that a friend participates in constituting my identity.
Throughout his description of constitutive friendship, Sandel never once raises the
question of which friend he deliberates with. He simply “consults] a friend who knows
[him] well.” However, he never considers, “which ‘me’ does my friend know well?” or
“which of my friends knows ‘me’ well?”26 While he emphasizes that the ‘me’ who is the
(subject and) object of self-reflection is open to revision or shaping, he does not similarly
recognize that the friend with whom I deliberate cannot be presumed to be identifiable in
advance. Just as the possibilities of my identity are multiple, so the possibilities of whom
my identity is constituted with must also be multiple.
26See, for instance, Maria Lugones’ “Playfulness, ‘World’ -Travelling and Loving Perception,” where she
describes being different “selves” in different “worlds.” Her friends in one of her “worlds” would assure her
that she is a playful person, while her friends in another of her “worlds” will tell her she is not in the least
bit playful. It seems a contradiction to her that she is both playful and not playful, but this contradiction
resolves with the recognition that she is not one unified self; the different “worlds” have constituted her
differently. This example can stand in contrast to Sandel’s assumption that one is constituted within one
community. It is clear in Lugones’ example that it makes all the difference in the world (so to speak)
which friend she deliberates about her identity with.
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It matters so much who the friend is precisely because the differences between
members of a community are so socially significant. If the differences between community
members were only individual idiosyncrasies, or if the differences were not connected to
having different ends, then it would not be so important who the friend was. There would
be no systemically manufactured way in which the ends I come up with depends upon
whom within the community I do the deliberating with. But socially significant group
differences—such as differences of race, ethnicity, age, gender, sexuality, religion, and so
on—are tied to differences in identity and in ends. If these group differences exist within
the realm of people whom my identity is or can be constituted with, then I have to ask the
question: with Mfom is my identity constituted/to be constituted?
Sandel s friend is someone like himself, someone with a shared history; one’s
ability to know a friend well is dependent upon seeing oneself as similar to the friend in the
sense of having a shared history. Knowing another by knowing oneself and assuming the
other to be like oneself is what Elizabeth Spelman describes as “boomerang perception,”
perception in which “I look at you and come right back to myself.” Sander s friends look
at one another and come right back to themselves, seeing in each other only their shared
history. But this seemingly shared history is not likely to be a neutral one; it is likely to
reflect a dominant group’s sense of which similarities are important. As Spelman notes:
In the United States white children like me got early training in boomerang perception
when we were told by well-meaning white adults that Black people were just like us~
never, however, that we were just like Blacks” ( Inessential... 12).
As with Aristotle whose friends are “similar in their goodness” (NE 1 156b7-8),
Sandel’s friendship is also based on at least a degree of similarity. However, Sandel never
considers or argues for the desirability or undesirability of this similarity for he assumes
that the constitutive community is homogeneous in the relevant ways and therefore that for
a friendship to be constitutive, it must be based on similarity, on having a shared history.
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For Sandel, one’s constitutive community is those with whom one finds oneself.
Only a mainstream (not marginal within the community) member of a mainstream (not
marginal within the larger society) community could find it plausible to assume that there is
something desirable about opening oneself up in friendship to the less-than-private, un-
mdividualist process of reflecting upon and constituting oneself with others whom one
finds oneself with, without also having agency in determining whom one is with. For
subordinate people may “find” that they are in community with their dominators, with those
who have a stake in continuing to constitute the subordinate as subordinate. It is only those
who are thoroughgoingly mainstream folk who can remain blind to the fact that it matters
very much whom one takes to be one’s own people, the people with whom one is
constituted. For such folk can afford not to consider whom they are with and still be likely
to find themselves among folk with whom they not only share values but also find
unproblematic being constituted in accordance with those values. Someone whom
dominant ideology favors and who in turn believes in and takes as his own this dominant
ideology can travel around to anyplace that subscribes to a similar ideology and easily
claim, “where ever I go, I always find folks I connect with,” etc. Someone who is rejected
by or who rejects dominant ideology must choose connections much more carefully; it is
not all that frequently the case for such folks that without purposely seeking out particular
others who share values, that such connections will come accidentally.
Furthermore, it is not just undesirable to have whom one is with as a given, it is
also implausible that it can be a given. The presence of diversity in a community creates the
question of whom one is with. Which members of the community I am constituted with is
a morally significant question when there are systemic differences of values between
different groups within a community. In a (counter-factual) completely homogeneous
community, there would not be any morally relevant difference between being with one
member of the community and being with another. It is only through a failure to see that
systemic differences within the community do exist that I can fail to notice what rides on
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the question ot whom I am with; the question of who I am in fact depends on the question
of whom I am with, a question whose answer cannot be a given unless there are no
relevant differences between the possible people. Thus in any community which is cut
across by group difference (as I am claiming that all communities are), whom I am with is
never completely given prior to my “shaping the contours of my identity.”
Whom I am constituted with cannot be such a given because it changes both with
shifts of consciousness and with shifts in whom I am actually with day to day. For
instance, if I am a white person in a pre-dominantly white community, I might think I am
just with other “people,” all of whom (despite some of them being people of color) I
assimilate in my mind to the norms of white/anglo culture. It is my lack of consciousness
about racial differences (allowed to me by my white skin privilege) and not the lack of
racial differences which leads me to see myself as constituted simply as one among other
people” in the community. If my race consciousness changes then I might begin to notice
the particular mixture of values, experiences, and so on of the people as racialized people; if
I now describe whom I am with, I would note the way race has functioned to constitute
some of us differently, although in intersecting ways. One could say that whom I am with
changed because of my shift of focus. Whereas before I was just with “people,” now I am
with racialized people, the extent of my identification of myself with those of my own racial
group is now conscious, and may in itself change.
Change in consciousness, then, affects change in whom I am constituted with, not
just change in who I am given whom I am with. Who I understand myself to be and whom
I am with continually inform each other. For instance, in one sense I could say I have
always been “with” other Jews, growing up as I did in a largely Jewish community.
However, I did not identify (strongly) as a Jew; I did not really understand Jewishness as a
significant part of who I was. In this sense, it is false to say that I was constituted with
other Jews in the same way that I would make that claim now, although I did without
realizing it absorb and become constituted with what I can now recognize as Jewish values,
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manners, style, and so on. There is a difference between being unconsciously a member of
a group or community and being consciously, actively, and purposefully a member. This
difference makes for one sense in which I can say that whom I am with changes just
because of a change in focus or attention that comes with a change of consciousness.
We cannot, as Sandel claims that we do, just “find” ourselves in a community, for
we continue, throughout our lives, to find different descriptions for that same community,
to find different understandings of whom we are with. In this way, it is no more a given
than who we are is. These shifts in definition of who the people of the community are can
be described as a sort of a shift in whom we are with. Furthermore, the shifts are certainly
not just definitional; they are not just shifts of understanding. For along with shifts of
consciousness come actual shifts of who the people are that I am with day to day. For
instance, recognition of gender as an organizing element of oppression may make me not
only describe differently who makes up the community (now gendered subjects make up
the community, not just people”), it may lead me to form different sorts of community
ties, for instance, ties with the women in particular. My practices change as my
consciousness changes, and the practices involve developing and sustaining ties to certain
people—say, to women—and refusing to sustain connections to those who constitute me as
subordinate.
We can only avoid the definitional shifts of whom we are with if we never become
conscious of the significance of group differences within our communities. If we do come
to consciousness of group differences (and we may become conscious of some, but not
other group differences), we are confronted with the question of which members of which
communities we are with. If our recognition of whom we are with is problematic, we
exercise the same agency with respect to changing this as we can exercise in answering the
question, “who am I?” And yet while Sandel gives a description of the process of self-
reflection in which we come to understand and revise the bounds of our self, he does not
give a description of the companion process of understanding and revising the bounds of
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who our people are. It is that he does not consider the importance of my having agency to
change who my people are, nor does he consider the fact that we do in fact act as agents in
doing this; we do not just find ourselves with a given community. Coming to a
consciousness which compels us to reject mainstream ideologies which inform our ways of
constituting ourselves and others reamres that we exercise agency in having a people or a
community. For a failure to exercise agency in determining who our people are amounts to
an acceptance of the mainstream or dominant people in the community in which we do find
ourselves. And for someone who cannot find herself in the mainstream-if she is caught
between communities or if she is rejected by whatever mainstream there is-the exercise of
agency in having a people cannot be avoided.
It is not just in friendship but in constitutive community in general that, for Sandel,
histories and values must be shared (for it is not just with one’s friends but in a wider sense
within the community in general that one’s self is constituted). In defining constitutive
community, Sandel writes:
In so far as our constitutive self-understandings comprehend a wider subject
than the individual alone, whether a family or tribe or city or class or nation
or people, to this extent they define a community in the constitutive sense.
And what marks such a community is not merely a spirit of benevolence, or
the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain ‘shared final ends’
alone, but a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit
practices and understanding within which the opacity of the participants is
reduced if never finally dissolved. ( Liberalism... 172)
It is the “common vocabulary of discourse” and the shared “background of implicit
practices. . .” that provide the ground for community members to be constituted together. 27
“ Sandel certainly believes that shared understandings and history make for constitutive community, and
that the community must be thought of as clearly bounded and homogeneous. However, even Sandel is not
the most rabid of communitarians in making this assumption. Michael Walzer, for instance, is absolutely
obsessed with the question of membership (who is in and who is out) in a community, and with
maintaining the community as a bounded world within which all meanings are common meanings. He is
led to focus on communities as clearly bounded worlds because he is primarily concerned with questions of
distribution, and believes that to theorize about distribution we must do so in reference to a bounded world.
He writes that “the idea of distributive justice presupposes a bounded world within which distributions take
place: a group of people committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods, first of all among
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In arguing that exercising agency with respect to one’s identity must include asking
whom one is being constituted with, I have not yet necessarily called into question whether
or not one can still only be constituted with others like oneself. I have suggested that one
can exercise agency in determining who the friends are that one reflects with, or in moving
within certain parts of a community, or in leaving a community altogether and creating or
joining a different one.28 However, all of this is potentially consistent with attempting to
continue to be constituted with others like oneself. I have argued that who one’s
constitutive community is need not be a given, and have thus opened up the question of
whom one might be constituted with. This leaves open the question of whether to argue
that constitutive community can, cannot, should, or should not be based on similarity. I
will discuss more fully later why I think that basing a constitutive community on a given
similarity is neither possible nor desirable in a society characterized by intersecting group
differences. The illusion of this similarity is certainly possible, but it is achieved only by
focusing on the mainstream of a community, or on describing community members only in
themselves. That world. . . is the political community” (31). This political community-a bounded world-
ts the only sort of constitutive community of which Walzer speaks. It seems natural to Walzer that
members of a political community share one unitary culture and want to keep their boundaries clear so as to
avoid sacrificing the distinctiveness of their culture. In speaking of neighborhoods (in order to make an
analogy to political communities) he claims that “their members will organize to defend the local politics
and culture against strangers (38). He reasons that 'the distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon
closure and, without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life” (39). He has absolutely no
way of accounting for cultural mestizaje. Furthermore, he writes that “we who are already members [of a
political community] do the choosing [of whom to admit into the bounded world], in accordance with our
understanding ol what membership means in our community and what sort of a community we want to
have. Membership as a social good is constituted by our understanding; its value is fixed by our work and
conversation; and then we are in charge (who else could be in charge?) of its distribution” (32, my
emphasis). It is clear that this is a dangerous situation for anyone who is not in the mainstream of the
political community, or for anyone who is considered to be on the outside of it and may want in. If there is
to be a “we" who have shared understandings (and who manifest no diversity or cultural mestizaje ), it is
only going to be achieved by erasing everyone who is not definitive of that norm. The illusion of the
political community as both homogeneous and clearly bounded is a dangerous weapon, but it is an illusion
which Walzer is especially committed to.
28\Vhen I speak of “leaving” a community, this “leaving” could be literal, as one leaves a geographically
based community of place, or it could be a matter of a shift of focus or attention; one could “leave,” for
instance, a patriarchal community while remaining physically amongst the same group of people, but
shifting one’s sense of whose perceptions and actions carry moral weight. See, for instance, Marilyn Frye’s
description in “To Be and Be Seen” of women shifting their focus onto each other in the “background”
while what she calls phallocratic reality takes up the “foreground.” There is a shift in who one’s
community is and how one’s self becomes constituted or reconstituted within community that accompanies
the shift of focus.
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terms of what they share, not in terms of their differences, as if the description of their
similarities exhausted them.
There have been two parts to the critique of Sandel here. First of all, he does not
consider that it matters whom I constitute myself with, and therefore does not explore how
I could exercise agency in shaping whom my constitutive community consists of; and, in
fact, he describes the encumbered self as for the most part unable to move in relation to
given values. Secondly, he characterizes constitutive friendship and constitutive
community as based on having a shared or common history, and so he never explores the
question of whether one can be constituted in relation with people from whom one is
different in significant ways.
D
;
Alasdair MacIntyre and the Quest for Unitv: At Whose Expensed
Alasdair MacIntyre, like Sandel, recognizes that we are constituted as beings
embedded in particular histories and communities, with particular social roles and ends
defining those roles. His account gives some depth back to what a “self’ is, depth which is
lacking when morality is replaced by the emotivism found in modern, liberal societies. I
turn now to MacIntyre because like Sandel, MacIntyre gives an account of the historically
and socially constituted self, and his account is potentially useful for understanding what it
is to have “a people” in a political sense. Like Sandel, MacIntyre argues that the modem
liberal (and emotivist) self—the self who cannot be understood as having any “people”—is
illusory. He contrasts the modern self primarily to the self of heroic societies, a self
defined by his (I use the word advisedly) social roles and the given virtues of these roles.
MacIntyre’s task could be described as that of modifying a lost version of the moral self so
that we might begin to redevelop it here and now, amidst the moral disarray of modernity.
To succeed in regaining a sense of the self as constituted with a history and a community of
a people (and an attendant catalogue of the virtues) would displace modem liberalism, but.
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as I will argue, if it is done on MacIntyre's terms, it will also erase the complexities of the
self that derive from the presence of interlocking, socially significant group differences.
MacIntyre begins by contrasting the (illusory) emotivist self-whose moral sense
comes from nowhere and consists of nothing more than an assortment of attitudes-with the
pre-modem self, who is defined by a particular placement within social history and social
roles. He writes of the modem, emotivist self:
. . . whatever criteria or principles or evaluative allegiances the emotivist
self may profess, they are to be construed as expressions of attitudes,
preferences and choices which are themselves not governed by criterion,
principle or value, since they underlie and are prior to all allegiance to
criterion, principle or value. But from this it follows that the emotivist self
can have no rational history in its transitions from one state of moral
commitment to another. Inner conflicts are for it necessarily aufond the
confrontation of one contingent arbitrariness by another The self thus
conceived, utterly distinct on the one hand from its social embodiments and
lacking on the other any rational history of its own, may seem to have a
certain abstract and ghostly character. (After. .. 33)
In rejecting such ghosts and developing an alternative understanding of the self, MacIntyre
harkens back to pre-modern, traditional societies.” He does so for two reasons. First of
all, such societies understood selves to be defined socially and so a pre-modern
understanding of the self is an alternative to the ghost-selves of modernity. Secondly,
because he sees selves as constituted in part by inheriting a particular past, he must look at
“our”29 history, a history which goes back to heroic societies.
For MacIntyre, there is a way in which heroic societies had it right about morality.
One can learn from heroic societies, MacIntyre writes,
first that all morality is always to some degree tied to the socially local and
particular and that the aspirations of the morality of modernity to a
universality freed from all particularity is an illusion; and secondly that there
29More later on problematizing this “us.”
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is no way to possess the virtues except as part of a tradition in which we
inherit them and our understanding of them from a series of predecessors in
which series heroic societies hold first place. If this is so, the contrast
between the freedom of choice of values of which modernity prides itself
and the absence of such choice in heroic cultures would look very different.
For freedom of choice of values would from the standpoint of a tradition
ultimately rooted in heroic societies appear more like the freedom of ghosts-
-of those whose human substance approached vanishing point-than of men
[sic]. (After.
„
126-127)
So it is not just that heroic societies had an account of morality that is more than the
“morality” of ghosts and so will be a useful tradition to consider as in developing an
alternative to modem liberalism, but furthermore there is a sense in which one must turn to
the history of heroic societies to understand one’s own moral self because, MacIntyre
claims, it is our history
,
a history by which “we” are partly constituted.
What, then, is the pre-modern understanding of a moral self? It is a self whose
given social position and history places him/herself at a moral starting point. MacIntyre
writes:
In many pre-modern, traditional societies it is through his or her
membership in a variety of social groups that the individual identifies
himself or herself and is identified by others. I am brother, cousin and
grandson, member of this household, that village, this tribe. These are not
characteristics that belong to human beings accidentally, to be stripped away
in order to discover ’the real me’. They are part of my substance, defining
partially at least and sometimes wholly my obligations and my duties.
Individuals inherit a particular space within an interlocking set of social
relationships; lacking that space, they are nobody, or at best a stranger or an
outcast. To know oneself as such a social person is however not to occupy
a static and fixed position. It is to find oneself placed at a certain point on a
journey with set goals; to move through life is to make progress—or to fail
to make progress-toward a given end. ( After. .. 33-34)
At first glance MacIntyre’s description of the pre-modern self looks promising as a model
for a contemporary, socially constituted self. First of all, he does recognize that one person
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can have many “interlocking” social roles at once; and secondly, he also characterizes the
moral subject as able to move and change within certain given social relationships.
MacIntyre’s project continues to look promising as he goes on to consider Aristotle’s
understanding of ethics and politics; he is interested in preserving Aristotle’s
communitarian sense of what a polis is while also critiquing and rejecting certain aspects of
Aristotelian theory.
According to MacIntyre, there are three related problems with adopting an
Aristotelian conception of the polis as a model for political community. First of all,
assuming that one does not accept Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology” that grounds his
teleology, one needs some other way of grounding one’s knowledge of what man’s telos
is. He puts the question out. If we reject [Aristotle’s metaphysical biology], as we must,
is there any way in which that teleology can be preserved?” (After. .. 162). He mentions
that others have responded to this question by saying that “all we need to provide in order
to justify an account of the virtues and vices is some very general account of what human
flourishing and well-being consists in” (After... 162). However, MacIntyre argues, “This
view ignores the place in our cultural history of deep conflicts over what human flourishing
and well-being do consist in and the way in which rival and incompatible beliefs on that
topic beget rival and incompatible tables of the virtues” (162-163). So MacIntyre has
introduced into Aristotelian theory the idea that if a good or telos is not given in advance in
some “natural” way, then it must arise out of human society; but where no single telos is
given, the question of what human flourishing is might be an open question. If there is not
agreement on the matter, how can one say it is a given? Thus it appears that MacIntyre is
going to develop a communitarian sense of how a community develops a conception of the
good without presupposing agreement.
The second problem which MacIntyre raises for contemporary communitarians who
want to preserve a form of Aristotelianism, is stated: “If a good deal of the detail of
Aristotle’s account of the virtues presupposes the now-long-vanished context of the social
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relationships of the ancient city-state, how can Aristoteliamsm be formulated so as to be a
moral presence in a world in which there are no city-states?” (After. .. 163). MacIntyre
thus recognizes that a constitutive community (polis) in contemporary society must look
very different than it did in Ancient Greece; he is not laboring under the illusion that we can
somehow go back to the pre-modern self of the good ol‘ days. Again, this looks
promising because one might expect that an examination of how the conditions of
contemporary society differ from those of Ancient Greece would lead a theorist to develop
a conception of political community which recognizes group differences. MacIntyre has
laid the groundwork for this recognition, but in the end he never really explores what the
differences between a Greek polis and a contemporary political community must be, since
he fails to acknowledge some of the (contingent, but nevertheless present) characteristics of
contemporary society in the United States. Among the relevant features of this
contemporary society, for any theory of constitutive community, must be the presence of
intersecting group differences, such as differences of race, gender, class, ethnicity, age,
religion, etc.30 I will return later to why these features of society cannot be ignored in a
constitutive community.
MacIntyre s third objection to Aristotelian ethical and political theory is that it
assumes that harmony, not conflict, is a desideratum in the polis. MacIntyre argues that:
there are the questions posed by Aristotle’s inheritance of Plato’s belief in
the unity and harmony of both the individual soul and the city-state and
Aristotle’s consequent perception of conflict as something to be avoided or
managed.
. . The absence of this view of the centrality of opposition and
conflict in human life conceals from Aristotle also one important source of
- We should note that many of these group differences-in different formations and by different names-
existed in Ancient Greece as well, although the differences were erased by thinkers such as Aristotle, who
strove for homogeneity among participants in the polis. Aristotle accounts for the existence of different
“groups” of humans (citizen men, citizen class women, male and female slaves [whom Aristotle did not
recognize as genderized—see E. Spelman, Inessential Woman , ch. 2], etc.), but this is irrelevant for the
question of how one is constituted or trained in the polis, for the polis is really only constructed to be a
training ground for one kind of humans, for citizen men.
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human learning about the one important milieu of human practice of the
virtues. (164)
In critiquing some of Aristotle’s assumptions, MacIntyre has pointed in a direction
to go in revising a conception of political community as constitutive. MacIntyre has
claimed, in sum, that contrary to what Aristotle believed, there is no naturally given telos,
there is no context of a given polls (in contemporary society), and there is not (nor should
there be) any a priori unity within a political community. Rather, he thinks, there is
disagreement over what human flourishing is, there is a heterogeneous society without
clearly given social structures and with a variety of practices, and there is (and should be)
conflict within political communities. However, MacIntyre goes on to argue-and here is
where I part ways with him-that despite our lack of a given telos
,
a given polls
,
and a
given unity, there is an overall unity to be found; one just needs to develop an account
which would explain how to conceive of that overall unity. And this is precisely what
MacIntyre sets out to do.
MacIntyre begins his quest for unity by looking head on at the apparent lack of
unity in our moral tradition. He notices that in his depiction of the history which has led
up to our present sorry state of moral disarray, different points in the history (as presented
by different thinkers or writers) reflect very different conceptions of the virtues. MacIntyre
wonders whether these different tables of the virtues are “different rival accounts of the
same thing” or whether they are “accounts of three different things” (185). He summarizes:
We thus have at least three very different conceptions of a virtue to confront:
a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to discharge his or her
social role (Homer); a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to
move towards the achievement of the specifically human telos, whether
natural or supernatural (Aristotle, the new Testament and Aquinas); a virtue
is a quality which has utility in achieving earthly and heavenly success
([Benjamin] Franklin). (185)
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MacIntyre's task is to acknowledge the differences in these conceptions of the
vtrtues and yet to demonstrate that all these points in h,story with their corresponding
virtues belong to one tradition, a tradition in which there is to be found an overall unity.
He aims to “disentangle from these rival and various claims a unitary core concept of the
virtues” in order to “provide the tradition of which I have written the history with its
conceptual unity" (186). This conceptual unity, we learn, is to be achieved by casting out
those virtues which do not comprise the tradition-by distinguishing, one might say,
between those virtues which are essential to the tradition and those which are only
accidental. MacIntyre claims that the conceptual unity of the tradition “will indeed enable
us to distinguish in a clear way those beliefs about the virtues which genuinely belong to
the tradition from those which do not” ( 1 86). There is a clue here that MacIntyre is
recognizing heterogeneity just enough to know how to “deal” with it-how to designate one
part as essentially comprising the unitary tradition and how to throw out the part that does
not belong.
It is helpful to look at how MacIntyre argues for his conceptual unity, to see where
the recognition of heterogeneity comes from, and also how it gets lost or overridden by the
quest for unity. To develop his account of which virtues comprise the moral tradition
which he is describing, MacIntyre focuses on the necessary background concepts of what
he calls a practice,-^ 1 a narrative order of a single human life, and a moral tradition. His
first, partial definition of a virtue depends on the concept of a practice:
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and
the lack of which effectively prevents usfrom achieving any such goods.
(191)
*2 i
“By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and
goods involved, are systematically extended” (MacIntyre, 187).
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Because a virtue is defined in terms of a practice, and because there are many varied
practices in contemporary society, the virtues are many-and they do not yet appear to be
unified in any way, for in fact they can be incompatible with each other. But MacIntyre has
been led to this preliminary account of the virtues because of his critique of Aristotle, and
MacIntyre’s account of the virtues does avoid two of the problems which he cited in
Aristotelian theory. First of all, by locating virtues as developed within practices, it is
teleological (MacIntyre calls it a “socially teleological account”) without being dependent on
Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology .” And secondly, it includes a description of the source of
conflict: conflict springs from “the multiplicity of human practices and the consequent
multiplicity of goods in the pursuit of which the virtues may be exercised-goods which
will often be contingently incompatible and which will therefore make rival claims upon our
allegiance” (196-197).
In this preliminary account of the virtues as located within specific and various
practices, MacIntyre recognizes heterogeneity in the form of group differences: different
practices call for and sustain different human virtues. What is missing is a recognition that
the group differences are systemic; humans do not just randomly participate in different
practices, but rather practices are tied to systemic, social ways of grouping people—by
gender, race, class, and so on. As I will go on to argue, MacIntyre’s readiness to resolve
the heterogeneity of practices and corresponding virtues into an overall unity derives from
his failure to see that this unity can only be bought at the price of a systematic dismissal of
certain practices-and thus certain persons-as not genuinely belonging.
So far MacIntyre has, by noticing a multiplicity of practices and corresponding
multiplicity of virtues, recognized heterogeneity and conflict. But he is troubled by the
heterogeneity-the lack of unity-in this preliminary account of the virtues. He has found a
place to account for heterogeneity and hence conflict, but he wants to go on to find a larger
unity in which this heterogeneity has a place. This larger unity is to be found in a whole
human life. He writes:
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The most notable difference so far between my account and any account that
could be called Aristotelian is that although I have in no way restricted the
exercise of the virtues to the context of practices, it is in terms of practices
that I have located their point and function. Whereas Aristotle locates that
point and function in terms of the notion of a type of whole human life
which can be called good. And it does seem that the question ‘What would
a human being lack who lacked the virtues?’ must be given a kind of answer
which goes beyond anything which I have said so far. For such an
individual would not merely fail in a variety ofparticular ways in respect of
the kind of excellence which can be achieved through participation in
practices and in respect of the kind of human relationship required to sustain
such excellence. His own life viewed as a whole would perhaps be
defective. (201)
If it is in a whole life that virtue must be located, then the fact that any person participates in
a multitude of practices-with perhaps conflicting virtues-must be problematic. MacIntyre
is concerned about there being “too many conflicts and too much arbitrariness” (201). In
particular, he fears that “the claims of one practice may be incompatible with another in
such a way that one may find oneself oscillating in an arbitrary way, rather than making
rational choices” (201).
It is clear that for MacIntyre, conflicts created by having multiple practices are a
threat to the unity of my whole human life. And lacking such unity-and thus lacking the
virtues which can be evaluated only as manifested in a whole life—can make me defective.
He remarks that those people who have allegiances to different particular practices
experience too much conflict and an overall arbitrariness to their lives. He gives examples:
“there may be tensions between the claims of family life and those of the arts. . . or
between the claims of politics and those of the arts.
. .”(201). But what MacIntyre and
these examples can lead one away from seeing is that there is in fact nothing arbitrary about
having split allegiances. Anyone with multiple identifications in different communities or
with different histories experiences the pull of different practices with different
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corresponding virtues, but there is nothing arbitrary about it; the differences are systemic.
Furthermore, the call for unity, for anyone who acknowledges their multiple group
identifications, must be heard as a call to cast off some of these identifications. For
instance, if the practices imbedded in Jewish history beckon me to develop one way in
accordance with “my” virtue-say, to marry a Jewish man and raise Jewish children in
order to perpetuate “my people” in the face of cultural annihilation-while the practices of
lesbian community beckon me towards another virtue-say, recognizing and resisting
compulsory heterosexuality and compulsory motherhood-then there is nothing arbitrary
about my conflicting allegiances, and no call for unity will resolve the situation if it entails
throwing away “pieces” of my identity.
In recognizing exactly how MacIntyre is going to create unity out of conflict, it is
possible to see how his solution requires people to reject some identifications. Unity is to
be found, MacIntyre argues, in the unity of narrative. We are characters in (and partial
authors of) narratives with a long history; human actions are not isolated events, but instead
are tied by a narrative history in which they are embedded. He asserts that “narrative
history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the characterization
of human actions (208), and adds that “someone may discover (or not discover) that he or
she is a character in a number of narratives at the same time, some of them embedded in
others (213). We are authors of these narratives in a collective sense; that is, “we are
never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of our own narratives” (213).
Thus the resolution of arbitrariness comes from discovering which practices fit
oneself, that is, which ones fit the character in the narrative of one’s life. MacIntyre writes;
The key question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only
answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question
‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter human society,
that is, with one or more imputed characters-roles into which we have been
drafted-and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand
how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be
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construed. It is through hearing stories.
. . that children learn or mislearn
• • • what the cast of characters may be in the drama into which they have
been born and what the ways of the world are. (216)
It is clear from the fact that MacIntyre sees narrative as providing unity and replacing the
arbitrariness ot participating in multiple practices that he does not recognize split allegiances
as re-occurring now in the form of multiple narratives. Through stories, children learn
about a cast of characters to form their own identities, but what do they learn when the
stories they hear are themselves multiple and contradictory? For instance, for those people
who are “split at the root”~to borrow the phrase that Adrienne Rich uses to describe her
mixed Jewish and Gentile heritage-the root which is revealed in narrative history will not
provide unity. If “the unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest” (219), then
that unity can only come from hearing/living a unitary story (or several stories amongst
which there is unity). But narratives can be multiple and conflicting just as practices can.
When MacIntyre goes on to the third stage in his account of the virtues, he begins
with the recognition that “I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues only
qua individual” (220); he needs to look, here, at the social circumstances that construct
different narratives (and thus identities). At this stage, if he were to recognize that some
people are constructed in a multitude of communities he would be led to see the production
of different, conflicting narratives as all describing one person’s life. But he does not
recognize multiple communities as providing social identity. He writes:
But it is not just that different individuals live in different social
circumstances; it is also that we all approach our own circumstances as
bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone’s son or daughter,
someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member
of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this
nation.32 Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who
-
-Note that some of these relations are more constitutive of identity than others. Iris Marion Young
distinguishes between social groups, associations, and aggregates. A “guild” or “profession” would be
counted as an association, not a social group. Only social groups are constitutive of identity. Relations of
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inhabits these roles. As such I inherit from the past of my family, my city,
my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations
and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting
point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity. (220)
While MacIntyre has not acknowledged that the pull of different constitutive communities
on one person’s life creates conflict or dis-unity just as the pull of different practices does,
he does see conflict as thriving within constitutive communities. He argues that our
particular social circumstances are part of particular traditions, and traditions are not static;
they change. Thus MacIntyre argues, the idea of a tradition is not necessarily conservative;
conflict within traditions create change. He describes a “living tradition” as “an historically
extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods
which constitute that tradition” (222), and notes that “traditions, when vital, embody
continuities of conflict” (222). Traditions can die out, MacIntyre thinks, but they do so
because of the failure to sustain the relevant virtues: “Lack of justice, lack of truthfulness,
lack of courage, lack of the relevant intellectual virtues—these corrupt traditions” (223).
MacIntyre, then, has partially opened the question of which traditions we inherit, but one
can see by his description of how traditions die that he has completely failed to recognize
the context in which traditions exist: the context of cultural imperialism, for instance, which
serves to wipe out certain traditions systematically. He makes it seem as if by an internal
weakness and lack of virtue a tradition will die, while failing to acknowledge that traditions
are killed from forces such as cultural imperialism. He notes the “virtue of having an
adequate sense of the traditions to which one belongs or which confront one” (223) but
does not mention that it is cultural imperialism and subsequent compulsory assimilation
which destroys many people’s sense of the traditions to which they belong. He has thus
squashed the political question of which story one tells, which tradition or community
gives a person an identity, as soon as he raises it. According to MacIntyre, the traditions
members of associations to one another can be liberal relations, relations which do not bear on the identity
of members.
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which sustain the virtues are those which survive, and it is these tradittons which we
inherit.
It is now possible to see why the call for unity systematically erases all but the
dominant communities’ traditions. The unity of a single human life is the unity found in
the narrative embodied in that life, MacIntyre has asserted. But it is not as individuals that
we are characters in narratives, it is as people with certain histories and social roles which
we inherit or discover ourselves within, and this history and our social roles legitimately
define our identity and our moral commitments. The unity required for a full account of the
virtues thus requires the discovery and acknowledgment of ourselves within our histories
and communities. And this is where the call for unity becomes a call for erasure of
heterogeneous or multiple traditions and communities. For a tradition to provide unity it
must not be a mixture of perhaps contradictory histories; for my location within a social
matrix to guide the virtuous living of my life it must not consist of social roles with
competing allegiances. And when there is a mixture of histories to inherit and yet I must
tell a unified story, I am directed to those traditions which sustain virtue and therefore do
not die, I am not directed to ask what the political forces of dominance and subordination
are which annihilate some traditions and make others hegemonic.
Because he believes there must be a unified story to be told, MacIntyre tells the
most visible story, the history which has virtuously survived. This is why “our” tradition
is rooted in heroic societies. He has told us that “living traditions, just because they
continue a not-yet-completed narrative, confront a future whose determinate and
determinable character, so far as it possesses any, derives from the past” (223). But he
does not ask, ‘which past?’ It is clear that he disregards this question by his assumptions
about which past “we” share, which past “we” inherit. He writes, for instance: “We are,
whether we acknowledge it or not, what the past has made us and we cannot eradicate from
ourselves, even in America, those parts of ourselves which are formed by our relationship
to each formative stage in our history. If this is so, then even heroic society is still
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inescapably a part of usall. . •” (130, my emphasis). This claim can only trigger echoes of
some version of Lorraine Bethel’s refrain: “What ’chou mean we, white girl?”33 All of the
examples throughout his book are from the history of white Anglo Americans or Western
Europeans; this alerts us to the fact that his attention is on those people who inherit this
history, this history which claims dominance in the United States today. There are to my
knowledge two exceptions in After Virtue where MacIntyre mentions non-dominant
peoples. The first is where he mentions “black Americans” only to illustrate a point about
white people’s individualist lack of a sense of history. It is not an analysis of the situation,
history, or social roles of Black people, but rather a use of Black people’s history to make a
point about white people’s history. MacIntyre writes, “...individualism is expressed by
those modern Americans [white, we are to presume, as all MacIntyre’s subjects are unless
otherwise noted] who deny any responsibility for the effects of slavery upon black
Americans, saying I never owned any slaves’” (220). He makes a similar point about
Englishmen who refuse responsibility for having wronged Ireland, and contemporary
Germans [Aryan, we are to presume] who see their relationship with Jews as morally
unaffected by the history of the Nazis. The second place where MacIntyre mentions non-
dominant peoples is to illustrate the presence of contemporary, traditional communities.
After describing modem society as a “conceptual melange of moral thought and practice,”
exhibiting only fragments of a tradition of virtues, he claims that he does see traditions
surviving more intact in “certain communities whose historical ties with their past remain
strong.” He continues:
So the older moral tradition is discernible in the United States and elsewhere
among, for example, some Catholic Irish, some Orthodox Greeks and some
Jews of an Orthodox persuasion, all of them communities that inherit their
moral tradition not only through their religion but also from the structure of
the peasant villages and households which their immediate ancestors
inhabited on the margins of modem Europe. (252)
^Lorraine Bethel, “What Chou Mean We, White Girl?” in Conditions: Five 1 1, no. 2 (Fall, 1979): 86-92.
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These examples stand in contrast to his emphasis on traditions being living traditions,
characterized as ongoing arguments; a tradition is healthy, he has told us, only when it
embodies conflict and change, and yet this sole reference to non-dominant traditions
portrays these traditions as stagnant, not living traditions, not vital. In mentioning non-
dominant cultures only to emphasize their traditional nature, he contributes to the insistence
that non-dominant cultures must die (for lack of vitality). Furthermore, he still has not seen
that members of marginalized cultures in the United States are often those who have to
complicate a sense of having a people, not those who have a clearly-bounded, traditional
culture and clearly given social roles.
MacIntyre never considers, “even in America,” the history of those Americans who
inherit the narrative pasts (or presents) of Africans, Asians, or Native Americans; he also,
thus, never considers the narrative past(s) of those who are hybrids or mestizos. And thus
it never seems problematic to him to speak of “our” narrative past or pasts, for the question
of “which past?” never seems hard for him to answer, is never itself the source of conflict.
But for many it is a source of conflict. As Gloria Anzaldua has written, “the mestizo faces
the dilemma of the mixed breed: which collectivity does the daughter of a dark skinned
mother listen to?” (Borderlands 78).
What traditions am I a part of?’ should be a key question. It is tied to the question,
‘whom should I engage in meaning-making with?’ which is the question of whom the
argument-the argument which constitutes a living tradition-is with. MacIntyre does see
people as having histories and traditions, which become present social contexts or
communities, but just like Sandel, MacIntyre fails to problematize the question of which
traditions one locates oneself in, which present communities constitute one’s identity. It is
as if he asks, ‘ given my history and tradition, what should I do to live it out?’ (or ‘how
should I engage in the argument about what the good life is, the argument which constitutes
my living tradition?’) but not, ‘which living tradition (as if they were even distinct) am I
located in, which argument should I participate in? with whom?’
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Furthermore, his characterization of a living tradition as an ongotng argument is
misleading. It implies that we are all equally regarded as being within the tradition,
legitimate participants in the argument. But it is not just an internal argument. It is also a
contest of borders. Questions arise before the argument begins: who is in the tradi.ton?
what goes on in the margins or the borderlands-is there an argument there, too? The
context of cultural imperialism, of dominance and subordination between different
traditions, has a bearing on the survival of some traditions and a bearing on who belongs
within which traditions. MacIntyre ignores this context.
To summarize: MacIntyre recognizes that there is conflict stemming from there
being multiple practices in a society. However, he does not recognize that the different
practices—and hence the conflicts of values-are systemicallv different. Since he has not
characterized contemporary society as cut across by overlapping group differences of race,
gender, ethnicity, etc., he cannot recognize the systemic nature of the different
constructions of practices. This has resulted in two failures on MacIntyre’s part.
First of all, in a society in which group differences construct different people with
different values (i.e. as having allegiance to different tables of the virtues) and in which the
group differences arrange groups of people hierarchically, the search for overall unity tends
to result in a forsaking of the practices of subordinate groups and a consequent increased
hegemony of dominant groups’ practices. MacIntyre fails to see that his call for unity leads
to systematically abandoning subordinate groups’ practices. Since the unity is based in
narrative history— our history going back to heroic societies—there is an erasure of
conflicting histories, histories of subordinate groups, for recognition of such histories
would disrupt the unified nature of the narrative.
But there is a second failure on MacIntyre’s part, which has to do with the fact that
group differences are overlapping, and they overlap within individuals. No one is just
racialized or just genderized, and so on; we are constituted with a gender which is in part
itself defined by race and ethnicity and class, and so on; for any given person, then, there is
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were some way of isolating, say, race, and
never just one story to tell. Even if there
thereby being able to tell the story of one person by telling the story of their race, there is
still, in most people’s “racial” story (remember, this is supposing, contrary to fact, that a
racial story could be told separate from any other story, a “gender” story for example)
actually several perhaps confhcting stories, for races are seldom “pure.”
Thus any one individual belongs to many “groups” whose histories overlap and
might conflict. Identification with one group Lather than another is a political act, and the
attempt to live out a mixed, or mestizo identity is also a political act. Which identities are
possible and desirable are among the important political questions to ask. However,
MacIntyre takes these as a given by failing to problematize the act of knowing and drawing
on one’s history, the past which has formed oneself.
* * *
Sandel and MacIntyre’s conceptions of encumbered selves, or selves who come as
bearers ol particular histories provide an account of how a certain kind of a self is
constituted as having a people. This self comes by his/her ends through a certain sort of
reflection, a reflection which asks “who am I?” and answers with reference to a single,
bounded community or a single narrative history. But I am interested in a different sort of
a self, because it is clear that in a world where multiple and conflicting community
identifications and multiple and conflicting narrative histories converge within individuals
to create complex identities, there us a need to understand a self who is forced to ask, “who
are my people?” precisely because the answer is not given in advance and in any case will
not reveal a unity. It is this complex self who is interesting because if I understand myself
as such a self, I am compelled to ask as open-ended the politically motivated question of
who the people are with whom I will engage in resistance, a resistance which in part
involves re-constituting my own self identity. For the complex self, this question cannot
be answered by reference to a unified community or history; so one is led to ask, who are
the people, who are the political companions, of the complex self, the self who lacks the
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unity that is the aim of MacIntyre's narrative quest? In the next chapter I will consider
theorists who are in dialogue with communitarian theory but who do not presuppose that
only traditional forms of community constitute our selves.
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CHAPTER III
BEYOND COMMUNITARIAN UNITY
The paradox of sociability reappears within the community of life as a paradox of group
cohesion: insofar as sympathy in social life requires an allegiance to common ends, it
threatens to destroy the individuality it wants to protect. By its very nature, community
is always on the verge of becoming oppression. The existing consensus may be
mistaken for the final expression of the good, and used as a justification for denying the
humanity of individuals and rejecting the legitimacy of dissident groups.
. . A politics
that responds to this threat must be one that emphasizes the transitory and limited
character of all forms of group life as manifestations of human nature. Such a politics
will be committed to the plurality and diversity of groups, and it will prize the conflictual
process through which community is created and made universal above the preservation of
any one collectivity.
—Roberto Mangabeira Unger
A. Introduction
As I argued in the previous chapter, Sandel and Maclntyre-as well as other
communitarian theorists-have extremely limited conceptions of what counts as a
constitutive community. At least, however, they do offer a model of community which
allows for the recognition that it makes sense to speak of “having a people”~that we are not
unattached, unencumbered ghost-selves who appear out of nowhere and can become
(through free individual choice) anything. In response to both Sandel and MacIntyre, I
have argued that instead of presupposing who the community is or which history our
character derives from, it is crucial to complicate the understanding of constitutive
community by opening the question of who one’s people are, while meanwhile not
sacrificing the claim that it does indeed make sense to speak of having a people, a
collectivity to one’s self.
What the traditional communitarians give is a descriptive account of the
communitarian self. We are constituted in community, they claim; we do “come with” our
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histories. The claim is descriptive in the sense that they are asserting that this is the way
human selves are. As social animals, we cannot fail to be constituted in relation to others,
although one can fail, as the liberal does, to understand oneself in this way; one can
mistakenly believe that one gains one's ends through an exercise of the will in which a
previously value-free subject selects from among the possibilities.
The traditional communitarian account of the self, then, can be understood to
constitute a descriptive claim that we are constituted in community; it can also be extended
to imply the limited normative claim that it is best to understand ourselves as so constituted,
for there is a poverty involved in seeing oneself only as an unencumbered ghost-self.
However, stronger and more complicated normative claims can be made when one revises
communitarian theory with the suggestion that while we are constituted in community and
through history, the communities and histories which constitute us are not unified, and are
not wholly given in advance. For if we are in part agents in the determination of whom we
are constituted with, then one can make normative claims about which histories and which
communities claim one’s allegiance. The basis for these normative claims is political, for if
one understands politics in the Aristotelian sense, then one understands doing politics with
others as an undertaking which is constitutive of one’s identity. A complex
communitarian view of the self reveals that political communities are neither completely
“chosen” by the unencumbered self nor are they completely determined in advance by
reference to a single, homogeneous community which was, say, one’s community of
origin. I will argue that one can make normative claims about who should comprise one’s
(constitutive) political communities, but that these claims must be ones that make sense for
selves whose identities are understood through intersecting group differences.
This chapter will open the way for such claims by considering whether and how it
is possible to exercise agency underneath the pull of conflicting constitutive identities.
Thus I am going to turn now to theorists who attempt to develop communitarian ways of
thinking about community without presupposing who the constitutive community is
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composed of. I will begin with Marilyn Fr.edman, whose account of commun.ty comes
out of her critique of communitarians such as Sandel and MacIntyre.
B. Community of Choice/Intentional Community
Marilyn Friedman’s goal is to retain the communitarians’ claim that the self is
constituted in community, but to reject their assumptions about what counts as a
community and about the “legitimacy of the moral influences which communities exert over
their members” (280). She suggests that one begins to think about the self as constituted
not only in communities of place but also in what she refers to as communities of choice;
she rejects Sandel ’s description of community as “not a relationship they [members] choose
(as in a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a
constituent of their identity” (Sandel, Liberalism 150, qtd. in Friedman 283). In
contradistinction to his point, Friedman asserts that “one need not have simply discovered
oneself to be embedded in them [communities] in order that one’s identity or the moral
particulars of one’s life be defined by them” (284). She writes, “communities of choice
foster not so much the constitution of subjects but their reconstitution” (289)—that is,
purposeful, chosen reconstitution. Her suggestion is that “communities of choice” can be
better moral starting points—and better locations for doing continued collective ethical
thinking—than communities of place, for one can choose to become a member of a
community which is based on feminist or liberatory values, a community whose norms and
practices are informed by feminist thinking; implicit is the claim that one can choose to
constitute or “reconstitute” oneself as a member of a community which is based on feminist
or liberatory values. According to Friedman, to create or join a community of choice
allows one to exercise choice about what sort of relations and norms will inform one’s
ethical thinking; one does not have to take as given (or as unshakable), as one does in
communitarian philosophy, the set of moral values which are held in the community in
which one finds oneself.
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Friedman’s use of the distinction between communities of place and communities of
choice in thinking about how the self is constituted in community could be helpful if it
allows one to mamtain a commitment to thinking of the self as socially constituted without
thereby being committed to seeing oneself as necessarily constituted by the dominant moral
values which were embodied by the communities of place which were one’s communities
of origin. However, it is not clear that Friedman’s description of “choosing” a community
within which to reconstitute one’s self is supported by an adequate account of the choosing
subject. Although she describes the self as being socially (re)constituted once it is within a
community of choice, she does not give a defensible account of what this self is like at the
point of entry into the community of choice; in fact, the image of the self at this point is of a
self who can cast off her history and the ways her community of place have constituted her,
and start anew. This conception of the self-which Friedman in fact refers to as the modern
self— is quite like the liberal, unencumbered self at the point of choosing a community of
choice—and from then on, the self is characterized as communitarian, socially constituted
within the community of choice.
Thus a communitarian response to Friedman’s advocating that we form
communities of choice might include the assertion that recognizing humans’ sociality
requires acknowledging the extent to which we are necessarily constituted by the cultures
of our communities of place; thus, one might argue, to suppose that a person could simply
“choose” with whom to constitute their self-identity is to make an individualist assumption
about human nature. Friedman’s valorization of communities of choice thus needs to be re-
examined. However, I do not think that this re-examination needs to lead to a rejection of
the possibility of communities of choice; instead, it means one has to show that a self can
be both socially constituted and capable of exercising agency in changing, leaving, or
creating a constitutive community. Friedman has not provided a description of the
choosing self as someone who is already encumbered or socially constituted, but this does
not mean that an encumbered self could not “choose” to radically change which community
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she is constituted within. In fact, I have argued
.ha, an encumbered self can, contrary to
Sandel's characterization, exercise the sort of agency necessary for making this sort of
change.
Friedman critiques “the legitimacy of the moral influences which communities exert
over their members" (280). But questioning the legitimacy of moral influences-which
Friedman is quite right to do-does not entail denying that these moral influences are
present in the seifs history or identity. Being a self who comes to resist or reject certain
moral values-say, the ethnocentrism of a particular community-should be distinguished
from being a self who has no history of being constituted with that value-of being, for
instance, ethnocentric. By equating a rejection of the legitimacy of the values with a denial
that the values in part constitute the choosing subject’s history or identity, Friedman leaves
herself open to the criticism that she relies on a conception of the self as unencumbered
upon entering a community of choice.
But one can argue for both the possibility and the desirability of communities of
choice (which might better be called intentional communities, to emphasize intention-
which the encumbered self can have-as opposed to choice, which connotes a choosing
subject with no prior or given ends) without denying that the self is always constituted with
a history of values, whether these values exert a legitimate or an illegitimate pull. The
exercise of agency in rejecting the values one is constituted with is the agency of the
encumbered, not the unencumbered self. The communitarian critical claim (that it requires
making a mistaken individualist assumption to see oneself as capable of “choosing” a
community rather than finding oneself as constituted in a community) ignores the way in
which, for instance, marginal beings are constituted as (partially) outsiders in communities
of place; recognizing this leads one to see that “choosing” an intentional community is not
an act of an (illusory) individual—an unencumbered self (i.e. someone who somehow
would not have been constituted in a particular social context)-but rather an act of someone
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who was constituted in a particular social context, but a context which constitutes her as
someone partially outside (or in a problematic relation with) the community.
It is important to notice that Friedman does not characterize the “choice” to leave
one community or set of values and to enter into another one as an act of a socially
constituted self, but rather as the act of an idiosyncratic individual. She discusses
friendship, for instance, as a relationship which is not “discovered” as part of one’s social
role, but rather is freely chosen. She writes, “friends are supposed to be people whom one
chooses on one’s own to share activities and intimacies. No particular people are assigned
by custom or tradition to be a person’s friends” (286). It is as if any individual could
choose any other individual as a friend, independent of their social positions. But this is
clearly false; social customs play a large part in determining whom one can be friends with.
There are social sanctions against friendships across race, or age, or class, for instance.
And in some instances, there are particular others whom one is expected to be friends with-
-one s cousin, for example. Friedman seems to deny these forces when she writes that
friendship is based on voluntary choice,” where voluntary choice “refers to motivations
arising out of one s own needs, desires, interests, values, and attractions, in contrast to
motivations arising from what is socially assigned, ascribed, expected, or demanded”
(286). But this is a false contrast, if it is the case that my “needs, desires, interests, values,
and attractions have themselves been socially constituted. For instance, the fact that many
women desire relationships with men is tied to their being socially constituted in a context
in which heterosexuality is institutionalized. Resistance to such a construction of desire
comes not, as Friedman would have it, out of an individual and idiosyncratic desire and
choice, but rather out of being socially constituted as resistant. Why would our conformity
to community values be socially constructed but our refusal to conform be somehow a
product of a ghost-self?
When Friedman writes, “women moved out of their given or found communities
into new attachments with other women by their own choice, that is, motivated by their
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own needs, desires, attractions, and fears rather than, and often in opposition to, the
expectations and ascribed roles of their found communities” (287) she is falsely assuming
that their found communities constituted them through a completely hegemonic set of moral
values. 34 To make this assumption is to see a given community as homogeneous and
clearly bounded. But in fact-and Friedman would agree with this-there is not just one
consistent set of values which influences or constitutes someone’s identity, because
communities are neither homogeneous nor clearly bounded. It is the recognition of the fact
that one can be socially constituted in multiple ways that allows one to claim that it is the
encumbered self who has been constituted so as to animate resistance to dominant values in
her own community. Only if one sees a community as having one consistent and
thoroughgoingly hegemonic set of values is one then unable to explain resistance without
reference to some idiosyncratic individual who somehow has, in a vacuum, developed
counter-hegemonic desires, attractions, values, and so on.
I would like to revise Friedman’s theory with the claim that intentional communities
develop through the intention of the socially constituted self-not the idiosyncratic
individual. Revised in this way, Friedman’s suggestion that communities can be both
intentional ( chosen ) and constitutive opens a wide range of question about what
constitutive communities are and can be. While Sandel and MacIntyre and other
communitarians’ accounts of constitutive communities are merely descriptive (or may
include the fairly weak normative claim that we not only are encumbered, but that we also
ought to understand ourselves as encumbered), the claim that constitutive communities can
be intentional allows one to give a normative account of them. Rather than being limited to
describing the community in which I Find myself, I can now consider, given my agency
Alison Jaggar would attribute women’s attraction to each other within a society where heterosexuality is
institutionalized as an instance of “outlaw emotions.” These emotions are not indications that there is
some part of us which has escaped being socially constituted, but rather they are indications that we have
been socially constituted within a context where the hegemonic values do not have a complete hold on us;
values created and sustained within other, non-dominant collectivities affect us also, and ground the
possibility for these “outlaw emotions.”
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(st,ll as an encumbered or collectively constituted self) and my capacity to develop or create
communities intentionally, what should those communities be?
C. Agency and the Encumbered Self
Garry Brodsky, in “A Way of Being a Jew; A Way of Being a Person” bnngs to
the dialogue about the communitarian self similar concems-although his are coming from a
different “place” of identity-to those of Friedman. Like Friedman, he recognizes that a
moral position does not gain legitimacy just because it carries the weight of being an
encumbrance of one’s “given” history or experience. The self he describes is a self who
does not accept the moral particulars of her/his given community as given; this self is:
aware of such general points as that traditions and communities can be
conservative and provincial and that telling someone that her identity is
bound up with family, nation, religion, or tradition often can be a means not
of revealing a fact but of fashioning one, thus persuading someone to bind
herself to a group, accept a belief, and, perhaps, support an action such as a
war, for no good reason. (258 )
His account of the self maintains the communitarian claim that we are encumbered
selves, but he meanwhile wants to argue that such a self can and should exercise what he
calls liberal choice. He sees the claim that the self is encumbered with a history and a sense
of identity or peoplehood as consistent with the claim that the self engages in an act of
choosing which manifests his/her freedom as independence from encumbrances. That is,
he aims to advocate a liberalism which is not dependent upon the liberal conception of the
self as unencumbered.
Brodsky’s argument is based on the example of a particular sort of a person—
a
particular sort of a Jew-whom Brodsky believes stands as evidence that one can both be
liberal in one s ability to exercise choice and make independent decisions, and yet still
“come with” a history and sense of identity. He begins his argument by pointing out that
the sort of person he has in mind-and whom he himself is-does not fit the description of
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the self offered by communitarians such as Sandel and MacIntyre, but on the other hand
certainly does not fit the description of the self which communitarians take liberals to be
positing: the self who is “‘wholly unencumbered.
. . individuated in advance’ and given
prior to its ends” (259). Brodsky has in mind a Jew who “is an assimilated, atheistic,
nonobservant, postmodern American who nevertheless feels deep attachments to Jewry and
Judaism” (260). The strong sense of Jewish identity felt by this self cannot be explained
by an account of the self as unencumbered, and so this self (whom Brodsky refers to as the
postmodern Jew”) might turn to a communitarian account of the self to make sense of
her/his attachment to Jewish history and feeling of Jewish identity. However, Brodsky
argues, a communitarian vision such as MacIntyre’s description of a self as constituted
through narrative history also does not adequately characterize the “postmodern Jew.” For
such an account ignores the dis-unity caused by the many different pulls on the
“postmodern Jew”; it ignores the “complex character of the life and allegiances of the
postmodern, assimilated American Jew” (253) and the fact that such a self “lives her
Jewishness and its history as a member of a group whose relations to the dominant,
mainstream culture are intrinsically complex” (254). These relations involve connections to
Gentiles through one’s profession, through living together in the same neighborhoods,
being tied to many of the same cultural influences, and so on; but on the other hand,
no matter how assimilated the American Jew may be, how comfortable he
feels in the mainstream culture, to what extent he identifies with and situates
himself within the American version of Western civilization rather than with
Jewish culture.
. . he knows that there is a significant part of that culture to
which he, as a Jew, does not belong, despite talk of ‘our Judeo-Christian
heritage.’ (254)
Thus the “postmodern Jew” is both encumbered with a sense of Jewish identity but also
complexly constituted by the variety of perhaps conflicting allegiances which result from
living a life not wholly circumscribed within one single, bounded and homogeneous
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community such as one that might be experienced by someone who lives or lived “as a
believing Jew in a Jewish community” (254-255). 35
These sorts of split allegiances are precisely what MacIntyre believes disturb the
desired attainment of a “metanarrative or ‘scheme of overall belief which extends beyond
the realm of pragmatic necessity,’” (MacIntyre, Whose Justice
. 393, qtd. in Brodsky.
248). A self like the “postmodern Jew” would be condemned by MacIntyre, Brodsky
argues, as a self “which has too many half-convictions and too few settled coherent
convictions, too many partly formulated alternatives and too few opportunities to evaluate
them systematically” (MacIntyre, Whose Justice
. 397, qtd. in Brodsky, 248). Brodsky,
however, disagrees with MacIntyre’s claim that unity is a desideratum for the self: “one
reason we are so willing to dispense with what the polis made available is that unlike
MacIntyre we don’t think the kind of self we have ascribed to the postmodern Jew has
serious short-comings” (255). For the unity which MacIntyre call for, Brodsky believes,
precludes the very pull of conflicting allegiances which allow one to (indeed demand that
one) exercise choice. And “postmodern Jews,” Brodsky posits, particularly value the
possibility of individual choice for they are particularly aware that “for a very long time
such options were not available to Jews” (262). Thus Brodsky believes that the
“postmodern Jew” not only continually faces choices to make but furthermore values the
ability to make such choices (about, for instance, “their careers, places of residence,
friends, marriage partners, and so on” [256]); and, in making choices, such a self can be
“partially responsible for fashioning her identity” (256). He acknowledges that “the
choices available to a person are delimited by, among other things, the sociohistorical
circumstances in which she lives, her family and her native physical, psychological, and
mental capabilities” (256) but notes that “while she is not, in Sandel’s words, ‘a sovereign
agent of choice,’ she is a partially sovereign agent of choice, and when she exercises this
33And, I would argue, even the “traditional” Jewish villages or shtetl communities in which, say, our
grandparents lived were also not as homogeneous and bounded as they have been made out to be.
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capacity and makes these choices she also exercises and develops her relative independence
from the communities that nurture her” (256).
Brodsky’s critique of the communitarian view of the self as unified and his
observation that the “postmodern Jew” is not such a unified self has led him, then, to claim
that the sort of agency exercised by the “postmodern Jew” is an agency that while affected
by history and social circumstances, is also an act of independence. But what is the nature
of the freedom which the “postmodern Jew” seems to cherish? Brodsky identifies it as the
same freedom which the liberal cherishes, the freedom to make independent choices about
one’s own life plans. His insistence that his account of how the “postmodern Jew” acts is
consistent with the tenants of liberalism would seem to imply that this freedom is
understood as (even if to a lesser degree than the liberals imagine it) freedom from
interference; otherwise, it is not clear why Brodsky would want to call his theory a liberal
theory. He tells us that “the postmodern Jew can affirm and cherish his ties to the Jewish
people and its history and, the communitarians notwithstanding, also accept the basic tenets
of liberalism (259), acknowledging that to fully argue this point he would have to go on to
show that liberalism can be defended without reliance on its untenable deontological
foundations. But it is unclear why Brodsky would insist that the only alternative to the
communitarian account of the self as unable to exercise agency must be the liberal
conception of agency as an exercise of choice free from interference.
Brodsky seems to be pointing to a difference of degree between the self he calls the
“postmodern Jew” and the unencumbered self of liberalism: the “postmodern Jew” is
encumbered, but not too encumbered; he/she is affected by history and social
circumstances, but not too affected to continue to make choices independent of these
encumbrances. What Brodsky does not do is develop a distinction based on a difference in
the kind of freedom that the self can be understood to have. This is odd precisely because
his recognition that the “postmodern Jew” can only explain his/her Jewish identity and
allegiances by understanding the self as encumbered would seem to imply an understanding
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Of freedom to choose as a social product, not as a form of freedom from interference, for to
understand that the self is always socially constituted (even if in a variety of perhaps
conflicting social contexts) is to understand that we never act free from “interference.'’
Brodsky’s recognition that the “postmodern Jew” has many difference allegiances-ties
which cross Gentile worlds and Jewish worlds-need not stand as evidence that such a self
requires freedom or independence in the liberal sense, but rather it can point to the fact that
the social worlds which create the freedom of this self are multiple and intersect in complex
ways. Freedom is no less a social product, though, just because it is a product of many
different or complicated social worlds. Thus I want to maintain the claim that the agency
exercised by the complex, communitarian self (including the self which Brodsky calls the
postmodern Jew”) is a form of collective agency, an agency which draws on the
complicated mixture of encumbrances or constitutive ties which are part of this self. It is
not the agency of an individual asserting independence from social ties or all sources of
interference, but rather the agency of a self whose sources of “interference” or social
constitution are multiple; thus who it is that makes up the collectivity in which the agency is
grounded is not obvious or simple. The fact that someone asserts independence from this
or that particular community is not evidence that this person is acting free from interference;
rather, it is evidence that there is some other social world whose values are sustaining the
resistance.
If the self one is concerned with is, like Brodsky’s “postmodern Jew” or like
Friedman’s feminist, constituted in a variety of communities and through multiple,
intersecting histories, then one needs to recognize that “community”—even in a constitutive
sense—means many different things, and it will be helpful to sketch out some of the ways
in which one might conceive of communities. Sandel and MacIntyre’s view of
communities as being limited to communities of place (especially communities of origin)
derives from their failure to recognize both that many different socially significant
groupings of people serve as constitutive communities for any given person, and that there
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can be intent,on involved in determining who one's communittes are. But before going on
to explore the senses of community that might emerge, I am going to turn briefly to
Roberto Unger's description of community, for he does use the term “community" in a
normative sense, providing a very different notion of what a community is than what
Sandel and MacIntyre have in mind.
D- The Spiral: Increased Community as Diminishing Domination
Roberto Unger comes to an exploration of community because he is engaged in a
consideration of the good, and sees that the good emerges in community. Beginning with
the claim that “the good is properly viewed as an actualization of human nature” or what he
calls the “species nature” (239), Unger goes on to describe the conditions under which the
species nature can emerge. His doctrine thus has two parts: the first defines the good in
relation to the species (human) nature, and the second specifies that community-as
opposed to domination— is a pre-requisite for the emergence of this species nature and
therefore of the good. He describes the two elements of his doctrine:
The first element is the concern of the theory of the self: it is the notion that
the good consists in the development of the species nature in the lives of
particular persons. The second element is the thesis.
. . that both human
nature and our understanding of it can progress through a spiral of
increasing community and diminishing domination. (239)36
Notice that Unger’s conception of human nature is not an essentialist one, for he sees the species nature
as evolving through the interaction of individuals; their participation in a universal human nature is in a
dialectic relation with their own particularity, which in part comprise the universal. His theory “does not
rely on the notion that mankind fsfc] as a whole and each of its members has an essence or an unchanging
core that can somehow permeate history and biography. Instead, it starts out from the idea that the
distinctive experience of personality is that of confronting a certain set of intelligible, interrelated problems
that arise in one’s dealings with nature, with others and with oneself. Insofar as both the problems and the
ideal ways ot responding to them are continuous in space and time, one may speak of a human nature and of
a universal good. But continuity does not mean permanence” (240). We might call his understanding of
human nature a socially teleological account; that is, the bounds of human nature are developed socially
under changing conditions and so are changeable and not tied to any given essence, but at the same time, no
one individual’s “nature” is completely free from the givens of their social context. Unger writes, “The
species nature advances through the development of the capacities of individuals. But no definable set of
realized individual talents exhausts human nature, which is continuously changing in history. The universal
good exists solely in particular goods, yet it is always capable of transcending them” (240). His
communitarian argument allows him to retain some conception of a human nature as not entirely up for
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Immediately the question arises for Unger: if the species nature advances through
whatever acts take place in community, why would one assume that this species nature
would develop in the direction of the good? That is, if one equates the good with the
attainment of the species nature, and if the species nature is whatever comes out of the
unfolding history of human acts in community, then what allows one to value certain
possible directions of development over others? What allows one to say that domination is
not a part of the good? Certainly domination is a part of what emerges though the
development of individual capacities and “talents.”
Unger responds to this problem by arguing that not just any actions are equally
representative of the species nature, for actions take place under different conditions; some
conditions serve to repress the emergence of the species nature or to wrongly represent it.
If one simply takes an inventory of the ways in which humans act or have acted across
different social and historical circumstances and come up with a list of seemingly shared
characteristics of human nature or common ends, then one engages in a method which
“pays no heed to the way values are determined by society.
. . it disregards the corrupting
effects of domination on the capacity of shared purposes to show human nature and
therefore to measure the good (242). Domination may itself produce a consensus—or the
appearance of a consensus—of values, but such shared values are not truly representative of
humanity or of the good. Unger argues:
Instead of asking what people want, we should ask first under what
conditions their choices might inform us more fully about what is distinctive
to each of them and to mankind [sic] as a whole. Our first concern should
be to determine the circumstances in which we are entitled to give greater or
lesser weight to consensus, taking agreed-upon values as better or worse
indications of our common humanity. . . Because of the fact of domination,
moral agreement is often little more than a testimonial to the allocation of
grabs, while meanwhile not falling into an essentialism; he writes that his effort “is to retain the
conception of a unitary human nature while acknowledging that man [sic] makes himself through the
different forms of social life he establishes” (246).
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power in the group. For moral union to be representative of the species
nature, it must arise from conditions of autonomy.
.
. Shared values carry
weight only in the measure to which they are not simply products of
dominance. (242-243)
Unger s claim, then, is that the good consists of those shared values which will emerge
from people through history, but only under certain conditions: the conditions that allow
moral agreement to be arrived at in an egalitarian way, to be uninfluenced by domination,
since domination creates a situation where only the dominators’ views become hegemonic,
come to stand for agreed upon” values. Thus domination inhibits the good from
emerging. And the opposite arrangement from that of domination, Unger stipulates, is that
of community. Thus he is led to conclude, “the species nature is revealed and developed in
history through the spiral of diminishing domination and increasing community” (260).
Unger has thus justified a definition of community in a normative sense: community
is not just any gathering of people, nor is it even just any way in which people may engage
with one another in the formation of values. It is only those ways of engaging which do
not manifest relations of domination and subordination; community, Unger can claim, is
opposed to domination and is bgtter than domination. To call something community is not
only to refer to a collective development of values, but it is to make the normative claim that
the development of values can only tend towards the good when there is freedom from
domination.
It become clear, then, how Unger’s understanding of community differs from that
of Sandel or MacIntyre; for both Sandel and MacIntyre refer primarily to communities
which are characterized by entrenched relations of domination and subordination. Their
accounts of community are merely descriptive; their claim is that we are constituted in
community, not that we should strive for community (where community is opposed to
domination). By understanding communities as intentional Friedman opened the way to
make sense of the normative claim that we should develop community; by defining
102
community in oppos.tion to domination, Unger provide a motivatton for maktng this
normative claim.
Unger must now consider what the conditions are for community, or for the
absence of domtnatton. To this end, he develops an account of what he calls the organ,
c
group. The organic group is a community regulated by three institutional principles,
principles whtch Unger acknowledges to depend upon certatn empirical assumptions and
inferences; these pnnciples are the community of life, the democracy of ends, and the
division of labor. I will focus here on the community of life, whose aim is to make a
community a location of “sympathetic social relations”; it is a community in which the
“political equivalent of love” can take place (261) ” Unger argues that:
Two factors coalesce in sympathy: the communion of purposes by virtue of
which each views the other as a complementary rather than as an
antagonistic will, and the willingness to see and treat others as concrete
individuals rather than as role occupants.
. . Sympathy means that people
encounter each other in such a way that their sense of separateness from one
another varies in direct rather than inverse proportion to their sense of social
union. When individuality and sociability complement each other, others
are viewed and treated as unique persons and as partners to whom one is
bound by common purposes. (261-262)
The face-to-face coexistence and the fact that members participate with one another in a
variety of activities prevents members from seeing one another as role-occupants; instead,
they are able to see one another as concrete, particular people, with whole personalities.
Thus an association characterized by face-to-face coexistence and by multipurpose
organization is a community of life” (262).
Unger’s primary concern with the organic group as a locus for community-for
non-domination—is with the tension between the group cohesion necessary for community
and the preservation of what he refers to as individuality. The elements of the community
•^The democracy of ends indicates the “circumstances under which choice would become increasingly
expressive of humanity,” and the division of labor describes the kind of organization of labor that can “serve
as a basis for the development of individuality as well as for the advancement of the species nature” (261 ).
103
of life are meant to both foster cohesion or a sharing of values and to provide a basis for
members to exist as and be known as concrete individuals. The community of life must
remain a small group in order to allow members to recognize each other as individuals
rather than role-occupants, for “others cannot be known and dealt with as real individuals
unless they can be seen and touched in the flesh” (263). But at the same time, the shared
values which ground members’ sympathetic relations with one another can serve to destroy
this very individuality. When Unger makes the arresting remark that “community is always
on the verge of becoming oppression" (266) he is expressing his wariness of achieving a
consensus of values, a consensus which so often only reflects the fact that dissension has
been suppressed. But the nature of this dissension itself needs to be examined, for Unger
does not give an adequate account of it. Dissension, for him, arises from individual
differences, not from group differences tied to categories of social identity. Unger has a
tendency to equate diversity with individuality: differences for him tend to be descnbed as
individual differences, not group differences, and so it is these individual differences which
he strives to protect within community.
Recognizing differences as socially significant group differences rather than just
individual differences requires adding to Unger’s description of the tension present in the
community of life. He sees a paradox between group cohesion and individuality; but I
would like to add that there is not only the question of individuals’ idiosyncrasies being
subordinated to group cohesion, but also a question raised by the interlocking of race,
class, gender, and so on in the formation of identity: if group cohesion is based on one of
these categories of identity-a shared racial identity, for instance-then does the norm of the
group become based on only those who are dominant in other categories of identity? If
group cohesion requires shared identity, then members who belong to more than one
marginalized group will always be the dissenters in every group they are in. Unger
powerfully represents the problem of the possibility of group cohesion becoming coercive
or tyrannical. But the problem is more than the problem of the subordination of
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individuality; it is the problem which arises when the group cohesion is achieved by
defining the group in terms of an essential characteristic of identity, and thus when all of
the complexity of identity as constituted through interlocking social categories is ignored.
When Unger asks how to preserve the possibility of individuality, he does seem to be
saying (despite his insistence that he is not saying this) that we need something like “room”
for individuality—that is, non-interference from others in the community; however, one
might say instead, what is needed for group cohesion not to be tyrannical is also the
possibility of having significant ties to (and of being able to act out the expressions whose
meaning is imbedded in) other communities, tied to one’s multiple membership in social
groups. 38
This leads to a complication in Unger’s concern for not seeing others as merely
role-occupants. Although others should be seen as concrete, particular persons rather than
occupants of social roles, in fact what their social roles or identities are cannot be ignored
because they are in part what make up the concrete particulars of people’s “personalities”
and experiences. Unger’s emphasis on seeing others as individuals rather than role-
occupants leaves no room for seeing others as individuals who are constituted in part by
their social roles or identities. It is important to retain an awareness of other members’
belonging to a variety of social categories (e.g. of race, gender, etc.); while it will not do to
see others merely as role-occupants (as instantiations of categories defined by essential
characteristics), it is nevertheless crucial to recognize how membership in a variety of social
categories affects or forms someone’s experience. As Pat Parker puts it, “For the white
person who wants to know how to be my friend/ The first thing you do is to forget that i’m
Black./ Second, you must never forget that i’m Black.” (297); the sense here is that it is
necessary to both see someone as a unique, particular person (and not to see someone as an
38Unger does raise the fact that people should be able to have multiple memberships in different
communities of life, but he never answers the question of how these people are to avoid being pulled in
different directions, and partially erased as whole personalities in each separate community of life. He
writes, “the individual ought to be entitled to be a member of various groups. The prudential problem will
then be to reconcile the requirements of a community that embraces many aspects of life with the
possibility of plural membership” (280). Indeed , this is the problem.
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instantiation of a category which is defined by an essential characteristic) and also to
recognize how the fact of important socially constructed categories of identity do affect
experience. Unger’s focus on seeing someone as a particular individual does not provide a
way to also see them as affected by their experience of being in particular interlocking
social categories. It misses the “never forget that i’m Black” half of Parker’s imperative.
Thus Unger is concerned with not erasing individuality for the sake of group
cohesion. However, answering that concern is not enough; one also needs to be concerned
with the problem of erasing multiple, interlocked group identities which come together in
the individual. This is more complicated because different group identities are connected to
or expressed by sets of shared practices or ways of being; but because a community (such
as Unger s community of life) is the locus for shared practice, one must consider what the
shared practices of the community should be. Shared practices might leave room for a
variety of individual expressions, thus answering Unger’s concern, but it is more
complicated to consider how to leave room for different expressions based on mixed,
interlocked social identities. Unlike communitarians such as Sandel and MacIntyre, Unger
seems to see society not as homogeneous; however, heterogeneity for him is due to
individual idiosyncrasies, not group differences. Thus his concern with allowing for the
expression of individuality within the organic group is not a concern with allowing for the
expression of complicated, interlocked group differences.
Unger, unlike Sandel and MacIntyre, argues that membership in any particular
community must be voluntary. In this way, he imagines “choosing” to be a member of an
organic group much as Friedman sees people leaving their communities of origin and
entering communities of choice. Unger argues:
A forced membership in the community of life or a prohibition of departing
from it violates the conditions on which its being is based. Suppose that
there are many organic groups already established, each united by an
initially distinct set of common experiences and shared purposes. The
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individual should be able to choose which of them to join or to leave in view
of his own experiences or purposes. (279)
However, it is important to notice that Unger, unlike Brodsky, does not have a liberal
conception of “choice”; for Unger, it is the encumbered self who exercises agency in
leaving or entering a community. He explicitly rejects the liberal definition of freedom “as
the nonexistence of external interference with one’s ability to do what one wants” (277) by
noting that “the self cannot be imagined apart from social relations” (278). Defining
freedom, for Unger, depends upon distinguishing “legitimate and illegitimate power, for
only the latter represents domination (278). To be free entails freedom from domination
or illegitimate power, but it does not require freedom from the necessary and legitimate
powers of socially constituted values. This is a very useful distinction which could be
applied to explain, for instance, the actions of Brodsky’s “postmodern Jew.” The
independence which the “postmodern Jew” asserts is an independence from the
illegitimate powers of one particular community, but it is not independence from being
socially constituted (or “interfered with”) altogether. It is really not accurately
characterized, then, as an exercise of free choice in the liberal sense.
Freedom, for Unger, as “the measure of an individual’s capacity to achieve the
good” is necessarily a social product as the good is only achieved in community. Freedom
is neither complete freedom from interference nor is it a complete internalization of
“objective or communal values.” Rather,
The good for each individual has a universal as well as a particular aspect so
that neither the affirmation of individuality nor the obedience to principles or
practices suffices to characterize freedom. Instead, freedom lies in the
relationship between the universal and the particular good, and between
choice and value, portrayed by the theories of human nature and
community. Individual choice is important both as a manifestation of
individuality and as a sign of the species nature. .
.
(278)
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Thus Unger s definition of freedom successfully describes how the encumbered
self is still capable of choice or the exercise of agency, and he is able to account for why it
is important for the encumbered self to be able to exercise such agency. But, despite his
insistence on an understanding of freedom as a social product, he still describes the
motivation for such a self to choose one community or another in terms of the manifestation
or the preservation of individuality, not in terms of the conflicts generated by being socially
constituted by a mixture of perhaps clashing values or ways of being. The individual picks
and chooses between established organic groups or creates a new one, not because he/she
is constituted with an identity that is tied to one group or another, but because he/she has an
individual personality suited better for a particular group. Thus Unger does overlook some
of the ways in which an individual cannot be free to leave a community, even with a social
understanding of what freedom is. For instance, one cannot leave a group that one is
racialized or genderized as a member of (except if one can and wants to “pass” or
assimilate), for others will continue to identify one as a member of the group and one’s
identity will continue to be in part constituted by these perceptions . 39
The same tension between group cohesion and individuality is present within the
organic group. Unger argues that members of a community must be able to transcend the
shared values of the community and to access values of other communities or cultures, but
again he does not see the tension as a conflict of values created by the interlocking of
different categories of social identities. He writes:
Community requires cohesion; it can survive only in an atmosphere of
strongly felt, though relative and shifting, moral agreement. At the same
time, however, individuals must have access to a culture that transcends
what any one group can perceive or accomplish on its own. The different
traditions of thought or work constitute the deposits of the species nature in
history. For that reason, they represent, despite their distortion by the vices
of dominance, parts of the good and indispensable aids to its further
39Thanks to Ann Ferguson for pointing this out here.
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realization. Moreover, without a basis for the criticism of shared values,
there will be the tendency to sacrifice autonomy to moral union, and
transcendence to immanence. (287 )
Here it is clear that while Unger sees the species nature as “deposited” in different cultures,
what he does not see is that particular people belong to particular cultures-belong in the
sense that MacIntyre does recognize, that we are “bearers” of a particular history or
tradition. To see us as truly constituted by our communities is to see that we embody, as
bearers of a history, particular manifestations of the “species nature”; we do not just pick
and choose from among the available cultural construals of the species nature. So while
MacIntyre (and Sandel) might not see enough possibility for agency in which values we
choose to have constitute us, Unger perhaps sees too much room for this agency; he fails to
see the “choice” of which communities constitute us as in part informed by the histories
defined by our cultures, race, and so on.
What Unger does provide is an expanded understanding of how constitutive
communities can aim purposefully towards the good where that good is socially developed,
but where the good is also understood to have the possibility of emerging only in the
absence of domination. His conception of freedom as a social product allows one to
understand choice as something which a socially constituted-or encumbered-self can
engage in. Thus both Unger and Friedman point to the need to expand what counts as a
constitutive community. Recognition of both pluralism (in what is constitutive of identity)
and intention (in development/formation of community) requires a broadened list of what
will be included in the term “constitutive community.” It will also allow one to include in
that list communities which have the intention of political resistance to dominance and
subordination, and to ask about these communities: who are my people in the sense of
being in such a community of resistance with me?
Unger opens the question of how a community can achieve the desired absence of
domination and subordination, and he answers by describing the features of the organic
group. What I have pointed out is that he has not given enough attention to how relations
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ot domination and subordination are maintained by a failure to recognize how communities
can suppress the values and expressions of members of a community who are also
constituted through a multiplicity of interlocking collectivities-collectivities based on
categories of social difference such as those of race, class, gender, ethnicity and so on. By
thinking, now, of various collectivities or communities which constitute self identities, we
can continue Unger's attempt to describe how a community (or set of communities) can
create and maintain conditions of non-domination; however, I intend to think of the
members of communities as in part constituted by racial, class, gender (etc.) identities, and
evaluate constitutive communities in terms of their possibilities for resistance to forms of
domination which are based on these categories of identity.
E. Senses of Community^
I want to suggest here many different ways of using the term “community,” not in
order to focus on the idea that some ways of using the term are incompatible with each
other (which may also be true) but more importantly in order to foreground the idea that our
identities are always constituted in a multiplicity of collectivities. To talk about the sort of
communities which constitute the self as a resistant political being, it is helpful to notice
what other sorts of communities also constitute the seifs identity. Included in the term
“community” are, for instance:
—community of origin
—community of place
—“home” community
—community of support
-community of choice
^Many of the ideas and the terms (and some whole sentences!) in this section are taken from a workshop
called “Sentidos de Comunidad: herramientas para pensar sobre redes comunitarias y sobre pohtica de base
comunitaria / Senses of Community: tools for thinking about networks and community based politics”
developed by the Escuela Popular Nortena, a folk school in Valdez, New Mexico, for our summer encuentro
in 1993. The workshop was created collectively by the staff of the school, including myself. The text of
the workshop is included in an appendix.
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—community ot social/political movement
—community of social/political identity
—political community
-community of resistance
-community of destination
The list could, of course, continue or be revised in many ways; the terms are flexible and
often overlapping or contained within each other. I list them not because I am interested in
setting definitions of them, but rather because I want to generate thinking about the plurality
of communitarian sources in which our identities are constituted. Some explanation of each
of the terms will help illustrate the broadness of the term “community.”
A community of origin is the community one is bom into, but this can be
understood in many ways: one is born into a particular place-a town or a neighborhood,
for instance-but one can also be bom into a family (extended or not, biological or not,
etc.), a religion (consciously observed or not) or lack thereof, a culture or a mixture of
cultures, etc. One does not choose one’s community of origin as a community of origin.
What the features of one’s communities of origin are depend upon which characteristics of
identity are salient. For instance, one is born as one sex or another and so in a society in
which there is a gender system (and only in such a society) one is born into a gender that
one does not choose to be or not to be born into. However, were there not consciousness
of gender as a socially significant characteristic, one would not think of a “community” of
people of one’s gender .41 One’s community of origin includes all that one inherits as one
is born as a historically constituted self. One can be bom with a history of being a
colonizer, for instance, or a history of being colonized, or one can be born embodying this
conflict, inheriting the history of both colonizer and colonized. Whether one later identifies
4
1
Ann Ferguson points out here that there are other circumstances as well in which one would not see
gender as a basis for calling a set of people a community. She notes, for instance, that “a group of people
who had minimal contact with other people might take gender to be socially significant” (for instance, they
might employ a sexual division of labor) and “yet not think of ‘communities’ of the women and men, since
there is no reason to think in such distinguishing terms unless and until women of one community want
and need to relate to women of another community.” (Notes on an earlier draft).
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with features of one’s communities of origin is not determined simply by virtue of one’s
birth into them, but it is not unrelated, either (For instance, the fact that I identify as Jewish
is not a necessary implication of the fact that I was born with this heritage; rather, it is in
part a result of a conscious act of identification and a form of resistance to assimilation.
But it is certainly dependent upon my being bom as a “bearer” of Jewish history).
A community of place is based on the place where one lives. It could be small-my
block or neighborhood-or huge-the nation. A community of place could remain relatively
constant or could be continually shifting. For instance, a community of place based in a
small rural town might be quite constant; there is little movement into or out of the town.
On the other hand, the community of place located in a college dorm is very temporary. If
one moves around a lot, one will have many communities of place, and if one is in a
community of place very temporarily, that community will probably not become very
constitutive of one s identity (unless, perhaps, one’s experience there is particularly intense
in one way or another). One may belong to a community of place out of a variety of
reasons, for instance, out of choice, out of tradition, out of economic necessity or
privilege, out of force (the inmates in a prison cell block, for instance, form a community
of place), and so on. Members of a community of place may or may not have a common
reason for being there, and members may be extremely similar or extremely different from
one another. A given community of place could include many other communities within
it .42
A “home” community may or may not be one’s actual home in the sense of where
one lives. It is quite possible to not have any “home” community (and one may or may not
feel this as a lack). It is the community at which one is most “at home” or at ease. One
might describe such a community by saying things like, “it’s where I can really be myself,”
or “it’s where I’m accepted for who I am,” etc. It could be as small as a circle of friends or
family, or it could refer more widely to a social group; for instance, some lesbians express
42Ann Ferguson suggests workplaces as possible examples of communities of place.
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the feeling of being at “home” only in lesbian community. One's "home" community is
where one is not constantly alienated, misunderstood, unappreciated; it is where one is
loved, where one is understood on all levels of meaning, where one can let down one’s
guard without being attacked. Perhaps it is also where one is not constantly challenged to
change. Of course, there can be various degrees to which a particular community feels like
it is a “home” community.
It is an interesting question whether “home” community is good or bad from a
radical political point of view. On the one hand, it is sustaining, and can offer the base of
appreciation, encouragement and love necessary to keep up hope, to not “burn out” or
despair, to risk creativity, to support the growth of identities which are forbidden or
undervalued in the mainstream. It can also provide material support or physical protection.
In extremely hostile conditions, a “home” community can be essential; for instance, gangs
can be “home” communities absolutely necessary for their members’ survival, for their
sustenance on all levels. On the other hand, if the “risks” of the outside world are more
imagined (out of racist fear, etc.) than real, the comfort of “home” can be too seductive; it
can keep us from entering communities where we are at risk, or where meanings are not
shared. For instance, in a community in which one is seen as an oppressor—where one is
someone with class privilege, for instance, or someone who speaks the “official” language-
-one may feel not appreciated, not at “home.” And identification with oneself as someone
who is not always to be loved and appreciated may be unappealing if there is a “home”
community calling one in. If such identification is politically necessary for change, then
having a “home” community may work against change.
Bernice Johnson Reagon contrasts the concepts of home and coalition, arguing that
coalition, and not home, is where political change is to be made. But at the same time, she
does not deny the necessity of having a home to go back to, to retreat from the battlefield-
like atmosphere which she experiences coalition to be. She writes:
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Coalition work is not work done in your home. Coalition work has to be
done in the streets. And it is some of the most dangerous work you can do.
And you shouldn’t look for comfort. Some people will come to a coalition
and they rate the success of the coalition on whether or not they feel good
when they get there. They’re not looking for a coalition; they’re looking for
a home! They’re looking for a bottle with some milk in it and a nipple,
which does not happen in a coalition. You don’t get a lot of food in a
coalition. (359)
Reagon sees coalition work as necessary for political change, and also necessarily difficult,
precisely because it is not a “safe space” like home is. But change and safety are at odds
with each other. However, Reagon does not think it is possible to engage in coalition work
all the time; it is too hard, too draining: “In a coalition you have to give, and it is different
from your home. You can’t stay there all the time. You go to the coalition for a few hours
and then you go back to take your bottle wherever it is, and then you go back and coalesce
some more (359). Coalition, according to Reagon, “is a monster. It never gets enough.
It always wants more. So you better be sure you got your home someplace for you to go
to so that you will not become a martyr to the coalition” (361).
Reagon s insistence that coalition and home be separate can be problematic. It
dismisses the possibility that a home which is separate from coalition can serve as a hiding
place from coalition rather than as a recharging place. But even more importantly, it
assumes that everyone has a “home ’ community. However, not everyone can have a
“home” community if communities are based on seemingly “separable” features of identity
and if shared identity is part of what makes a “home” a “home.” It is possible for a person
to have a “home” in a very personal sense-a family or a circle of friends-but still lack a
more public or political “home,” that is, a political community that serves as a home and yet
is not banished to the private sphere. For instance, if lesbian community is to be a “home”
for all lesbians, it cannot be based on the shared meanings which only white middle-class
young lesbians share. When there are many different lesbian communities (for instance, a
lesbian of color community, an older lesbians’ community, etc.), it is still often the case
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that the lesbian community that occup.es the most vtsible or public space is the one whose
members are mainstream or dominant in other ways: they are white, young, and so on.
Reagon is at the same time arguing that "the barred rooms [filled with members of a single
feature of identity] will not be allowed to exist” (362) and that we all had better have homes
to go back to. But to be marginal in every community is to not have a “home” community.
If one wants to make the claim, as Reagon does, that one needs a home to go back to after
surviving coalition, then one needs to consider how to make this possible for those who are
marginalized everywhere that might be called “home.” If what is necessary about “home”
community is sustenance and love and appreciation and material support and protection,
then we need to learn how to create this without pre-supposing shared meanings. If
coalition can only be maintained as long as everyone has a “home” to recuperate in, then the
fact that it is not the case that everyone has a “home” community points to the need to make
coalition itself a more sustaining place. The lack of a priori shared meanings must not
entail a constant battlefield, a lack of appreciation or love or other personally and politically
sustaining necessities.
A community of support can be narrower in scope than a “home” community, in the
sense that members of one s community of support may offer support in specific, limited
ways rather than for one’s “whole” self (or for all of one’s multiple selves). It might be a
club or a group of friends who support one another in their projects. The limits of the
support may be well defined; for instance, it could be a group of colleagues in an academic
setting who read each other s work and offer help, critique, and appreciation but who do
not necessarily develop their thinking or their projects collectively. It could be a network of
women who watch out for each other’s kids or serve as each other’s confidantes.
Community of choice refers to a group of people that comes together purposefully
and voluntarily for a common end. The entry into the group is intentional; it is not a given
of one’s life. It could be a liberal political group, a musical band, a coalition, or a study
group. It could be a group based on a feature of social identity—for instance, a women of
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color caucus or a Latino student organization-but the group itself (though not the identity)
is intentionally formed for a particular purpose. It is possible for a community of support,
for instance, to be one kind of community of choice.
A gQ-mmunity of social/political movement exists only in times of movement.
Identity in these times is dependent, at least in part, upon the movement for definition or re-
definition (“re-articulation” as Michael Omi and Howard Winant would put it*3). it [s
through the movement that the community is affirmed as constituting a community.
Identity in times of movement is not stagnant if the movement itself is vital—that is, if it is
truly movement and not stagnation. For instance, Chicano identity grew from Chicano
Movement, constituting identity as Chicanos or as Raza for people formerly self-identified
as Mexican-American.” The Women’s Liberation Movement created a sense of women as
forming a socially significant political category, and of there being reason for the formation
of women’s communities such as consciousness raising groups. The meaning of being a
woman is changed through the women’s liberation movement, and the concept of “lesbian”
as a political category was created in this movement. The Black Nationalist Movement, the
Civil Rights Movement, and so on all create and re-create (in compatible and incompatible
ways) the meaning of Black or African-American identity. The movement against the
Vietnam war created a community-and a counter-culture-which was constitutive of
identity for its members.
A community of social/political movement can evolve into a community of
social/political identity if the movement ends or stagnates but the identity created in it
remains. This is not a clear line because it is often unclear whether or not a movement is
alive. The “women’s community” or the “lesbian community” often tends to define identity
(and thus regulates membership) a priori-that is, instead of the movement’s defining and
redefining the meaning of “woman” and “lesbian,” a given “women’s community” or
“lesbian community” may take a stagnant definition of who counts as members of these
4^See Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960’s to the 1980's.
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categones and then one must meet this poor definition to gain admittance to the community.
When this happens the social meaning of the term “woman” or “lesbian” does not continue
to develop out of movement. Social/political identities are also created not out of
oppositional movements but out of oppressive systems of classification; for instance,
categories of racial identity are created by the racial state (as represented, for instance, by
the census), categories of ethnic identity emerge out of anthropological or sociological
research and colonial practices, and so on.
A social identity can embody the tension between resistance to and maintenance of
the status quo. For instance, to the extent to which the gender system is itself a tool of
oppression, basing a community on or embracing an identity such as “woman” might serve
to maintain the oppressive nature of the dual gender system; furthermore, if a gender
identity is defined in a way which does not recognize interlocking features of identity (e.g.
if having a gender is seen as separable from having a race, etc.) then defining a community
on the basis of gender enables race, class, etc. to be erased. On the other hand, movement
can re-define or re-articulate the meaning of identities, and a movement which resisted
oppressions as interlocked could create identities which did not depend upon the illusion of
the separability of, for instance, race, gender, class and so on. So a community of
social/political identity refers to a community where the identity upon which it is based is at
least problematic in some of the above ways-that is, given the tendency for features of
identity to be seen as separable and not interlocked, and given that many identities are in
fact tools of oppressive systems: for instance, the dual gender system and the racial state.
Communities of social/political identity are the communities which ground “identity
politics.”
By political community I mean to include communities which correspond to
Aristotle’s conception of the polis as not a mere aggregate of persons, not just cattle who
happen to be grazing together in the same field, but rather people who self-consciously
participate in the formation of each other’s—of the public’s-values or conception(s) of the
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good. I am not agreeing with Aristotle that such a community requires unity or harmony or
a consensus about what the good is; but it does require engagement and struggle about
values rather than disengagement or the infamous “freedom from interference " A political
community in this sense could be conservative (for instance, the “moral majority”) or it
could be radical (for instance, a communo-anarchist group) but it could never be liberal
(nor could it be libertarian).
A community of resistance
,
then, denotes a political community which engages in
resistance to the oppressive status quos and thus whose values include, at base, a
commitment to such resistance. I am not including liberal groups who advocate members’
individual rights to choose their own conceptions of the good, for such groups purport to
not be constitutive of identity; they are not political communities. A community of
resistance might be both inwardly and outwardly directed: personal transformation in
accordance with collectively changed values combines with action or education or the
creation of movement aimed at changing oppressive practices or institutions or systems. A
community of resistance could be at the same time a community of place, or a community
of social/political movement, and so on. I will leave open for now the question of whether
a community of resistance could be a community of social/political identity, for to answer
this question means going on to consider whether maintenance of distinct lines of identity is
consistent with resistance to the oppressive status quos, a question which I will take up in
subsequent chapters.
A community of destination denotes one’s political destination or aim. It is a
(political) community of resistance but it may have not yet been forged as a community; in
claiming it as one’s community of destination one expresses a hope for such a community.
The community of destination constitutes the self as resistant, but at the same time the
community of destination is itself a product of resistance; it is the destination at which one’s
resistance aims. A destination can change as social/political conditions change and as
movements redefine identities. To say that political destinations are both the products of
118
resistance and the pre-conditions or the ground for further resistance is to invoke the
anarchist idea of perpetual revolution: the goal of political resistance is not to reach some
stagnant, ideal state in which no further changes will be necessary, but rather political
resistance must be understood to be ongoing, offering continual resistance to re-emerging
dominance or oppression within changing conditions.
A community of destination could be a found community or it could be a
purposefully formed community or both (as lesbian communities were purposefully formed
and can now often be found-already-formed). Since one engages critically with any
political community, whether it is already formed as a community or not, one’s engagement
with it in part forms it; it remains continually in the process of formation.
Lacking a community of destination could be described as lacking political clarity,
or lacking the conditions for such clarity. Knowing what one’s community of destination
is requires radical imagination; it means being visionary with respect to the goal or
destination of one’s resistance. But such vision must take into account what may be
problematic about affirming any one community or another. For instance, one may not be
able to unproblematically affirm any one community of social/political identity as one’s
community of destination, given that oppressions (and features of identity) are interlocked.
To affirm a community as one’s community of destination without ignoring interlocking
oppressions requires creating a community of destination that itself recognizes identities as
complex. Without such recognition, the affirmation of any one community of destination
can mean condemning one’s own self to marginalization; for instance, for a Black Puerto
Rican to affirm U.S. Latinos as her community of destination may mean subjecting herself
to ostracism for her own dark skin. To be able to say, then, that one has a community of
destination in the sense of affirming that community as one’s own-and for that affirmation
not to require ignoring the interlocking of oppressions-is itself a political achievement, a
product of resistance.
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To name one’s community of destination is, in fact, to be able to answer the
question, “who are my people?” in a particular sense; it is to be able to point to the people
with whom one wants to throw one’s lot, with whom one engages in political resistance
where this resistance includes both the transformation of members’ self-identities in
accordance with liberatory values, and the transformation of systems of oppression through
the creation of or participation in movement.
Having surveyed many different possible senses of community it becomes clearer
that the who are my people?” question can be answered in many different senses; that is, it
can be answered by reference to any (or many) of one’s constitutive communities. To call
someone one of “my own people,” then, may just indicate that we belong together in some
community which is truly constitutive of our identities. Calling someone “my own” may
be merely descriptive or it may be normative; that is, the affirmation of some but not others
of our communities serve to promote political resistance and change of oppressive status
quos. I might call someone “my own” in a descriptive sense just because we came, say,
from the same community of origin. But if I am fundamentally at odds with this person, I
may be reluctant to affirm them as “my own.” I would like to distinguish between
admitting someone to be one’s own and affirming them as one’s own. For instance, I
should admit that the classist and racist members of the community of place (in this case, I
am thinking of the particular town) I grew up in are “my own” in a descriptive sense; this
admission both acknowledges that I have in part been constituted within a community with
these values and it indicates that I am responsible for engaging with this community in an
attempt to change their values. But I would not affirm the community unproblematically as
my own, as a community whose values I could stand behind.
However, if I draw a distinction between affirming and admitting someone to be
one’s own, I want to maintain that even when “just” admitting someone to be one’s own,
there is no less of a strong sense of moral connection: they implicate me and I implicate
them; we are, in a sense, morally responsible for each other, whether I want to affirm their
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actions and values or whether I want to try to get them to change. Their actions and values
are still in some sense mine, despite my being opposed to them. Bat-Ami Bar On illustrates
this sense of being implicated in the actions of one’s own people even when one would
oppose, rather than affirm, their actions. She argues that when one counts someone as
one’s own, it is appropriate to feel not only anger (which one can feel towards someone
from whom one is morally separate) but also shame, for feeling shame reflects one’s own
connection to the actions of one’s people. One’s opposition to the action does not make
one thereby not responsible for or implicated by it. Bar On writes:
Uncomfortable as shame is, I need it, and I need it more than I need the
anger that I feel at the governments that have formulated and dictated the
Jewish-Israeli policy in relation to the Palestinians. Although anger too
presupposes horror at what happens, and it too is a moral feeling and thus
motivates action, it allows me to separate myself from what becomes
posited as the origin of the repression, for example, the Israeli government.
In this respect anger is a self assuring and purifying feeling. Shame, on the
other hand, does not separate but includes. It is a feeling entailing the
taking of personal responsibility of seeing oneself implicated in the
wrongdoing. (“Meditations on National Identity” 56-57)
Feeling shame, then, is a way of claiming someone as one’s own and simultaneously
expressing opposition to or horror at their actions or values.
Affirming a community or a people as “my own” means making a political claim
both that the community should exist as a community, and that I can stand behind the
values of the community (this would not necessarily mean that I agree with all of the values
of the community). My different communities may stand in complicated relations to being
affirmed as “my own”; some communities I could affirm as “my own” only with
ambivalence. And given that there is never a morally “pure” community, whatever this
would be, there should probably be some ambivalence in the affirmation of any community
as one’s own. For instance, to say “my people” are those in my “home” community may
be easy if I have such a “home,” but it may be politically problematic; if my “home”
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community is based on shared identity, for instance, then the affirmation of this community
could itself be expressive of a failure to count as “my own” the people from whom I am
different. And, it would leave people who recognize their identities as complex and
interlocking mixtures-who have no “home” community based on seemingly distinct
features of identity-without any people to call their own in the “home” sense.
The unambivelent affirmation of a people or a community as my own, then, is the
achievement of a community of destination. Having a people in this sense is never a given;
it is a result of the creation and sustenance of a community of resistance which recognizes
and fights oppressions as interlocked. But affirmation of people as “my own” is not an all
or nothing affair: short of realizing a community of destination, I may belong to other
communities of resistance which I can—with greater or lesser degrees of ambivalence—
affirm as my own.
The next several chapters explore different reasons why it may be politically
problematic to affirm a particular community as “one’s own.” I will focus on the ways in
which describing the boundaries of communities have depended upon essentialist
understandings of identity, and consider why such essentialism promotes continued
oppression. Then, I will go on to consider communities that are defined through the
concept of “culture” (these communities could be, for instance, communities of place or
“home” communities).
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CHAPTER IV
THE COMMUNITARIAN SELF IN IDENTITY POLITICS
A. Introduction
In the previous chapters I have tried to argue that it makes sense to think in terms of
having a people—that is, that the self can be thought of as encompassing more than a self-
contained individual, tied to no history or community. I have argued that Aristotle's
conception of the polis provides a model for seeing how the self is formed morally in a
context of others who consider the question of what the good is (or how to attain it) to be a
public matter, not a matter of private decision. I have also shown how some contemporary
theorists have built on Aristotle's communitarian conception of the self and have held this
conception up against modem, liberal notions of the abstract individual.
I have been interested in the communitarian account of the self precisely because I
am interested in thinking about the place that it has or potentially could have in the
development of a non-individualist politics, and so I will turn now to one such possibility:
identity politics, that is, politics grounded in group identity. My appreciation for the
politics of identity lies in the fact that it is a politics which takes identity to be socially
constituted within a context characterized by group difference and thus provides a model
contrary to liberal politics which denies the significance of group difference and posits the
subject as a human being capable, ideally, of free choice. Just as traditional
communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre argue that there never is a
choosing subject free from social constitution with particular values but rather that all
identity is social identity, so the basis for identity politics is a belief that members of
different social groups are deeply constituted with a collective identity and that such an
identity has a bearing on the moral and political choices that subjects make. But traditional
communitarianism also consistently posits the subject as unitary, not multiplicitous or
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complex, and portrays communities as distinct and separable, not themselves cut across by
group difference. Identity politics has inherited these assumptions too, translating them
into accounts of collective identity which depend upon the conceptual unity of groups.
While an abandonment of the politics of group identity undermines the conditions for
collective thinking and acting and leaves us instead with a conception of the self as
unencumbered with particular moral values, a dependence upon unity for group identity
ignores the complexity of the communitarian sources of identity.
In a time when collective moral and political thinking and acting is inhibited by a
pervasive ideological image of the subject as an unencumbered individual, it is essential to
be able to make conceptual sense of a communitarian account of the subject. Believing that
meaning cannot be made alone, I am committed to the creation of the possibility for
collective thinking and acting, collective meaning-making. Here I agree with Maria
Lugones, who speaks of knowing her company: “a layering of voices of women of color
comes to my mind.
. . voices that have accompanied me sweetly. The voices all speak this
knowledge to me: one just does not go around alone (lonely maybe), but not individual-
style alone making or remaking anything.
.
.” (“On the Logic” 35).
But in liberal society, one is not meant to have company in Lugones’ sense; one is
not meant to have company with whom one makes meaning and is oneself made by this
meaning. In such a society, in the moment before collective responsibility might be taken,
the process is thwarted by the persistent ideology: “it’s my own private decision; above all,
I expect and act on my freedom to do as I choose.” In contemporary, liberal U. S. society
we see daily messages that our moral values are freely chosen, that our cultural identities
can be changed at will as cultural artifacts are bought and sold, that nothing is lost when
history is forgotten, transcended or assimilated beyond, that beneath our colorful or not-so-
colorful skins, we are all simply, abstractly, human beings. This is a society in which
“multi-cultural” education has come to have the flavor of an import store: ethnicities are
displayed like fascinating bits to browse through, selecting what is appealing. But the
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array of choices is not meant to challenge anyone’s identity nor is identity understood to
affect how the cultural selections are to be made, who is to take on which cultures and in
what way. Even the identities which one would think are inscribed on the body are now
instead able to become a matter of choice-for those who can afford such things as plastic
surgery and colored contact lenses-rather than something that must be accepted as given or
even respected as a marker of history and heritage. Moral problems that raise issues of
public policy are responded to with solutions that rely upon the illusion that moral thinking
is done as an individual whose values are formed independently of the social context.
Think, for instance, of the currently popular bumper sticker which reads, “if you’re against
abortion, don t have one (read: you make your decision and I’ll make mine, since after all,
our values need not affect each other at all as long as there is free choice). Politics based on
the notion of the unencumbered self prohibits a consciously collective thinking about moral
problems, and dismisses the possibility that collectively shaped identities—be they simple or
complex-form or inform our moral and political thinking. It bars one from asking, then,
who one’s company is.
B. Towards Alternatives to the Unencumbered Self
It will be helpful to look at a more sustained example of how the belief in the
unencumbered self translates into concrete moral or political actions, before examining
identity-based ways of thinking that stand in opposition to the notion of the unencumbered
self. The following example should serve to contrast the ideology of the unencumbered
self with identity-based thinking, thinking that sees the identity of the self as given or
socially constructed, but not “chosen” prior to or apart from the given values of a particular
history and social context. Recently, a gentile woman with whom I am acquainted
“converted” to Judaism and now considers herself to be Jewish. I want to use this action
as an example because I think it raises interesting questions about identity, and the ways in
which recognition of historically and socially formed identities intersects with the
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possibility of choice. For the concept of conversion to make sense in this case
,
44 Jewish
identity must be thought of as something that can be “chosen”; my claim is that what is
required for this is a conflation of Jewishness as a historically and socially constructed
identity with Judaism, the religion, and an understanding of a religion as a set of beliefs
which anyone, potentially, could freely choose to adopt. This conflation serves to deny
recognition of the Jewish self who is Jewish because she is part of a history and a
community (perhaps an imagined community) that is Jewish
.
45
What I want to contrast here is Jewishness as a given social identity with
Jewishness as belief in and knowledge about a set of claims constitutive of a religion. In
the case I am describing, the woman in question thinks she became Jewish just by virtue of
choosing certain beliefs and undergoing the recognized process of committing to them.
Reconstruction of identity, in any deeper sense than the changing of one’s beliefs, was not
seen as necessary for becoming a Jew. The claim that all there is to becoming Jewish is
choosing to learn about and believe in Judaism is consistent only with a view of the self as
unencumbered; if, as Sandel puts it, “the subject is regarded as prior to its ends” then the
given subject (my gentile acquaintance) chooses new ends, the ends of Judaism. For such
a subject, “the relevant moral question is not ‘Who am I?’ (for the answer to this question
is given in advance) but rather ‘what ends shall I choose?’ and this is a question addressed
44
I say “in this case” because I can imagine other cases of “conversion,” or better put, reconstructions of
identity, which were not thought of as “chosen” by a self who could be thought of as standing somewhere
outside of the chosen values themselves.
45Naomi Scheman has a similar reaction to the idea of conversion to Judaism, and compares it to her
“uneasiness about male to female transsexuals.” She writes, “I have no problem with the wish
,
any more
than I have a problem with wishing one were born in Paris; I just don’t believe one can realize it.” That is,
just as someone raised to be a man cannot completely undo and remake gender construction to be a woman,
Scheman argues, so being Jewish is not the sort of thing one “chooses.” If being a Jew is a matter of
religious belief and knowledge, then, Scheman points out, an atheist like herself would not count
(similarly, if being a woman is at least in part a matter of animating femininity, as it seems to be for male
to female transsexuals, then women who are not feminine or who reject femininity would not quite count as
women.) And, Scheman argues, the convert’s “kind of Jewishness [i.e. religion] is more intelligible in
contemporary America than mine; more intelligible even to me. My own feels ineffable; but one thing I
know about it with certainty is that it is my birthright, that it is not something I chose, nor is it
something I could cease to be. . . it doesn’t seem to me that one can really choose it, imbued as it is with
history: one would have to change the past.” (“Jewish Lesbian Writing” 189). I would add that the
convert’s kind of Jewishness is more intelligible precisely because it is grounded in the unencumbered self,
whereas Scheman’s (or my) kind of Jewishness requires a conception of the self as encumbered with or tied
to a history of a people and a community of a people.
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to the will (Sandel, Liberalism... 58) The unencumbered self becomes Jewish by
choosing new ends.46
It is important to notice that in the mainstream of this liberal society the predominant
understanding of what it is to be a Jew is that it is a matter of religion.47 Being Jewish is
understood here through the lens of the ideology of free individual choice available to the
unencumbered self. What is interesting about this example of liberal thinking is that it
stands in stark contrast to the seemingly obvious fact that being Jewish can also be thought
of as a given social identity. In fact, the view that being a Jew is a matter of choice co-
exists, even under liberalism, with the contradictory view that a Jew can never be other
than a Jew. A non-religious Jew (someone who does not “choose” to believe in the claims
of Judaism) is seen as a Jew when Jewishness is present in her speech, her manners, her
body, and so on; in fact, I would argue that there is a whole “culture” belonging
specifically to atheist Jews, a fact which is irreconcilable with the view that being Jewish is
no more than a matter of religion. Furthermore, anti-Semitism operates in such a way that
a Jew cannot be seen as other than a Jew, no matter what “choices” she/he may make 48
What, then, is the alternative to seeing Jewishness as a matter of religion and as
such something which can be chosen by the unencumbered self? Is it that Jewishness,
46
I think that within some Jewish communities, conversion is looked at with ambivalence precisely
because for Jews whose sense of identity is so clearly tied to history and community, it is not quite
believable that one can become a Jew through an act of the will: thus the convert is never quite believable
as a Jew. The following story “about the Italian barber who fell in love with a Jewish girl on Broome
Street” by Abe Cahan from the Jewish Daily Forward (from the early 1900’s) illustrates this: “He wanted to
marry her, but her mother wouldn’t bless the match. Finally the mother agreed to the marriage provided the
barber converted to Judaism. The mother made the new husband learn Hebrew and he had to pray every
morning wearing his yarmulka. The Italian and his Jewish wife lived with the mother, and the barber did
not get his breakfast until he had prayed. But that wasn’t all. The wife had a brother named Joe and Joe
never prayed before breakfast. So the barber asked his mother-in-law what was the difference between him
and the brother? The answer was, ‘Joe’s a Jew. / know he’s a Jew but you’ve got to prove you’re one.’”
(Harry Golden, in Metzker, Isaac, ed. A Bintel Brief 20).
47This was made vivid to me once several years ago when I was in a feminist consciousness-raising group
in which about half the members were Jewish. One week we decided our topic would be “Jewish identity.”
One of the gentile women asked, “What should I talk about? Christianity?” For her, her difference from us
Jews was to be found in her different religion, not in her different history or culture or race or ethnicity.
48Even Jews who “convert” to a Christian religion remain Jews in the eyes of anti-Semites (and, as it
happens, in the eyes of Jews—the wisdom is, “once a Jew always a Jew”). My mother and members of her
family were baptized Christians in Germany, but come 1933 they were, because of their Jewish background,
still “non-Aryans” according to Nazi logic, and were treated accordingly. This is an anti-Semitic application
of the recognition that the identity of the self goes deeper than what one chooses as one’s individual ends.
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understood as something more than a set of religious beliefs and a body of religious
knowledge, cannot be chosen by someone whose heritage does not already include it? I
think that the answer must be both yes and no, and the key here is the sense of “choice” or
agency through which one could become or be Jewish. As I argued in a previous chapter,
traditional communitarians cannot account for the exercise of agency involved in changing,
or re-constituting one’s identity; an identity is given or inherited and such an identity is
morally binding. Against this view, I have argued that even when understood to be
encumbered or socially constituted, the subject can and must exercise agency and continues
to be constituted and reconstituted through intersecting, continually changing social
contexts or communities. Thus the agency exercised is a collective agency. While the
woman in my example understood herself to be exercising “choice” in the liberal sense, one
could imagine a case of someone reconstituting her identity as Jewish through a process
understood to involve deep cultural change-change of social identity-where this change
took place through the remaking of identity in community
. It would require an extreme
essentialism to uphold the claim that only people meeting X condition (e.g. having a Jewish
mother, having three or more Jewish grandparents, being raised Jewish, etc.) were truly
Jews. Borderline cases challenge the plausibility (not to mention the desirability) of such a
claim. For instance, the Jew who is raised assimilated can be understood to later exercise
agency in remaking herself to have a strong sense of Jewish identity; she can reconstitute
her identity in Jewish community .49 While this involves the exercise of agency, it cannot
be simply understood as an act of the will, an exercise of choice. While one could argue
that this case is different than the case of someone who has no Jewish heritage who
undergoes a similar process (since we can think of the assimilated Jew as still encumbered
with a Jewish history, however deprived of it she was, while we would not think of a
gentile in this way), it seems impossible, without invoking an essentialist definition of who
is and who is not a Jew, to say that there is a clear line between those people who could
49See, for instance, Adrienne Rich’s account of her lifelong process of reconstituting her identity as a Jew,
in “Split At The Root.”
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and those who never could reconstitute their identities as Jews. My point in describing the
example of conversion was not to assert that no one can change their socially constructed
identities; rather, the point was to say that what took place in this case was not understood
to be a social reconstruction of identity. It was understood to be an act of individual
choice, an exercise of the will.
Traditional communitarianism can serve as the basis for accounts of identity which
view the self as socially constituted such that they are essentially unchangeable. As I have
argued with respect to the communitarians, the maintenance of such accounts of identity
depends upon seeing communities in which selves are constructed as bounded, separate,
and homogeneous. An apparently homogeneous, traditional, self-contained Jewish
community, under such an account, would constitute its members simply as Jews, and
someone who was not part of some such community (and one would be either in or our,
never in between) and had no Jewish heritage could never become Jewish simply by
choosing to commit to a set of religious beliefs; “conversion,” under such an account,
makes no sense.
Thus I am identifying two different existing strains of thought about the possibility
of conversion: there is the predominant view that being Jewish is a matter of religion and
can be chosen, and there is an identity-based view, for which communitarianism provides a
grounding, which sees Jewish identity as an inheritance, a result of belonging and being
constituted through a particular history and community. While I am claiming that there are
alternatives to the liberal view that becoming a Jew can be a matter of the unencumbered
self making a choice, I want to suggest that a view of social identities (of which Jewish
identity would be an example) as completely given is only one such alternative. My claim
that reconstruction of identity is possible in community through the exercise of collective
agency suggests the beginning of another alternative account that takes the self to be neither
unencumbered nor completely constituted within a given, single collectivity. What I want
to question is the politics of an identity-based alternative to the unencumbered self, and the
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possibility of seeing identity more complexly without losing the sense of collectivity that it
represents. To do this, I turn now to an exploration of the link between politics (that is,
the purposeful exercise of thinking and acting with a political aim) and group identity.
C. Identity and Politics
The term identity politics” makes reference to a potential or existing link between
politics and group identity. I have been led to an exploration of the variety of conceptions
of the self and of politics (and the connections between them) that are all termed “identity
politics” because I understand these conceptions to provide alternatives to the
understanding of the self as unencumbered and to politics as a matter of interest-group
liberalism
.
50
“Identity politics” have included politics based on identities such as: “African-
American identity,” “lesbian identity,” “Latino identity,” “working-class identity,” and so
on. In these terms “identity” implies socially constructed identities based on categories of
race, culture, ethnicity, class, gender, “sexuality” and perhaps other categories or
groupings which emerge and dissolve in different historical periods
.
51 Each of these
identity categories has its own history and characteristics; with some the creation of the
category more clearly serves the purpose of oppressive systems while some emerge from
movements of resistance (and some may have a dual nature in this sense). I take it that the
groupings of people into these categories is not a “natural” given; the categories
themselves, as well as the identities they refer to, are socially constructed. In each case,
while I am referring to “categories” of identity, it is also the case that although they are not
in any sense “natural,” the categories are also not just formal; they both produce and are
produced by the lived realities of social life, so that members of the categories have the
lived experience of shaping their identities in relation to (or within histories and
communities of) other members of that category or group, and in contradistinction from
50See, for instance, Ann Ferguson’s “Ethico-Political Strategies and Feminist Oppositional Communities”
for a discussion of how identity politics differs from interest group politics.
51
“Sexuality,” for instance, is a relatively recent mode of categorizing people or referring to personal
identities.
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members of other groups.52 With some of the categories (culture, for instance) it is more
plausible that the lived experience that members of the category have of shaping their
identities in relation to each other (e.g. through shared values, ways of being, language,
daily practices, customs, etc.) exists apart from the classification of the members into a
distinct group. But even in such cases, the drawing of borders between the categories (that
is, the notion that different cultures are separable and distinct from one another) can result
from the articulation of the categories as categories, not simply from the lived experience of
the social construction of identity.
To the extent that one does think of people in terms of such categories of identity,
there is a challenge to the view of the self as unencumbered. For instance, for someone to
say, As a Black man, I think...” implies that values are informed by socially constructed
identity. For the unencumbered self, color differences are only “skin deep”; they cover the
generic, rational human being who is underneath. For the person who speaks “as a Black
man,” Blackness is more than this covering; it represents an identity with a particular
history, experience, perspective and set of values. Furthermore, identity politics not only
recognizes that a self s identity is constituted as tied to these categories of identity but also
makes the claim that there is a connection between self identity and engagement in politics.
While identity politics shares with communitarian theory the understanding that our
identities go deeper than what is open to be changed by individual choice, the departure of
identity politics from traditional communitarian theory is that the collectivity in which the
self s identity is constituted is not assumed to be a traditional community of place but rather
is thought to be based on categories of identity such as those of race, gender, class,
ethnicity, and so on. My contention is that if one sees these categories of identity as
complex and inseparable, and yet adheres to the communitarian recognition that our
identities are constituted in community, then one must ask complicated questions about
^Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s account of racial formation informs my description of categories of
identity here. Racial formation, for them, refers to “the process by which social, economic and political
forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by
racial meanings” (61 ).
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who comprises one’s constitutive communities. Recognition of the profound depth with
which members of a community may engage with one another-in that they form each
other s moral constitutions-makes questions about who our “company” is particularly
weighty.
While the existence of the ideas of culture, race, gender and so on can challenge the
plausibility of the unencumbered self, even these categories of identity can be deflated in
the liberal mind; they can be seen as indicators of differences that do not go deep enough to
create different moral identities. Thus, for instance, women and men are seen as not
constructed with different “moral voices,”53 but rather each can, despite their superficial or
cosmetic (or “sex”) differences, think simply as a human being. It is not that the liberal
must deny that differences exist along lines of categories of identity, but they must see
these differences as only skin deep and thus not really differences of socially constructed
identity at all.
Categories of ethnicity and culture would seem to present the defender of the
unencumbered self with a difficult challenge, for cultural differences are recognized to be
tied to differences of values. But through ethical relativism, even cultural differences are
interpreted in a framework that emphasizes free choice as an exercise of the will. Non-
interference in the practices of other cultures is thus required because to do otherwise
would be to impede free choice. Thus recognition of cultural differences leads the liberal to
a principle of non-interference, rather than to the practice of “interference”-which might
better be called participation in the public realm or polis—at least within one’s own culture
or community. The recognition that culture forms its members morally might lead to a
recognition that one should understand oneself to be engaged morally with others. This
engagement should at least be seen to make sense within one’s own culture or community,
but furthermore, to the extent to which all cultures are, especially in this postcolonial
53As Carol Gilligan’s challenge to Lawrence Kohlberg suggests that they are. See Gilligan, In a Different
Voice.
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world, inextricably mixed up with one another, such engagement can make sense across,
between and amongst different cultures as well . 54 However, even when the liberal
acknowledges the extent to which culture plays a part in morally constituting its members,
this acknowledgment leads not to engagement but rather to disengagement; since cultures
are different, the thinking goes, one must not judge others unlike oneself. If this cultural
relativism dissolves into an individual subjectivism, even the recognition that one is a
culturally constituted self is lost and one is urged to not see oneself as morally bound to any
community. Thus for the idea of social identity to present a challenge to the idea of the
unencumbered self, it must be seen as going more than skin-deep. The fact of difference
must be seen not as a call for tolerance or non-interference, but rather as an indication of the
social construction of identity and thus as a call for engagement in the public realm in which
identities are constituted.
The possibility of collectivity is both suggested by and made problematic by the
recognition of the degree to which our identities are socially constituted. If social identities
are constituted by collectivities based on distinctions of race, gender, and so on, then one
can recognize these categories as a basis for feeling oneself to have a “people,” a depth of
collectivity that is denied to the unencumbered self. However, if in fact the categories of
identity are not distinct and separable but rather are interlocked and mixed, then who this
collectivity is becomes unclear. There is a political motivation for looking at categories of
social identity as a possible yet suspicious basis from which to answer the “who are my
people?” question.
It is important to ask the “who are my people?” question in relation to identity, but it
is also important to be clear that the question is a political question and not simply a
question about identity for the sake of identity. That is, I am not going to pre-suppose that
we should hear the “who are my people?” question, as it is probably most often heard, as if
it were synonymous with the question “what is my identity (be it cultural, racial, gender,
54This is, however, made problematic by the fact of imperialism, which makes it an exercise of domination
for some to engage in others’ cultural formation.
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etc. identity)? Rather, I am recognizing that accounts of identity have provided or tried to
provide answers to the “who are my people?” question, and I am interested in considering
what the politics are of these identity-based answers. That is, what are the motivations and
effects of basing one s political sense of who one’s people are on one’s sense of identity?
To ask what, if any, is the relation between identity and politics is to question the automatic
assumption (implicit in some versions of “identity politics”) that one’s identity determines
one s politics. There are, of course, many ways of referring to “identity” in answering the
“who are my people?” question, and these different conceptions of what identity is have
different political implications; one can redefine what is meant by social identity in order to
avoid describing our identities in terms of apparently separable categories of identity, and
thus one can create a politics that is still in some sense a politics of identity, but with very
different political implications. This is, then, not an abandonment of the concept of socially
constructed identity, but rather a revision of what this means. So the question is open
about whether group identity makes sense as a basis for answering the “who are my
people?” question as a political question, and about what account of identity best grounds a
politics of resistance.
In the previous chapter I pointed out that, recognizing the many different senses of
community (community of origin, community of social/political identity, community of
resistance, etc.), one can see that the “who are my people?” question can be answered in
many different senses. When identity politics links group identity-as it is constructed
through the available categories-to political commitment, it assumes that one’s community
of social/political identity should also form one’s community of resistance (which is a
political community); that is, it assumes that to answer the “who are my people?” question
with reference to one’s community of social/political identity is to simultaneously answer
the “who are my people?” question as a political question, a question that inquires about
one’s community of resistance. For instance, under this thinking, someone constructed by
the binary gender system as a woman—that is, someone who has a social identity as a
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woman-should be committed specifically to the politics of women’s liberation. It is the
assumption of the link between identity-as constructed through categories of social
identity—and politics that I am going to question so I can ask, instead, what are the
possibilities for a community of destination that is characterized by a depth of collectivity or
a sense of peoplehood and yet does not depend upon categories of identity as they are
currently and problematically constructed?
D. Keeping Identity Political
While identity politics links group identity and politics, it is also possible for the
assertion of subordinate identities to be seen as itself the political goal; that is, one can go
further than seeing identity as just motivating or directing one’s politics, and instead see the
assertion or preservation of a subordinate identity as itself exhaustively comprising one’s
political action, and thus fail to see there being anything more to politics. Under this
understanding, it is common to hear the “who are my people?” question as exclusively a
question of identity (as opposed to a question about one’s political commitments), and
indeed, even as a question exclusively about social identity, it is a complicated and
interesting question, one which for many people cannot be easily answered. But the
question of what one’s identity is can be a problematic or complicated question without
necessarily being a self-consciously political question. One can hear the “who are my
people?” question as a difficult question of identity without addressing it as necessarily
politically motivated. An example that comes to mind is the recent attention given to the
complicated identities of mixed race people. Many treatments of this topic focus primarily
on the psychological difficulties involved in negotiating identity, rather than on the political
implications of and motivations behind various possible identities or identifications . 55
Similarly, recent literature on the children of Holocaust survivors tends to focus on the
55 See, for instance, many of the essays in the collection edited by Maria P. P. Root, Racially Mixed
People in America . Other essays in this same collection do focus on the political questions.
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psychological aspects of this status rather than asking: what are the moral/political
implications or imperatives for survivors of a genocide?56
I am suggesting that one not investigate identity solely in order to sort out the
givens of who one is, but rather in order to also ask, politically speaking, what about who
one is or whom one could change one’s identity to be? In this way, one can hear the “who
are my people?” question as a question about politics that may or may not be answerable in
terms of what one considers to be the givens of one’s identity. Insisting that one ask the
question as a political question guards against getting stuck in identity as an end in itself.
In emphasizing that it is not enough to stop at the recognition and affirmation of identity,
June Jordan asks, “What is the purpose of your identity?” (qtd. in Parmar, 1 1 1, my
emphasis). She illustrates the difference between on the one hand hearing the “who are my
people? question as a question about identity and on the other hand hearing it as a question
about politics, in this second case, identity can be shown to be relevant only by saying what
the purpose (i.e. political purpose) of one’s identity is. Jordan says in an interview with
Pratibha Parmar:
Almost every year black students at Stonybrook where I teach, come around
to say to me that they want to hold a meeting and I say yes, and I ask what’s
it about. They say unity and I say unity for what? I am already black and
you are black so we unify okay but I don’t need to meet with you about
that. When we get together, what’s the purpose of that, what do you want
to do? I don’t need to sit in a room with other people who are black to know
that I am black—that’ s not unity. Unity has to have some purpose to it
otherwise we are not talking politics, (qtd. in Parmar, 111)
While it is important to note that identity is not always as much of a given as June Jordan
takes it to be here—for instance, for many mixed race people or for people who have grown
up assimilated, claims like the one that “I am already black and you are black. . .” are too
problematic to be given as obvious-her point is well taken that questions about identity do
56See, for instance, Helen Epstein, Children of the Holocaust or Dina Wardi, Memorial Candles: Children
of the Holocaust.
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not in themselves amount to questions about politics. One can ask identity questions
without any political intention (although one might also say that any question about identity
is a political question, even if not intended as such). My aim here is to ask the political
question: what are the politics of answering the “who are my people?” question in this
particular way rather than that particular way, with reference to this particular identity rather
than that particular identity? The claim that there are political decisions to be made in
answering the “who are my people?” question suggests that identities are not only not
givens, but that their reconstruction can be motivated and guided by political
considerations.
A similar objection to political questions’ dissolving into questions of identity is
expressed by Jenny Bourne. She begins her essay “Homelands of the Mind: Jewish
Feminism and Identity Politics” with the assertion: “Identity Politics is all the rage.
Exploitation is out (it is extrinsically determinist). Oppression is in (it is intrinsically
personal). What is to be done has been replaced by who I am. Political culture has ceded
to cultural politics” (1). It is not that she thinks there is or can be no tie between identity
and politics, but rather that political considerations (and she is primarily concerned with
economic exploitation as the political problem) must guide the conscious making and
remaking of our identities; identity is not an end in itself. Bourne argues: “The question
that needs to be asked is not what constitutes our identity, but what is identity for?” noting
that identity must have “a purpose over and above its own definition and preservation”
(21 ).
I am sympathetic to Bourne’s proposed line of questioning here, but I would like to
suggest a complication which arises for me because I do not share her belief that all
oppression should be analyzed through the concept of exploitation. 57 As I will argue later,
enforced assimilation is itself a form that oppression takes, and the resistance to this
oppression through the assertion of a threatened identity is a political act. What Bourne
57 See, for instance. Iris Young’s “Five Faces of Oppression” in Justice and the Politics of Difference.
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objects to-and here I agree with her-is the stopping with this act as a final end, as if it
were the only form of political resistance to engage in. With her focus on exploitation,
however, it is not even clear that she recognizes resistance to assimilation as a political act
itself, but in any case, her point remains that political action does not end here; identity is
not just an end. Furthermore, given what a problematic task it is to know what is involved
in asserting any identity, there are political questions to ask about how identity is to be lived
even for the seemingly clear purpose of resisting assimilation. For instance. Bourne is
wary of Jews fetishizing Yiddish and notes that “all such searches for identity will end up
on the side of recreating who we no longer are’”(21) rather than creating an identity which
makes sense in our own historical and political context.
Thus even when asking what the purpose is of identity, it is not necessary to
answer that assertion of identity has no political purpose. Bourne writes that “Identity
politics regards the discovery of identity as its supreme goal. . . the mistake is to view
identity as an end rather than as a means” (22). An open question, then, is how can
identity serve as a means to political struggles that aim at ending oppression, and how can
any embracing of identity itself avoid recreating or creating in different ways elements of
oppression which produce beings who are marginalized, fractionalized,58 or fragmented?59
Bourne ends with a suggested direction to take this questioning. She writes:
“Identity is not merely a precursor to action, it is also created through action. . . We can
only learn and confirm our identity. . . through our actions. What we do is who we are"
(22, emphasis in the original). I am going to hold this reminder in mind as I go on to look
at descriptions and justifications of identity politics that have been offered, to read these
accounts through the recognition that identity can be a starting point (“a precursor to
58This term was used in this context in the Combahee River Collective’s “A Black Feminist Statement” in
1977.
59Maria Lugones uses this term: “Fragmented: in fragments, pieces, parts that do not fit well together,
parts taken for wholes, composite, composed of the parts of other beings, composed of imagined parts,
composed of parts produced by a splitting imagination, composed of parts produced by subordinates
enacting their dominators’ fantasies” (“Purity” 463).
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action ) and can be remade through collective action where the remaking is understood with
political purpose.
E. The Social Construction of Identity and the Question of Fssentialism
Claims about the connection between identity and politics could begin either with
the assumption that identities are naturally given or with the assumption that they are
socially constructed. While some strains of identity politics have, purposely or not, relied
upon claims about the naturalness of certain features of identity, any consideration of how
identity might be reconstructed through political practice must take identity to be open to
social construction. Before turning to see how it is argued that identities are socially
constructed, I will look briefly at versions of identity politics that make the contrary
assumption.
Linda Alcoff, in “Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis
In Feminist Theory,” describes cultural feminism (which I count as one version of identity
politics) as “the ideology of a female nature or female essence reappropriated by feminists
themselves in an effort to revalidate undervalued female attributes” (408). She sites the
work of Mary Daly and the early work of Adrienne Rich as examples of such theory.60
She summarizes Daly by writing, “Female energy, conceived by Daly as a natural essence,
needs to be freed from its male parasites, released for creative expression and recharged
through bonding with other women. In this free space women’s ‘natural’ attributes of
love, creativity, and the ability to nurture can thrive” (408-409). For Daly, the natural
attributes of women—that is, those constitutive of their femaleness—are their essential
attributes, and all other attributes such as their race, ethnicity, and so on, are “male defined
differences” (Daly, 365, qtd. in Alcoff, 409), and are, as Alcoff notes, “apparent rather
than real, inessential rather than essential” (409). Daly, Alcoff argues, bases her claims
60Alcoff draws on Mary Daly’s Gvn/Ecology and Adrienne Rich’s On Lies. Secrets, and Silence and Of
Woman Born . She also notes that in “Notes Toward a Politics of Location” in Blood, Bread and Poetry .
Rich departs from her earlier position.
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about what women's politics should be on their g.ven female nature: "Our essence is
defined, here, in our sex, from which flow all the facts about us: who are our potential
allies, who is our enemy, what are our objective interests, what is our true nature" (409).
Alcoff also notes that Adrienne Rich bases her arguments on the claim that women’s
biological characteristics can be the basis for their liberation; Rich writes that women must
“come to view our physicality as a resource, rather than a destiny.
. . We must touch the
unity and resonance of our physicality, our bond with the natural order.
.
.” (Rich, Of
-
°man
" 21 ' 1,d ’ in AIcoff- 409 >- Thus Rich also “identifies a female essence, defines
patriarchy as the subjugation and colonization of this essence out of male envy and need,
and then promotes a solution that revolves around rediscovering our essence and bonding
with other women” (Alcoff, 410).
I want to note a few things about such theories which take identity to be based on a
naturally given essence. First of all, such theories are ahistorical in the sense that they do
not recognize the ways in which different women are constructed differently depending on
their social and historical contexts; even in the face of evidence that women often
experience their differences from each other as more salient than their commonalities, still a
biologically based shared characteristic is maintained to be what is essential precisely
because it is seen as timeless. However, such shared biological characteristics are not
timeless; this becomes clear once we recognize that the interpretation of female biology is
different during different historical periods, as well as across cultures and across other
defining group differences. Whether a woman s biology places her as a mother, a virgin, a
deviant, a whore, and so on, for instance, has everything to do with her other features of
identity such as her race and her class. To name women’s shared “physicality” as a
common essence, then, ignores the fact that biology itself is always socially interpreted and
constructed.
Secondly, to give an account of women’s identity as based on an essential and
naturally given characteristic and to argue that women should privilege this identity is
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harmful to those whose experience it discounts; for tnstance, it discounts the experience of
women of color who are told that their racial identities are inessential to who they are and to
what their political commitments should be.
Thirdly, to see identities as naturally given is to severely limit the questions one can
ask about what one’s politics should be. That is, one’s political possibilities are limited to
asking how one should redefine or revalue what has already been given (for instance,
women’s innate abilities to nurture, to be peaceful, etc.); one cannot ask how one should
remake one s identity through practice. Furthermore, it does not make sense to ask with
whom one should engage in politics, since, as Alcoff noted, “who are our potential allies,
who is our enemy, what are our objective interests” (409) and so on are all given by our
natures.
It may appear that the recognition that identities are socially constructed rather than
naturally given will provide a way for identity politics to avoid the problem of essentialism
and the corresponding problem of privileging only some people’s identities. However, this
is not necessarily so. Even if identities are constructed, they can be described as
constructed with essences: a theorist who argues that identities are socially constructed
might argue that one can be constructed as simply a woman, or as simply a Black person,
and so on. Constructionist language reveals essentialism in its use of terms like “woman”
to describe beings who have all been socially constructed with a shared characteristic (or
essence, to insist upon this extended use of the word) which legitimizes the use of the
categorical term.
That constructionism is or can be really just another form of essentialism is the
focus of Diana Fuss’ argument in Essentially Speaking . She argues that essentialism “is
most commonly understood as a belief in the real, true essence of things, the invariable and
lixed properties which define the ‘whatness’ of a given entity” (j«); essentialism is
“classically defined as a belief in true essence—that which is most irreducible, unchanging,
and therefore constitutive of a given person or thing” (2). As an example of such
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essentialism in feminist theory, Fuss notes that “essentialism can be located in appeals to a
pure or original femininity, a female essence, outside the boundaries of the social and
thereby untainted (though perhaps repressed) by a patriarchal order” (2). This “classical”
understanding of essentialism, then, captures the sense in which theories such as those of
Daly and Rich, as described above, count as essentialist.
Fuss, however, argues that there is “no essence to essentialism, that (historically,
philosophically, and politically) we can only speak of essentialisms” (xii ) and that, in fact,
constructionism (which she defines as “the position that differences are constructed, not
innate” [xii]) employs another form of essentialism. She is thus challenging and expanding
what she has called the “classical” understanding of what essentialism is. She points out
the ways in which constructionists employ a different sort of essentialism. For instance:
While a constructionist might recognize that ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are
produced across a spectrum of discourses, the categories ‘man’ and
woman still remain constant. Some minimal point of commonality and
continuity necessitates at least the linguistic retention of these particular
terms. (4)
The constructionist might use categorical terms in the plural (e.g. “women” rather than
“woman”) to indicate that there is no single or unitary way in which members of the
category are constructed transhistorically, but even the use of the plural term, “though
conceptually signaling heterogeneity nonetheless semantically marks a collectivity;
constructed or not, ‘women’ still occupies the space of linguistic unity” (4). Specifying
sub-categories of “woman”-for instance, using separate categories for women described
differently in terms of race and class and historical period, and so on—does not avoid
essentialism either, for “it succeeds only in fragmenting the subject into multiple identities,
each with its own self-contained, self-referential essence” (20).
To do this fragmenting into separate essential identities employs what Elizabeth
Spelman calls the “additive analysis” of identity and of oppression; each separate identity
that gets added on has its own essence. Recognition that identities are socially constructed,
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then, even when the process of social construction is understood in terms of multiple
systems such as racial systems and gender systems, can coexist with an understanding of
identity as based upon an essence or a conjunction of essences. And, simply the
recognition that identities are socially constructed rather than naturally given does not
necessarily avoid the harms of essentialism such as the marginalization of the experience of
certain people. For instance, an identity as a “Black woman,” might be understood, under
the additive analysis, to consist of an identity as “Black” (defined by an essence of
Blackness, likely to be based on a male norm) added onto an identity as “woman” (defined
by an essence of womanness, likely to be based on a white norm). Whether the
understanding of what it is to be Black and the understanding of what it is to be a woman
are based on the assumption that these identities are given naturally or are based on the
assumption that they are socially constructed, the identities are still understood to contain
essences, and the essence is extracted from the experience of whoever is the “norm” of the
category (i.e. Black men, or white women), thus excluding or marginalizing, for instance.
Black women, or fractionalizing them into having two separate identities neither of which
describe them properly. Thus as Fuss argues, recognizing that identities are socially
constructed has not solved this particular problem of essentialism.
Indeed, Fuss argument that there is an essentialism employed in constructionist
accounts of identity seems to be confirmed by the fact that feminist critiques of essentialism
in feminist theory often focus on feminist theorists who assume a social construction of
identity. One clear example of this is Elizabeth Spelman’s Inessential Woman which
critiques feminist theorists such as Simone de Beauvoir and Nancy Chodorow for their
essentialist uses of the term “woman.” De Beauvoir obviously rejects all claims about
natural essences; with her important claim that “[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes, a
woman” (249), she clearly recognizes that women are socially constructed or conditioned
creatures, that is, constructed or conditioned as women. Nancy Chodorow’ s The
Reproduction of Mothering is an investigation into the psychological aspects of how
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females are socially constituted or gender,zed (within a context in wh.ch women do the
mothering) to be women. Ne.ther of these constructionist accounts of identity rue able to
avoid describing women's construction to be a construction as women, as people who
share a particular essence, though de Beauvoir would clearly deny that there is any essence
to the condition of women.
If it is true that the move from seeing identities as naturally given to seeing identities
as socially constructed does not avoid essentialism and its attendant harms, then there must
be further questions to ask about identity even for those proponents of identity politics who
see identities as socially constructed. Fuss suggests that “the question we should be asking
is not 'is this text essentialist (and therefore ‘bad')?’ but rather, ‘if this text is essentialist,
What moliva,es i,s deployment?”' (*,'). Her point is that we should focus on whether an
essentialist discourse is strategically smart-whether it is worth the “risk ."61 To put this
differently, I would like to suggest that in examining versions of identity politics which
take identities to be socially constituted, one should focus on considering whether or not
the particular link between identity and politics which is posited is one that furthers the
oppression of the very people whom it purports to liberate. Critiques of essentialism may
be helpful in this respect because they point to some of the ways in which oppression is
perpetuated (for instance, through fragmentation) by some versions of identity politics;
however, the focus should be not on determining if, under some account of what
“essentialism” is, identity politics is essentialist, but rather on determining whether
oppression is being resisted or perpetuated.
Meanwhile, although an identity politics that assumes the social construction of
identity may share with other ‘nature’ or biologically based identity politics the dangers of
seeing identities as separable, and so on, there is an important difference: the recognition
that identity is a matter of social constitution can (although does not necessarily) allow one
to claim that identity can be re-constituted through changed practice. If this is so, then there
61 Of course, the immediate question is: worth the risk to whom?
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IS the possibility of remaking our identities and our political practices so as to avoid the
harms imbedded in essentialist constructions of identity and their corresponding politics.
Even so, as I have suggested, recognizing identity as something which is constituted in
community does not necessitate seeing the possibility for change, including the possibility
lor embracing hybrid identities. Traditional communitarianism stands as an example of a
way of understanding identities as socially constructed without thereby being able to
understand identities as formed in complex or hybrid ways, and without raising questions
about the possible reconstruction of identity.
Even if, as Fuss argued, the recognition that identities are socially constructed
rather than naturally given does not automatically solve the problem of essentialism and its
resultant imperative to base one’s political sense of who “one’s people” are on one’s
identity, what it does allow is the possibility of reconstructing identities, and of attempting
to do this in a way that does not duplicate the problems I have pointed out. Any identity
politics that is based on the belief that identities are given naturally through, for instance, a
female essence, does not even offer this possibility, for as Aristotle asserts, “nothing that is
what it is by nature can be made to behave differently by habituation” (NE 1 103a 18-20).
To recognize that identities are socially constructed is to know they are changeable through
re-habituation, even if the change is not simple or easy. As Marilyn Frye argues:
The hope and possibility of profound change for women on this planet lies
precisely in the fact that our being is only historically determined.
. . and
not given in nature. For then it is a contingent fact that I am who and how I
am, and thus it could be otherwise, I could be otherwise. That is precisely
the logical space needed to make it thinkable to assume responsibility for
changing history (and our selves). (“History” 302-303)
Identity is formed through all social practice. If one pays attention to the political questions
about identity (e.g. “what is the purpose of your identity?”), then one’s political
understandings can inform the practices through which one’s identities continually are
developing. That is, it is not simply that one’s identities, as given, are what dictate what
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one s politics should be (as some identity politics imply); rather, one’s identities are
themselves also formed through politics, since our political practice is itself an arena of
(re)habituation, or re-constitution of identity.
* * *
I have argued in this chapter that group identity can be valorized either for its own
sake or for its potential tie to politics. The communitarian account of the self can be taken
to simply be a descriptive account: the self is socially constituted. Political motivations lead
me to want more than this descriptive account: not only is the self socially constituted, but
furthermore it is good to embrace the social constitution of the self for this allows one to
take (collective) responsibility for this moral constitution. Thus I am urging that one go
beyond a valorization of group identity just for its own sake; I am suggesting that there be a
political thinking about how the self can and should be constituted through the creation and
sustenance of different social contexts or communities. Identity politics can politicize
group identity in this way. Because of this potential in identity politics, I will turn in the
next chapter to an examination of the trajectory that identity politics has taken, and suggest
a direction for its movement.
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CHAPTER V
THE PATH OF IDENTITY POLITICS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
Humanity in the form of fraternity invariably appears historically among persecuted
peoples and enslaved groups In this as it were organically evolved humanity it is as
if under the pressure of persecution the persecuted have moved so closely together that the
interspace which we have called world (and which of course existed between them before
the persecution, keeping them at a distance from one another) has simply disappeared.
The humanity of the insulted and injured has never yet survived the hour of liberation by
so much as a minute. This does not mean that it is insignificant, for in fact it makes
insult and injury endurable; but it does mean that in political terms it is absolutely
irrelevant.
--Hannah Arendt
[Pjartnership in misery does not necessarily provide for partnership for change: When we
get the monsters offour backs all of us may want to run in very different directions.
-June Jordan
A. Introduction
This chapter will be an examination of the ways in which identity politics have
inherited both the virtues and the problems of traditional communitarian theory, and an
exploration of a possible politics of identity that rejects those tenants of communitarianism
that are problematic. In moving to sketch the path of identity politics, I will keep centrally
in mind the questions that I raised in the previous chapter of whether different versions of
such politics allow one to ask questions about the parameters of group identity. While I
think that communitarian theory must be revised to enable it to countenance the
heterogeneity within constitutive communities, along similar lines I believe that such a
revision must take place within identity politics. I will argue that identity politics—at least in
some of its various guises— is characterized by a problem similar to a problem present in
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communitarian theory: it requires that the collectivities that form one’s self identity be
conceptualized in such a way that hybridity cannot itself be countenanced as an identity or
as a mode of conceivtng of identity; rather, the identity exists as a unity. I will follow a line
of questioning suggested in the work of Maria Lugones, a questioning that leads to a
critique of identity politics in both its separatist and some of its coalitionist guises, without
abandoning the possibility of a politics of group identity.62
The connection between identity and politics has been described differently by
different branches” of identity politics, and so I turn now to look at some of the different
accounts of identity politics that have been formulated. The Combahee River Collective
originally formulated an account of “identity politics” in “A Black Feminist Statement” from
1977 where they write:
Above all else, our politics initially sprang from the shared belief that Black
women are inherently valuable, that our liberation is a necessity not as an
adjunct to somebody else s but because of our need as human persons for
autonomy. This may seem so obvious as to sound simplistic, but it is
apparent that no other ostensibly progressive movement has ever considered
our specific oppression as a priority or worked seriously for the ending of
that oppression.
. . .We realize that the only people who care enough about
us to work consistently for our liberation is us. Our politics evolve from a
healthy love for ourselves, our sisters and our community which allows us
to continue our struggle and work.
This focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the concept
of identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially the
most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to
working to end somebody else’s oppression. (212)
Their references to recognizing their own specific oppression comes out of their assertion
that they “often find it difficult to separate race from class from sex oppression because in
our lives they are most often experienced simultaneously” (213). They are also working
62
It is not just the critiques of specific theorists-for instance, Sarah Hoagland and Iris Young-which are
informed in this chapter by Lugones’ work, but more generally the direction of my thinking in this chapter
has been inspired by her work, particularly “Purity, Impurity and Separation.”
148
from the recognition that the major systems of oppression are interlocking” (210). Thus,
the specific oppression to which they refer is constituted by the interlocking of these
inseparable and simultaneous forces.
While they focus on this specific oppression, they also “feel solidarity with
progressive Black men and do not advocate the fractionalization that white women who are
separatists demand” (213). They go on to make more sense of their claim that they should
focus on their own oppression rather than that of others by asserting that ending their own
oppression would entail ending all others’ oppression: “If Black women were free, it
would mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessitate
the destruction of all the systems of oppression” (215). That is, they take it that because
they experience (simultaneously, and as interlocked) sexism, racism, economic oppression
and heterosexism, fighting against their own oppression involves destroying all of these
major systems of oppression and thus involves ending the oppression of all others who
experience any of these forms of oppression. 63
The Combahee River Collective s emphasis on identity politics as requiring the
recognition of the interlocking of oppressions is important to remember since, in popular
usage, “identity politics” often refers to a politics that utterly fails to take into account more
than one supposedly distinct form of oppression at a time. As Barbara Smith reflects:
The concept of identity politics has been extremely useful in the
development of Third World feminism. It has undoubtedly been most
clarifying and catalytic when individuals do in fact have a combination of
non-mainstream identities as a result of their race, class, ethnicity, sex, and
sexuality; when these identities make them direct targets of oppression; and
when they use their experiences of oppression as a spur for activist political
work. ( Yours In Struggle 84)
63The reasoning here is problematic to me, as I am skeptical that focusing exclusively on the intersection
of oppressions which Black women experience amounts to fighting everyone’s oppression. The claim that
Black women are affected by every major system of oppression-sexism, racism, economic oppression, etc.-
-may be true but because these systems of oppression operate in a variety of ways on, say, people who are
racialized in different ways, fighting the particular oppressions which affect Black women will not
necessarily address the particular forms of oppression which affect, say, Latinas.
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She contrasts this version of identity politics (of which the Combahee River Collective
stands as an example) with lesbian separatism and cultural feminism, which she refers to as
more limited versions of identity politics, noting that “these approaches to dealing with
being social-cultural outsiders only work when the more stringent realities of class and race
are either not operative (because everyone involved is white and middle-class) or when
these material realities are ignored or even forcibly denied” (84).
Thus another possible formulation of identity politics is one that posits one feature
of identity as most essential or at least most salient, and advocates organization around this
one identity, with other identities being subordinated. There can be vast differences within
this formulation of identity politics, for there are a wide variety of ways in which one might
argue that one feature of identity is more primary than others. For instance, as Linda
Alcoff pointed out, Mary Daly and Adrienne Rich (in her early work) take women’s
identities as women to be prior to their racial identities, and their arguments are based on an
understanding of a “female essence” that is naturally given. Or, one might argue that a
particular system of oppression is the cause of other forms of oppression: Marxist theories
posit economic bases for other forms of oppression such as racism and sexism; some
feminist theories such as Daly’s posit patriarchy as the model for racism. Cultural
feminism is built upon the notion that women share something essential in common-a
women’s culture-and that women’s “other” cultural ties are less central in the
determination of their identity or position in society. Commenting on the rise of cultural
feminism, Alice Echols writes, ‘ cultural feminism with its insistence upon women’s
essential sameness to each other and their fundamental difference from men seemed to
many a way to unify a movement that by 1973 was highly schismatic” (244). She sites
“The Fourth World Manifesto” as one example of cultural feminism’s subordination of
women’s differences from each other to their commonality; this “Manifesto” states:
A woman’s class is almost always determined by the man she is living with.
. . . class is therefore basically a distinction between males, while the female
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is defined by her sexual caste status. ... As the Female Liberation
Movement must cut across all (male-imposed) class, race and national lines,
any false identitication of women with privileges that are really male (such
as whiteness or class, etc.) will be fatal to our Movement. (“Manifesto”
331, qtd. in Echols, 246)
Whether the rationale behind women’s unity is derived from assumptions about biology,
from the claim that one form of oppression causes others, or from the belief that race, class
and so on do not really constitute a woman’s identity in the way her sex or gender does, the
form of identity politics that emerges from these assumptions calls for women to see
themselves as essentially women and to deny or downplay the importance of their racial,
ethnic or class identities. Furthermore, when identity politics takes the form of cultural
feminism, it is the embracing of female identity itself that is seen as the political goal; this is
the route that Jenny Bourne warns against, as I noted in the previous chapter. One is
prevented from asking the question of what the political purpose of identity is, beyond a
valorization of the identity itself.
B. Separatist Identity Politics
If different forms of oppression are seen as isolated and stratified, one is left with
an identity politics that calls for an erasure of the non-primary elements of identity. While a
“crude” version of such identity politics might explicitly state that one feature of identity is
more primary than another, other more careful theories recognize that any one person may
experience several oppressions and yet by advocating that separation take place along one
line of identity (e.g. gender identity) and that other forms of oppression be fought within
the separatist community, one form of oppression is still being privileged, and oppressions
are therefore being seen as conceptually separable. It is worth looking closely at this sort
of identity politics to see how it is a departure from the sort of identity politics described by
the Combahee River Collective. As an example, I will look here at Sarah Hoagland’s
version of lesbian separatism.
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Hoagland stands as an interest,ng example of someone whose identity politics is
explicitly communttartan and could thus potentially recogntze and respond to the fact that
people have mult,pie communitarian sources of identity. Hoagland's descrtptton of the
self, much like Roberto Unger's, emphasizes both collectivity and individuation; she rejects
the tdea that individuals are autonomous, but maintains that while engagmg in community
with others, the self emerges as unique. She calls this self “autokoenonous”:
I mean to invoke a self who is both separate and connected. So I create a
word for what I mean : 'autokoenony' (o' to ken o ' ne) which I take from
the greek auto ( self) and 'koenonia’ (“community, or any group whose
members have something in common”). What I mean by 'autokoenony' is
the self in community.” The self in community involves each of us making
choices; it involves each of us having a self-conscious sense of ourselves as
moral agents in a community of other self-conscious moral agents. (145)
Hoagland is focused on the question of how lesbians can re-constitute themselves in
lesbian community
,
a community that exists within a context of oppression that affects
what our moral possibilities are. She recognizes how we have been socially constituted
within what she calls heterosexualist contexts, but she is interested in resisting the ways in
which these contexts have constituted us as valuing relations of dominance and
subordination.
For Hoagland, then, separation is motivated by the possibility of creating new
values, values not based on dominance and subordination, in a lesbian context that exists
apart from heterosexualism, where heterosexualism is “a way of living that normalizes the
dominance of one person and the subordination of another” (7). She argues that lesbian
separation from heterosexualism is “a legitimate moral and political choice,” for “to engage
in a situation or a system in order to try to change it is one choice. To withdraw from it,
particularly in order to render it meaningless, is another choice” (55). Hoagland’s
argument turns on the claim that by refusing to be a part of the heterosexualist system—that
is, by refusing to be a member of the category ‘woman’-and by defining oneself as
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‘lesbian’, one can open up the possibility of being morally re-habituated in a context in
which one is not subordinate. Not only does the heterosexualist system from which
lesbians separate thereby become meaningless, but within lesbian community there is the
possibility of creating new value, new meaning, for “the conceptual category ‘lesbian’-
unhke the category ‘woman’-is not irretrievably tied up with dominance and subordination
as norms of behavior” (68).
While Hoagland s recognition of the social construction (and potential re-
construction) of the self is central to her thesis that we can change our moral identities
within lesbian community, and while she argues that it is only among other lesbians that a
lesbian can do this, Hoagland does not apply her vision of how the self is constituted only
in community to think about what sort of communities lesbians’ racial, ethnic, or class
identities are constituted within. That is, while it is clear to her that as a lesbian, a lesbian
can only re-constitute herself with liberatory values as an autokoenonous being in lesbian
community, she does not problematize the act of speaking of someone as a lesbian without
meanwhile speaking of that person as someone with a particular, say, racial identity; to do
so would raise the complicated question of where this self could be autokoenonous as
someone with a complex identity.
Thus a separatist version of identity politics can view multiple oppressions as
affecting one person, and yet still imply that one feature of identity should be privileged by
arguing that separation take place along one line of identity. Spelman’s critique of how
essentialism imbeds itself in such feminist theory is useful for seeing how this isolating and
privileging of gender takes place. Spelman critiques the “additive analysis” of oppression,
arguing that this analysis assumes that different oppressions-for instance, sexism and
racism—are separable, and that when two or more forms of oppression are experienced by
one person, these oppressions add on to each other without mixing. According to the
additive analysis, then, those who experience “both sexism and racism” experience just
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that: sexism and racism, not a specific form of oppression that is the result of some
particular mixing, or interaction, of sexist and racist forces. As Spelman comments:
It is highly misleading to say, without further explanation, that Black
women experience “sexism and racism.” For to say merely that suggests
that Black women experience one form of oppression, as Blacks (the same
thing Black men experience) and that they experience another form of
oppression, as women (the same thing white women experience). (122)
The additive analysis claims that although we may each experience other forms of
oppression, what women have in common as women is that we all experience sexism, and,
by implication, should unite in order to resist this shared oppression. A lesbian separatist
theory such as Hoagland’s can recognize that some women experience racism, but not
notice that the heterosexualism that a woman of color experiences differs from the
heterosexualism that a white/anglo woman may experience. Heterosexualism is never just
“a matter of men (or the masculine) dominating women (or the feminine)” (8) as Hoagland
says it is, but rather it is always a matter of racialized men dominating (and/or, depending
on the racial relation, being subordinate to) racialized women.
Rejecting the additive analysis of oppression, Spelman argues that we must think of
gender, race, and class identities as mixing in such a way that they are partly constitutive of
each other. So for any individual woman, that woman’s gender is partly determined by
what her race and class are. If this is true, then it is not the case that there are only two
genders in the world and it does not make sense to speak of all women as sharing a gender
identity. In considering this point, Spelman looks at Nancy Chodorow’s work on the
development of gender identity. Chodorow describes the process by which female humans
are turned into gendered beings-girls, and then women. Spelman argues that Chodorow
needs to go further than to just claim that females are turned into girls and women; in fact,
all females are turned into particular girls and women. She notes, “. . . it does not seem
accurate to describe what my mother nurtured in me, and what I learned, as being simply a
‘girl.’ I was learning to be a white, middle-class, Christian and ‘American’ girl” (85).
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Similarly, we might ask of Hoagland: is a female turned into a woman under
heterosexualism, or into a particular sort of a woman? When Hoagland claims that
woman exists only in relation to ‘man’ (someone who dominates), and as long as this
identity holds, male domination of women will appear socially desirable and, even, natural”
(7) she is seeing that heterosexualism creates ‘women,’ but not that heterosexualism creates
Barticular women-for instance, women who are racialized in a particular way.
Responding to the claim that all women have gender identity in common, Spelman
writes: “But do we have gender identity in common? In one sense, of course, yes: all
women are women. But in another sense, no: not if gender is a social construction and
females become not simply women but particular kinds of women” (113). If there is a
sense in which women do not share a gender identity-that is, if ‘woman’ describes not one
but many genders-then it does not make sense to base feminist politics on what we have in
common, for there is a sense in which women do not even have gender in common. 64 In
light of this, strategies such as separatism cannot argue that all women should separate
from all men without making the false assumption that a woman’s gender identity
distinguishes her from all men and only from men, for there are many genders of women
and many genders of men. Separatist strategies thus fail to acknowledge these complicated
gender divisions. Furthermore, lesbian separatist strategies also fail to acknowledge (as
significant for strategies of resistance) divisions that do not run along lines of gender at all.
Separatist politics which simply suggest the separation of all women from all men aim at
altering the power relations between what Spelman calls the “generic woman” and the
“generic man,” beings who, like the unencumbered self of liberalism, in fact do not exist.
While there are certainly many different versions of lesbian separatism,65 it has, in fact,
generally been understood to involve some such separation of women from men. 66
64Even retaining the term ‘gender’ (e.g. in statements like, “she is genderized as a middle class Asian-
American . .
.
[etc.] woman”) to refer to an identity which is partly constituted by race and class factors may
be problematic; it may seem to privilege gender over race or class.
65 See, for instance. For Lesbians Only : A Separatist Anthology , eds. Hoagland and Penelope.
66For instance, Marilyn Frye defines separatism in “Some Reflections on Separatism and Power” as
“separation of various sorts or modes from men and from institutions, relationships, roles and activities
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Ann Ferguson proposes the term “racial gender” as a way of indicating that gender
formations and racial formations interact and change one another. She does not argue that
women do not have “gender” in common, but rather that women do not all have racial
gender in common. Such a claim still calls an identity politics based on gender into
question. She writes: “The disparity between the gender norms for the dominant and
subordinate races and ethnic groups of a particular social formation account for differences
in personal identities that make identity politics based on a common sense of gender
difficult (“Racial Formation” 1 14). She meanwhile maintains that there are some
transhistoncal features of gender, and that women might come together across other
differences based on these features. For Ferguson, the concept of racial gender explains
motivations both for antagonisms and for coalitions between groups of women:
[T]o say personal identities involve racial genders is to say that there are
economic, political, and cultural practices through which race identities and
gender identities get defined. Further, in some of these practices white
women and women of color are defined differently as women because of
their race, which may set up a political antagonism. In other practices,
women are defined similarly as women in spite of their race. (“Racial
Formation” 1 16)
Without the concept of racial gender, Hoagland’s claim that the term ‘lesbian’—
unlike ‘woman’
-is not “irretrievably tied up with dominance and subordination” (68)
indicates that the lesbian she has in mind is indeed the generic lesbian. While Floagland
attempts to see lesbian subjects as non-generic-that is, as racialized, constituted with class
and ethnic identities, and so on, her attempts to recognize the complexity of identity are
undermined by her failure to see the necessity of multiple communities for the complex
subject. 67 It is only if the category ‘lesbian’ describes generic lesbians that the category
escapes systemic links to dominance and subordination; if all members of the category
which are male-defined, male-dominated and operating for the benefit of males and the maintenance of male
privilege-this separation being initiated or maintained, at will, by women” (The Politics of Reality . 97).
67 In fact she is careful to consistently note the race and class, etc., identities of any lesbian she is
discussing whenever these identities are relevant, and in this way is always aware of non-generic subjects.
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‘lesbian’ are racialized members, for instance, then once again the category ‘lesbian’ must
be seen as tied to relations of dominance and subordination, for just as the system of
heterosexualism creates of males and females dominant men and subordinate women, the
racial state racializes subjects as dominant and/or subordinate. Those who reject as illusory
the generic lesbian cannot say that it is separation from the system of heterosexualism that
frees us from all systemically created and enforced relations of dominance and
subordination; it is important to also see, for instance, that to be racialized is to have
identities constituted as tied to a system of dominance and subordination. If all lesbians are
racialized lesbians, then the category ‘lesbian’ is tied to dominance and subordination.
The generic woman and the generic man (or the generic lesbian) could be described
as similar in one aspect to the unencumbered self; that is, they are encumbered with a
gender identity but not encumbered with identities tied to the race, ethnic and class
communities to which they belong. Thus the recognition of gender as a form of social
construction--that is, as the system that makes women of females and men of males-can
take place without the recognition of other systems of social construction of identity, or
without recognition that many systems of group difference act together and inseparably to
socially constitute any one person’s identity. In this way, even a communitarian-based
theory such as Hoagland’s offers a limited recognition of how the self is “encumbered.”
Hoagland’s separatism certainly tries to recognize and address multiple systems of
oppression, but her insistence that all forms of oppression be addressed within a lesbian
separatist community mistakenly assumes that heterosexualism is most salient in
determining whom an individual woman has her most significant ties of identity—and thus
of politics—with. For instance, she does not advocate separation for women of color along
racial lines or suggest that within racially separatist communities, women could address
heterosexualism. Her positing of heterosexualism as the form that dominance and
subordination takes and her argument that heterosexualism can be fought by women’s
evacuating all heterosexualist contexts (contexts that construct them as women, that is, as
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subordinates to men, rather than as lesbians) misses the simultaneous primacy of racism,
for instance, in some women’s lives and the racial state as constituting us as dominant
and/or subordinate beings. Hoagland attempts to avoid calling for fractionalization by
arguing that in fact racism can be fought within the lesbian community and thus that no
woman has to choose to ignore her racial identity or to feel the split loyalties that result in
fractionalization. And yet this argument ignores what many women of color have pointed
out: that resistance to racial oppression comes out of the communities of color in which
racial solidarity exists. The Combahee River Collective, for instance, asserts that they “feel
solidarity with progressive Black men,” noting that “our situation as Black people
necessitates that we have solidarity around the fact of race” (213). Along similar lines, bell
hooks writes:
There is a special tie binding people together who struggle collectively for
liberation. Black women and men have been united by such ties. They
have known the experience of political solidarity. It is the experience of
shared resistance struggle that led black women to reject the anti-male stance
of some feminist activists. (From Margin 69)
Maria Lugones critiques Hoagland’ s version of separatism precisely because it requires her
to leave the communities of color in which she can engage as a critical cultural participant, a
necessary act of resistance to racial and cultural oppression because it is such critical
participation that keeps subordinated cultures from becoming ossified under colonization.
She writes, “I come to lesbian community with ‘my culture on my back’ [Anzaldua,
Borderlands 21] but this is not where I can struggle for the survival of hispana culture and
life” (“Hispaneando” 142). She argues that it is necessary for herself (and for
Nuevomejicana lesbians) to be able to engage in this struggle, for the culture needs critical
participants in order to remain alive. She writes:
Nuevomejicana lesbians cannot just leave the preservation of la cultura to
other men and women, because la cultura Nuevomejicana (as all other
Chicana and Latina cultures) needs to be both fortified and transformed or
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else we will carry dead cultures on our backs, we will be obsolete beings
(“Hispaneando” 143).
As someone who is socially constituted in several communities, Lugones notes that she
cannot be autokoenonous as a hispana lesbian in either heterosexualist hispana communities
or in lesbian separatist communities. Separation along one line of difference ignores that
the self is constituted in more than one community.
Recognizing identity as complex and as deriving from membership in multiple and
intersecting communities points to the dangers of an identity politics that privileges one
feature of identity by advocating forming communities based on one feature of identity and
then engaging in all of one s politics within this community. Even when such identity
politics recognizes the need to address, say, racism within a lesbian separatist community,
there is a failure to recognize that communities constitute their members and members
constitute their communities and that to separate from a community is to change how one is
socially constituted; thus it is not enough to address racism within a lesbian community, for
the separation of women of color from their communities of color represents a choice not to
continue to be constituted within these communities, and not to critically participate in the
continued shaping of these communities, the communities on which their identities are in
part dependent. Lugones notes that it is lesbians of color who are most aware of the harms
of having to leave their communities of origin. She writes,
[W]e have left our kin and, in a significant sense, our people in
communities that will not recognize us as fully their own as lesbians. I do
not know if anglo lesbians have this sense, but they do not express it
frequently. Hispana lesbians express constantly an ambivalent attachment
to lo nuestro.(“Hispaneando" 141)
In fact, Jewish women also frequently express a similar sentiment. Rima Shore writes:
As the politics of identity play an increasing role in our community, I find
myself baffled at conflicting claims on my loyalty. We are being urged, and
urging each other, to acknowledge and to reclaim the cultures from which
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we have emerged. ... Am I to value the culture from which my family
came, while dismissing the family itself? Do I seek to identify with Jews in
the abstract, but not with the brothers I have loved all my life? (Shore, 98-
99, qtd. in Bulkin, 125).
If lesbian communities reflect a culture that derives from the dominant white/anglo culture,
then white/anglo (gentile) women who form lesbian separatist communities do not quite
leave the communities in which their cultural identities have been constituted in the way that
members of non-dominant cultures do.
Thus recognizing that identities are socially constituted and that this takes place, for
any one person, in a number of communities or along lines of multiple and intersecting
group differences makes it evident that separation from communities in which one’s self is
partly constituted results in a lack of sustenance for the self that is so constituted; at times
one certainly may want to refuse to sustain some of the ways in which one’s self has been
socially constituted and may purposefully separate from a community for this reason. But
it is a mistake to think that one could maintain a desired identity (as a living, changing
identity) apart from the community(ies) that sustain it. If meaning is made socially then one
cannot carry one’s culture on one’s back all by oneself and expect the culture to continue to
make new meanings. Thus, there are problems with any identity politics that, inadvertently
or not, calls for the social sustenance of only one feature of identity (separable from the
rest) by requiring one to leave the communities that make the continued social constitution
of, for instance, one’s racially or culturally defined self impossible.
C. Multiple Communities
In response to the problem that I outlined above with separatist politics, it might be
suggested that one could have multiple and yet separate communities, each of which is built
on the commonality of one feature of identity. However, I believe that such a suggestion
will not do. If it is unacceptable to have to leave some of the communities in which one’s
self is socially constituted, the suggested line of thinking goes, then let us maintain all of
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our communities and yet keep the integrity of each community as defined along different
lines of difference. This model of identity recognizes that the self is constituted as
multiplicitous, and thus calls for multiple community or group identifications.
Such a model is proposed by Iris Young in her description of group difference
within what she calls the “heterogeneous public.” Rejecting the idea that the public is the
arena in which differences are to be left behind in the formation of a unity, she suggests a
public differentiated by social groups each of which has a distinct sense of identity; social
groups that are oppressed are entitled to special forms of representation within the public,
in order to counter the fact that the public, when conceived of as a locus of impartiality,
excludes such oppressed groups or requires members of these groups to assimilate as a
condition ot participation. To give some examples of social groups who are to be specially
represented in the heterogeneous public, Young writes that “clear candidates for group
representation in policy-making in the United States are women, Blacks, American Indians,
old people, poor people, disabled people, gay men and lesbians, Spanish-speaking
Americans, young people, and non-professional workers” (Throwing 127-128).
Participation in public decision-making, then, is a matter of group representation, carried
out through caucuses based on social groups whose interests and perspectives would
otherwise be ignored. Young writes that:
Though its realization is far from assured, the ideal of a “Rainbow
Coalition” expresses such a heterogeneous public with forms of group
representation. ... In a Rainbow Coalition.
. . each of the constituent
groups affirms the presence of the others and affirms the specificity of its
experience and perspective on social issues.
. . Ideally, a rainbow coalition
affirms the presence and supports the claims of each of the oppressed
groups or political movements constituting it, and it arrives at a political
program not by voicing some “principles of unity” that hide differences but
rather by allowing each constituency to analyze economic and social issues
from the perspective of its experience. (Throwing 126-127)
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Young’s proposal serves to recognize both the fact of group difference (including its role in
shaping the collectivities within which .dent,ties are constituted) and the necessity of taking
concrete measures towards ending the dominance of some groups over others while not
ending group differentiation itself.
But what goes on within each of the social groups or caucuses? Such a concern
informs Maria Lugones’ reading of Young’s proposal. Lugones uses the concepts of
thickness" and “transparency" to describe the positions of members of social groups
within their groups. She writes:
Thickness and transparency are group relative. Individuals are transparent
with respect to their group if they perceive their needs, interests, ways, as
those of the group and if this perception becomes dominant or hegemonical
in the group. Individuals are thick if they are aware of their otherness in the
group, of their needs, interests, ways, being relegated to the margins in the
politics of intragroup contestation. (“Purity” 474)
So, for instance, within a group of women, women of color tend to be thick members;
within a group of Latinas, Latina lesbians may be thick members, and so on. Lugones then
considers what happens during Young’s process of group representation to those people
who are thick members of each of the social groups to which they belong. She argues that
we need a solution to the problem of walking from one of one’s groups to another, being
mistreated, misunderstood, engaging in self-abuse and self-betrayal for the sake of the
group that only distorts our needs because they erase our complexity” (“Purity” 473).
Having multiple and yet distinct group memberships results, Lugones argues, in
fragmentation, as long as some members of each group are transparent while others are
thick:
Fragmentation occurs because one’s interests, needs, ways of seeing and
valuing things, persons, and relations are understood not as tied simply to
group membership, but as the needs, interests, and ways of transparent
members of the group. Thick members are erased. Thick members of
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several oppressed groups become composites of the transparent members of
those groups. As thick, they are marginalized through erasure, their voices
nonsensical. (“Purity” 474)
While Young does not call for separation along only one line of identity, as lesbian
separatists such as Hoagland do, what she does call for can be characterized as a series of
temporary separations into distinct caucuses. Those who are thick members in each of
these caucuses are fragmented as they move from group to group, erased in each separate
group. The very problem that Young aims to solve by ensuring representation of
oppressed social groups seems to be replicated within the social group: participation in the
group requires assimilation to the hegemonic ways of transparent members; the unity that
Young rejected as a desideratum for the polity resurfaces within the social group as the
group articulates its concerns and positions. As a form of identity politics, Young’s
mechanisms for identity-based group representation still require the conceptual separability
of “features” of one’s identity; while the subject can be multiplicitous for Young-that is,
one can belong to and be constituted within several different social groups-thick subjects
are fragmented. As Lugones notes, Young “lacks a conception of a multiple subject who is
not fragmented” (“Purity” 473).
* * *
In this context, a return to the Combahee River Collective’s conceptualization of
identity politics looks very appealing, for they are aiming to avoid this very problem of
fractionalization while not abandoning the concept of collective identity. They insist upon
their identities as Black women (they also alternately describe themselves as “Black
feminists and lesbians”), and state that they cannot separate the features of their identity.
They explicitly refuse to walk from one of their groups to another (such as from a Black
caucus to a women’s caucus), as thick members in each group, “being mistreated,
misunderstood, engaging in self-abuse and self-betrayal for the sake of the group. . .”
(Lugones, “Purity” 473); instead, they insist upon the group in which they see themselves
as not being thick members, the group of Black women.
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While I think that The Combahee River Collective is aiming to address the very
problem of fractionalization which they name, I believe that their approach can be further
complicated if one presses the question of whether there are still thick and transparent
members in a group of Black women. The Combahee River Collective has addressed one
of the ways in which complex identity can be distorted. That is, identities can be seen
through the additive analysis; their identities could be seen as the identity of a (generic, but
really male) Black person plus the identity of a (generic, but really white) woman, and so
on. They have rejected this fractionalizing way of characterizing identity. They guard
against being marginalized (as thick members) in the various wider groups in which they
might be placed, among Black people, among women, among lesbians, and so on.
However, they are still positing a unity within the identity they have named: the identity of
Black women. This insistence upon unity can serve to systemically marginalize others who
do not fit squarely within any such identity; to posit a unity of “Black women” may just set
up another norm to contend with that marginalizes those within or on the borders of this
group who do not quite fall into place: for instance. Black Latinas or other mixed-race
women, Blacks who are gender-ambiguous, Black women who in some other way fall
outside the defining or hegemonic features of the unity, whether by being urban, elderly,
Caribbean, a gang-banger, rural, non-English-speaking, Southern, and so on. That is,
despite the narrowing by the Combahee River Collective of their group to those identified
as Black women, there may be more and more forms that thickness and transparency can
take within such a group.
There are, then, at least two distinct ways in which essentialist constructions of
identity are problematic for or harmful to those who are marginalized by these constructions
(and one can experience both of these ways at once). The first is the problem of not fitting
the norm of the separate, distinct lines of group difference from which one’s “composite”
identity is derived. Recognition of this problem leads the Combahee River Collective to
focus on their own oppression as Black women . However, there is a second problem that
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persists even when identity is characterized as free from this sort of fractionalization: the
assumption of commonality of identity within a group such as Black women misses the
indeterminacy, “impurity,” hybridity, or mestizaje present within even such a precisely
specified identity. It is not just that there are gender differences within a group defined
along lines of race, for instance; there are also racial ambiguities or mixtures within
Blackness, gender indeterminacy amongst those generally called women, and so on. Unity
of group identity is not reached by specifying more narrow categories of identity, especially
when the illusion of such unity is created by marginalizing those who will never be the
ones defining the norm of the category. This is the marginalization faced by those who are
gender ambiguous~“bom in the wrong body”~and do not fit the two gender categories
offered, as described for instance by Leslie Feinberg; it is the marginalization of the mixed
race person, as Naomi Zack (among many others) describes, or the Mischling that
Adrienne Rich writes about being in “Split At The Root”; it is the marginalization of the
mestizo and the mestizo, terms used by Chicana/Latina/raeshza theorists such as Gloria
Anzaldua, Maria Lugones and Linda Alcoff as they draw on the Latin American tradition of
acknowledging the mixing of peoples into what Jose Vasconcelos named “La Raza
Cosmica”; it is the marginalization of the hybrid, to use a term from Trinh T. Minh-ha’s
work; it is the marginalization of the assimilated who are not considered “authentic,” and of
the survivors or descendants of imperialism, whose subjectivity reflects the cultures both of
the colonizer and the colonized, as described, for instance, by Edward Said . 68
The Combahee River Collective’s solid identity as Black women-or any other
clearly defined category of identity— is not always available to those who are on the borders
68See Leslie Feinberg, Stone Butch Blues (Ithica, N.Y.: Firebrand Books, 1993); Naomi Zack, Race and
Mixed Race (Philadelphia: Temple U.P., 1993); Adrienne Rich, “Split at the Root: An Essay on Jewish
Identity” in Blood, Bread and Poetry: Selected Prose 1979-1985 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
1986); Gloria Anzaldua, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestizo
;
Maria Lugones, “Purity, Impurity and
Separation”; Linda Alcoff, “Mestizo Identity” (unpublished paper, presented at the Eastern Division of the
Society for Women In Philosophy at Binghamton University, April 1994); Jose Vasconcelos, “La Raza
Cosmica: Mision de la Raza Iberoamericana” in Obras Completas (Mexico: Libreros Mexicanos Unidos,
1957-1961); Trinh T. Minh-ha, “From A Hybrid Place” in Framer Framed (New York: Routledge, 1992);
Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994).
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of or who straddle the defining lines of difference of categories of identity. And yet, there
is clearly a value to naming the collectivity of identity. Just because the lines of difference
which would delineate categories of identity cannot be drawn clearly, nevertheless we are
not, underneath it all, all the same as one another or only idiosyncratically different from
one another; thus I want to hold on to Young’s commitment not to ignore group difference
or promote an undifferentiated, supposedly impartial public. I will return, then, to the
question of how to have collectivity which does not define by a systemically exclusionary
norm and marginalize the rest, how to name an identity which recognizes the sociality of
experience and subjectivity without reducing that sociality to a circumscribed category. To
ask the question using Lugones’ terms, how can there be a collectivity within which there
is no one who is a thick member, no one who is “relegated to the margins in the politics of
intragroup contestation” (“Purity” 474)?
D. From Identity to Politics: Where Does the Hybrid GrC
Trinh T. Minh-ha comments that “‘[identity’ has now become more a point of
departure than an end point in the struggle” (Framer 140) and Linda Alcoff suggests that
we understand the identity politics that the Combahee River Collective developed as
indicating that “one’s identity is taken (and defined) as a political point of departure, as a
motivation for action, and as a delineation of one’s politics” (“Cultural Feminism...” 431-
432). I think this is a positive interpretation of the political implications of the Combahee
River Collective’s formulation of identity politics, for it is one which focuses not on the
marking off of categories which define the identity out of which work is done, but rather
on the work to be done itself, and it takes the direction of this work to be open-ended, not
decided a priori by the givens of one’s identity; the work of politics is itself a source of the
constitution of identity, a process through which identity changes. The sense of identity as
a point of departure is echoed by June Jordan, who comments in an interview with Pratibha
Parmar about “issue-oriented unity among different kinds of people, women, black people.
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or black women" that "it may be enough to get started on something but I doubt very much
whether it s enough to get anything finished" (qtd. in Parmar, 109-110).
Even so, it is not enough to say that identity is a point of departure, for the question
remains: where, given a certain conception of identity, is one compelled to depart to, and
what conception of identity leads one to depart to engage in a politics that does not erase
hybridity? While 1 will return to this question momentarily, I first want to discuss briefly
how particular assumptions about identity may lead to a politics that enables one to maintain
one s identity based on clearly delineated categories-a politics that enables one to never
quite depart from an essentially defined identity.
The political question about whom to “do politics” with (that is, one version of the
“who are my people?” question) is often framed as a debate between “separatism” and
“coalition-building.” However, I believe that both of these forms of oppositional politics
can presuppose the distinctness and separability of social identities. With separatist politics
it is perhaps most clear that one must be able to isolate one feature of identity as definitive
of the line along which separation is to take place. But coalitions can also invoke a
conception of social identity as fractionalized or composite, if the coalition is understood to
be a coming together of previously distinct and separate groups or “caucuses” that remain
distinct throughout the coalition process. Bernice Johnson Reagon’s proposal for
“coalition politics” presupposes a “home” to which parties to the coalition can return.
Reagon s insistence that coalition and home be separate can be problematic, precisely
because one must ask who gets “relegated to the margins in the politics of intragroup
contestation (Lugones, “Purity ’ 474) within the “home.” While Reagon thinks of the
coalition she proposes as an alternative to separatism (imagined as “barred rooms”), in fact
the separate “homes” that sustain or revitalize participants in the coalition also can be places
of marginalization of “thick members.”
Coalition politics is consistent with the conception of identity put forth by the
Combahee River Collective. Such a coalition is envisioned by the authors of Yours In
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Struggle, a collection of three essays, by Minnie Bruce Pratt, a white Christian-raised
Southerner, Barbara Smith, an African-American, and Elly Bulkin, an Ashkenazi Jew.
The authors preface the book by saying “we believe our cooperation on this book indicates
concrete possibilities for coalition work” (9). And yet the coalitions are conceived of as
coalitions between distinct groups-for instance, people of color and Jews. The illusion of
the distinctness of these groups is created by dismissing or downplaying the existence of
those whose identities are mixtures, or are not the norm of either group. Barbara Smith
writes in her essay: “Almost all Jews in the United States are white people of European
backgrounds (80), dismissing as a “minority” those who do not fit this description. Elly
Bulkin asserts that “Jewishness is not, as many assume, equivalent to whiteness” and
comments on the inadequacy of the language available to describe the racialization of Jews
(especially Sephardim); however, her commitment to coalition and perhaps the persistence
of an image of coalition as taking place between distinct groups leads her to announce that
her focus is primarily on relations between white-skinned Jews and non-Jewish people of
color in this country” (97). Jews who are not white are left outside of the focus of
Bulkin s analysis, fitting into neither of the groups that comprise the coalition. Thus the
“thick members” of each of the caucuses have their identities fragmented by the conceptual
separability of the various groups to which they might claim membership, even as these
groups come together in coalition.
Coalition politics, then—such as the Rainbow Coalition that informs Iris Young’s
description of the heterogeneous public or the coalition that grounds the idea of Yours In
S truggle-can require clean categorization of group difference just as much as separatism
can. This indicates to me that one needs to conceive of coalition differently, that one needs
to envision a genuine coalition in which the distinctness of seemingly separate identities
dissolves without the group differences themselves disappearing.
Here the suggestion that we conceive of identity as a point of departure is pertinent.
If identity is a point of departure, could coalition be a destination (albeit an ever-changing
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one) instead of a temporary engagement from which one then returns home? One can
imagine a coalition in which one’s identity would be changed in the coalition process,
where the coalition work itself would be a practice constitutive of identity. In fact, Bernice
Johnson Reagon’s description of coalition suggests that extraordinary change in identity
might take place in the process; if this is so, however, one would end up without, in
Reagon s sense, a home to go back to, for one would not end up as the same person-
fitting into the same home community—as the person whom one was when one entered the
coalition. When identity is understood as including hybridity and including the possibility
(and perhaps desirability) of consciously (re)-constituting oneself as hybrid, there can be
no homes in Reagon’s sense.
E. Partnership in Misery or Partnership for Change?
Who might be partners in a coalition that would be understood to be transformative
of identity? What sorts of partnerships could acknowledge that identities have been made
in complex ways by intersecting group differences but also see identities as points of
departure, not limiting facts?
June Jordan writes that “partnership in misery does not necessarily provide for
partnership for change” (“Report” 82). Hannah Arendt expresses a similar idea when she
distinguishes between on the one hand a sort of humanity present in “dark times”69-that is,
a fraternity based on the intimacy and unity of the persecuted and characterized by what she
calls worldlessness-and on the other hand a friendship whose discourse “belongs to an
area in which there are many voices and where the announcement of what each ‘deems
truth' both links and separates men, establishing in fact those distances between men which
69
“Dark times,” for Arendt, are times when the public realm disappears. She writes in the preface to Men
In Dark Times : “If it is the function of the public realm to throw light on the affairs of men by providing a
space of appearances in which they can show in deed and word, for better and worse, who they are and what
they can do, then darkness has come when this light is extinguished by ‘credibility gaps’ and 'invisible
government,’ by speech that does not disclose what is but sweeps it under the carpet, by exhortations,
moral and otherwise, that, under the pretext of upholding old truths, degrade all truth to meaningless
triviality” (viii).
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together comprise the world” (“On Humanity” 30-31).™ Jose Vasconcelos also speaks of
the unity or patriotism within his raza
,
a patriotism that is necessary in resistance to the
effects of imperialism, but that is not the ultimate end, since in his teleological fashion,
Vasconcelos sees history leading towards the ultimate emergence of “la Raza Cosmica
futura” (904), una raza mestiza. Here the racial nationalism is necessary under present
conditions of domination by stronger nations, but is itself limited. Vasconcelos writes:
Para no tener que renegar alguna vez de la patria misma es menester que
vivamos conforme al alto interes de la raza, aun cuando este no sea todavia
el mas alto interes de la humanidad. Es claro que el corazon solo se
conforma con un intemacionalismo cabal; pero, en las actuales
circunstancias del mundo, el intemacionalismo solo servirfa para acabar de
consumar el triunfo de las naciones mas fuertes. ... El estado actual de la
civilization nos impone todavia el patriotismo como una necesidad de
defensa de intereses materiales y morales, pero es indespensable que ese
patriotismo persiga finalidades vastas y trascendentales.71 (912)
All of these three theorists, then, have a double-edged recognition of the place of the
collective identity of oppressed peoples. Categories of social identity are created from
systems and conditions of oppression that give rise to a certain solidarity, partnership,
fraternity or collective identity. Such an identity cannot be denied without denying the
reality of the conditions of oppression or of the “dark times” that form the context for it.
As Arendt writes:
I cannot gloss over the fact that for many years I considered the only
adequate reply to the question, Who are you? to be: A Jew. That answer
alone took into account the reality of persecution. As for the statement with
which Nathan the Wise (in effect, though not in actual wording) countered
70Thanks to Bat-Ami Bar On for suggesting the relevance of this essay to me.
7
'in order to not at some time have to renounce the very fatherland it is necessary that we live according to
the high interest of the race even when that is not yet the highest interest of humanity. It is clear that the
heart only conforms to complete internationalism; but, in the present circumstances of the world,
internationalism would only serve to finish perfecting the triumph of the strongest nations. . . . The
present state of civilization still imposes patriotism on us as a necessity of defense of material and moral
interests, but it is indispensable for that patriotism to pursue vast and transcendental ends.
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the command: “Step closer, Jew”~the statement: I am a man-I would have
considered it as nothing but a grotesque and dangerous evasion of reality.
(“On Humanity” 17-18)
While to ignore or miss the importance of the solidarity and collective identity of the
oppressed would indicate a denial of the reality of persecution, the politics of such a
collective identity are limited, for they forestall the possibility of fully embracing and
developing human hybridity or mestizaje .1
2
The identity politics which I have been
considering in this chapter have in various ways manifested this limitation, as they have
tried to build “partnership for change” out of oppressed identities.
For Arendt, the refusal or inability to cross lines of difference is part of what it
means for a people to have their collective identity forged through persecution in dark
times. The “fraternity” of the persecuted is dependent upon a retreat from the public realm
where true discourse-the contestation of meaning-takes place. She speaks of the
powerful need men have, in such [dark] times, to move closer to one another, to seek in
the warmth of intimacy the substitute for that light and illumination which only the public
realm can cast. But this means that they avoid disputes and try as far as possible to deal
only with people with whom they cannot come into conflict” (“On Humanity” 30). But the
true humanity of discourse in the public realm also cannot be gained by ignoring the context
of persecution and acting as if group difference did not exist, that is, by crossing over lines
of difference without acknowledging that the lines were ever there. In the context of
persecution, to deny the relevant lines of difference along which group identity are formed
would be both dangerous and a denial of reality; while Arendt wants the true humanity of
friendship rather than the forged intimacy of fraternity, the friendship cannot be one that
fails to acknowledge the context in which it takes place, a context in which we are not all
is important to distinguish between mestizaje which is free from domination and U.S.A.-style melting-
pot, assimilationist ideology, which is tied to domination. This distinction is thoroughly discussed by
Linda Alcoff in “Mestizo Identity.” It is also addressed by Carlos A. Fernandez in “La Raza and the Melting
Pot: A Comparative Look At Multiethnicity” and by Jose Vasconcelos in his development of the idea of
“La Raza Cosmica.”
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just human beings. Rather, any friendship in the context of persecution must be one that
fully recognizes the context. She writes:
[I]n the case of a friendship between a German and a Jew under the
conditions of the Third Reich it would scarcely have been a sign of
humanness for the friends to have said: Are we not both human beings? It
would have been mere evasion of reality and of the world common to both
at that time; they would not have been resisting the world as it was. A law
that prohibited the intercourse of Jews and Germans could be evaded but
could not be defied by people who denied the reality of the distinction. In
keeping with a humanness that had not lost the solid ground of reality, a
humanness in the midst of the reality of persecution, they would have had to
say to each other: A German and a Jew, and friends. (“On Humanity” 23)
Without endorsing the retreat into the collective identity of the persecuted as a persecuted
people, Arendt finds a way to maintain in view the relevance of group difference.
Her account is suggestive of an alternative to an identity politics that depends upon
partnership in misery to ground the shared identity. Even under persecution, where
identity seems to be something that is imposed or given by the oppressive system, a
resistant identity can be claimed or created within a coalition that transforms identity rather
than accepts it as given by the oppressive system. The transformation must be tied to a re-
introduction of the contestation of meaning within the collectivity, that is, a re-introduction
of what Arendt shows is missing from the “fraternity” of the persecuted. The
transformation takes place both in the assertion of the identity as a collective and contested
political commitment-a commitment that recognizes and defies the identities as created
through oppression-and in the treatment of identity as a starting point -in part shaped by a
context of oppression—but not as an immutable fact. To be somewhat metaphorical about
identity, one can contrast Bernice Johnson Reagon’s characterization of “home” as a stable
place of return to recuperate from coalition work, with June Jordan’s characterization of
“home” encapsulated in her remark that “everybody needs a home so at least you can have
some place to leave which is where most folks will say you must be coming from”
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( Notes” 123). Jordan’s “home” is a point of departure; in a coalition in which identity
were transformed through political practice, one would not return to the same home.
Linda Alcoff notes that “people of mixed races and cultures.
. . have had to choose
in some sense their identity” (“Cultural Feminism” 432) precisely because what was given
as an identity could not easily be defined within the parameters of the available categories;
being in this position of choosing compels one to treat identity as a point of departure. In
contrast to the communitarian account of the social construction of identity that tends to be
deterministic because it takes the subject to simply inherit a set of values as given within
one unified history or community, I would like to claim that since the person who is
socially constituted as hybrid exists within complex and intersecting communities, and
these communities may pull on her self identity in various and perhaps conflicting ways,
there is always the need to exercise agency in navigating one’s own self identity. Thus for
someone who does not quite “fit” the category as it is defined by a system of oppression
such as the racial state, there must be a political act of identification, either with the category
she does not quite “fit” in (and thus she transforms the category by inserting herself into it,
by insisting that she does fit, as Sojourner Truth did with the category ‘woman’ by asking,
“ain’t I a woman?”), or with an identity which resists the categories, an identity as impure,
hybrid. Thus a racially mixed person might identify with one race: Black, or Latino, for
instance-or might identify as hybrid; the assimilated Jew might choose politically to
identify as Jewish, and so on. When infused with agency in this way, an act of identifying
holds the possibility of being resistant; the collectivity can be conceived of through terms
used to denote those who are “partners for change” rather than “partners in misery.”
Think, for instance, of the difference between the term ‘Chicano’--a politically claimed
identity—and the term ‘Mexican-American’—a category of identity given by the racial state;
along similar lines, think of the difference between ‘queer’ (or ‘gender resistant’) and ‘bi-
sexual,’ the difference between ‘mestizo ’ (or ‘hybrid’) and ‘mixed-race’ (or ‘bi-racial’),
and the difference between ‘dyke’ and ‘gay/homosexual woman.’ The terms “Chicano,”
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“queer,” dyke” and so on keep alive the contestation of meaning among those to whom the
term applies (which is itself indeterminate) as long as the meanings of the terms are
themselves contested. As Cherrie Moraga comments on some of the other terms, I
have always hated the terms ‘biracial’ and ‘bisexual.’ They are passive terms, without
political bite.
. . They are a declaration not of identity, but of biology, of sexual practice”
(126). That is, these terms refer to something that is taken to be a given or a neutral fact;
they do not declare identity as political commitment, as identification.
The solidarity named by these terms of identity is the solidarity of a political
commitment, but a commitment that, as Arendt urges us to do, takes into account the
context of persecution in which the relationship is formed. It is not as “human beings” that
a community resists together, but it is not necessarily as a group whose members all belong
to the same given category of identity. The creation of identities within such communities
would require an act of identifying to be cognizant of how the starting-point identities of
those involved have been formed under oppression, but not to take these identities to ever
be finished. Under this conception, rather than having or being a certain identity, one
engages in political acts of identity, acts that take identity, as Linda Alcoff suggests, as a
point of departure but also as a continually evolving possibility; “identifying” with
someone, then, is one way of affirming them as one’s own, where this affirmation is
always understood as a purposeful political act, and one which does not need to reinforce
or line up in accordance with given categories of identity, but cannot ignore them, either.
That is, it is not simply that our identities, as given, are what dictate what our politics
should be (as some identity politics imply), but that our identities are themselves also
formed through our politics, since our political practice is itself an arena of (re)habituation,
or re-constitution of identity. While some identity politics such as cultural feminism take
identities as they are formed through persecution (or, in fact, as naturally given) to
determine one’s politics and one’s political community, the politics of identity I am
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suggesting here takes identity to be created through ah social practice, including through the
continuing work that we do in political communities or coalitions.
Given this understanding of identity as created through political acts, no unity is
fixed or unchanging; communities who politically forge their sense of unity maintain this
unity only through the continued struggle of collectively developing and maintaining their
political commitments. Basing one’s solidarity on shared resistance, however, requires full
consciousness of the real possibilities for this resistance being actualized together; that is,
one must not underestimate the importance of how deeply our social constitution has
shaped our experiences and values differently, perhaps in ways which make us at odds
with each other even as we commit to engage in resistance together. We are not all equal
candidates for being each other’s “people,” and yet the affirmation of someone as “one’s
own can still go against the grain, and must go against the grain if one is to disrupt
essentialist constructions of identity while maintaining a communitarian sense about one’s
political life.
If one takes as a starting point the sort of multiple social groups that Iris Young has
proposed for the heterogeneous public, one must focus on the departure from this place of
multiple group identities that result in fragmentation. I am not denying the significance that
the existence of such social groups has for guarding against forced assimilation into an
undifferentiated public. I am suggesting a rethinking of Young’s heterogeneous public
with attention given to what happens within each group and in the very defining of the
parameters and characteristics of the group. If Lugones is correct, there is a forced
assimilation that still takes place within each group, an assimilation of the thick members to
the norm defined by the transparent members. I am suggesting that one reconceive of the
social groups such that their coherence depends not on the categories of oppression but
rather on the contested terms of political commitment. When it is the categories of
oppression that define social groups, these categories lend authority to transparent members
as they make their own ways and concerns seem to represent those of the whole group;
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without these categories of identity there is less to back this hegemony. If one takes
identity as a point of departure and never as itself a given, defining norm of a social group,
all emerging norms can be contested and one can depart from given identities even within a
collectivity by taking collectivities or coalitions to be places of re-constitution of identity.
To understand one s identity as in part formed through political practice allows one to
purposefully resist the re-emergence of new forms of thickness and transparency. I
envision a process where within any collectivity members aim to remake themselves in the
direction ol hybridity, for it is a hybrid self that will develop when the meanings of the
collectivity in which identities are forming are contested meanings. In this process one may
draw on the group differences that have been sustained through groups like those that
Young suggests, but treat these social groups and the identities that were sustained in them
as contestable without being dispensable, that is, one can treat them as points of departure.
This departure includes an enactment of a new sense of what it is to be solidary
with a group. The idea of solidarity must be constructed so that there is still room for
noticing one’s differences from those with whom one is solidary, but also so that there is
the possibility of recognizing two other intertwined phenomena: first of all, being solidary
with a group must be understood to allow for having the status of both being and not being
the other with whom one is solidary; and secondly, being solidary with a group must be
consistent with identities being remade or reconstituted through the experience of solidarity-
-that is, through the actual work done in the coalition community. This remaking of
ourselves in the coalition community does not decrease our differences; rather, it increases
the degree of hybridity within all of us.
I will close this chapter with a reminder from Jenny Bourne, who writes: “Identity
is not merely a precursor to action, it is also created through action. . . . What we do is
who we are” (22). And as one asks the question “what do we do?” one must ask which
political actions create room for identifying with the hybrid, in oneself and in others.
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In the next chapter I will consider the question of collective identity as it could be
grounded in the concept of ‘culture’ and I will focus in on the question of whether some
understanding of ‘culture’ can allow one to develop and animate hybridity. That is, I will
be asking whether the concept of ‘culture’ provides a basis for a socially constituted
identity that could avoid some of the problems that I have outlined in this chapter within
identity politics; could ‘culture’ inform a politics of identity in such a way that did not
depend upon essentialist categories of identity that marginalize those on the borders? I will
argue that as it is commonly understood and as it has been drawn upon to ground some
political communities and oppositional movements, ‘culture’ has tended to be a reifying
notion; however, understood differently, it can include the idea of mestizaje and be a
framework in which identities are socially constituted and lived as creative possibilities.
This conception of ‘culture’ aims to resist assimilation without reifying the claimed identity.
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CHAPTER VI
POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE CONCEPT OF ‘CULTURE’
A. Introduction
In the previous chapter I argued that there is often a problematic link between
politics and group identity when the group in question is defined by systemically created
and enforced social differences. In this chapter I will take the questioning one step further
by suggesting that there is frequently a problem with the concept of ‘culture’ itself, and it is
often culture that either defines a priori or later comes to be associated with a group’s
identity. That is, communities that distinguish themselves from other groups by the
ethnicity of their members take shared culture to be, a priori, a basis for community
membership. And, other constitutive communities (whose members do not share an ethnic
heritage)—such as “women's community” or “lesbian community”—often are thought of as
becoming, through the development of shared practices and values, the locations of shared
‘culture’; for instance, one often hears the terms “women’s culture” or “lesbian culture .”73
Such communities “borrow” the concept of ‘culture’ to attach to what could otherwise be
understood simply as a shared identity. It is as if the concept ‘culture’ adds depth to the
degree to which a community is thought of as constitutive of its member’s identities; it adds
credence to the community as constitutive precisely because to share a culture is to share
something that goes deeper than what can be chosen by an unencumbered subject.
However, I believe it is a mistake to fall back on the concept of ‘culture’ -at least as
the term is commonly understood—to ground political communities whose goal is liberatory
73Ann Ferguson’s “Is There a Lesbian Culture?” critiques the concept of “lesbian culture” on grounds other
than (though compatible with) the ones that will be the focus of my critique. She argues first of all that
there are lesbian subcultures, not a universal lesbian culture, and secondly that “we need. . . to conceive of
our goal as international political movement building (of interconnected lesbian, gay and feminist
movements) rather than culture building” precisely because “those who see themselves as building a
political movement are more able to tolerate value disagreement than those who see themselves as building
a culture” (82 ).
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change, and so I will be asking what role the concept of ‘culture’ plays in creating a sense
of unity within such communities. I will focus now specifically on political communities
that are committed to working to end relations of oppression, that is, of systemically
maintained dominance and subordination of people along lines of group difference, such as
those of gender, race, class, sexuality, and ethnicity. I am motivated here by my
recognition that it is frequently the concept of ‘culture’ that provides the conceptual unity
among members of such communities, and by my concern that in fact ‘culture’—as it is
typically understood-is at odds with the project of liberation. Meanwhile, however, the
giving up of culture through assimilation may itself perpetuate oppression. Thus for the
political communities that I have in mind, both the option of eradicating a non-dominant
culture (through assimilation) and the option of preserving a culture in any simple way are
problematic options. Furthermore, both of these options are typically suggested or pursued
in the context of movements for social change. My contention is that both assimilation (on
the one hand) and the attempt to maintain traditional cultures (on the other hand) are
inconsistent with liberatory political change. I will point out that when a culture is a
stagnant and commodified set of practices and characteristics, that is, a “thing” to be passed
down unchanged, it serves to limit the possibilities available to people and as such is a
conservatizing force. However, I will argue that a critique of culture should not push
those whose cultures are non-hegemonic towards a rejection of their culture. I will end the
chapter by suggesting an account of ‘culture’ that could ground political communities
without serving, as I will argue that ‘culture’ often does, as a reifying notion.
* * *
I will begin by defining the term ‘culture’ here in accordance with its use by
contemporary anthropologists, as including such things as the art, literature, food, and
language of a group of people, and also their everyday ways of being-everything from
their ways of moving through space, holding their bodies, and gesturing to their ways of
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arranging relationships, feeling emotions, and so on™ Cultures, in this sense, are most
obviously shared by groups who not only have the same heritage or ethnicity but also share
their locations; that is, cultures are enacted in particular communities of place, where
everyday practices are shared. These practices may develop out of features of the place; for
instance, all members of one community of place may share practices that are tied to such
things as living in a certain climate, engaging in the same sort of industry or work,
speaking the same regional dialect, attending the same synagogue, or using the same
reservoir. However, at least in the contemporary U.S., such communities of place are
largely obsolete, and yet shared ‘culture’ continues to cement together what could be called
communities or imagined communities in a way that is analogous to how shared culture
holds together a community of place. As Gloria Anzaldua says, “in leaving home I did not
lose touch with my origins because lo mexicano is in my system. I am a turtle, wherever I
go I carry home on my back (Borderlands 21 ). Even without living in a community of
place that shares a culture, she belongs to an imagined community of tnexicanos who
continue to share what can still be called a culture. So one can think, for instance, of social
movements such as the Chicano movement and their corresponding communities (or
imagined communities) of people, as based on a shared culture. In this sense there are
many communities that are comprised of those who may think of themselves as “a people”:
Black communities, Jewish communities, Latino communities. By a further analogy, one
can include here communities of people who do not share an ethnic heritage, but who have
developed certain practices together or who collectively enact certain ways of being; so
there could be shared styles of dressing, attitudes, ritual events, literatures or other artistic
expressions, and so on, all of which can be thought of as cultural practices; in this sense, a
community (or imagined community) such as a gay and lesbian community can be thought
of—and popularly is thought of—as having a corresponding culture.
74See James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture (230-236) and Raymond Williams, Culture and Society ,
for critical discussions of the history of the concept of ‘culture’ and the emergence of this contemporary
anthropological use of the term.
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When a culture is non-hegemonic, and especially when a culture is under a serious
threat of annihilation or cooptation under the forces of the hegemonic culture (which in this
country is white/anglo culture), it may appear that the preservation of the culture is itself an
act of political resistance. The promotion of “multi-culturalism,” in fact, is based on the
assumption that non-dominant cultures in this society need to be practiced and celebrated in
order to resist their erasure in the mainstream or their disappearance into the elusive melting
pot. However, the simple preservation of non-dominant cultural practices is not
necessarily hberatory. Notice, for instance, that every culture contains practices that
perpetuate relations of dominance and subordination along lines of group difference among
the members of the culture. Preservation of traditional cultural practices, then, includes
preservation of the practices of systematic dominance and subordination. A single cultural
practice might be understood both to be oppressive and to be resistant to oppression. For
instance, Trinh T. Minh-ha looks at the choice to be made (presumably by women who
belong to cultures in which women traditionally wear veils) between wearing or not
wearing a veil. She notes that [i]f the act of unveiling has a liberating potential, so does
the act of veiling. It all depends on the context in which such an act is carried out, or more
precisely, on how and where women see dominance” (“Not You” 372). Women’s
removing a veil may be done “in defiance of their men’s oppressive right to their bodies”
(“Not You” 372); but putting the veil back on may mark the women with a cultural identity,
in resistance to another culture’s hegemony.
But the problem with culture goes deeper than the fact that there are specific cultural
practices that, in identifiable ways, perpetuate relations of dominance and subordination.
It this were the only problem, it could presumably be worked on without calling into
question the desirability of culture itself.
Because I think there are deeper problems with conceiving of cultures as unifying
political communities, I will turn now to a critical examination of the very concept of
‘culture.’ I will argue that when political communities are constituted or defined by a
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particular shared culture, the possibility for true resistance to oppression depends in part on
the possibility of the relevant culture’s being one that can be “lived” rather than one that is a
stagnant, reified set of practices and characteristics that members can only consume, and
have little room for changing. This requires a reconceptualization of ‘culture,’ for the
typical understanding of the concept of ‘culture’ is that it excludes being “lived.” For
instance, as Renato Rosaldo points out, the classic norms of anthropology include the
belief that “if it’s moving it isn’t cultural” (209). If it is possible to reconceptualize and
work to enact ‘culture’ as something that is actively “lived”, created and recreated,
ambiguous and resistant to essentializing definitions, it may turn out to be useful to think of
a political community as sharing a culture.
B. The Spectacle
The Situationists75 have developed a critique of culture that I will use as a starting
point, although I will also reject their assumption that there could be such a thing as doing
away with all culture. For the Situationists, the very concept of culture precludes the
possibility of its being something which is actively “lived” rather than consumed. Their
account highlights the ways in which cultures that are (as the Situationists say)
“spectacularized” harmfully limit the possibilities presented to people by their culture.
However, the Situationists fail to see societies as anything but spectacularized; they fail to
see resistance in how people live their cultures. Furthermore, their call for the destruction-
rather than the revision—of all cultures requires them to presuppose some sort of pre-social
or unencumbered self, a self that could conceivably exist apart from or without any social
context, without any culturally specific way of being. As I will argue, when colonized
cultures really do face possible destruction, preventing this destruction requires being able
7
-’The Situationists—that is, members of the Situationist International (S.I.)—were a group who engaged in
radical thought and action in France in the 1960’s. Their work continues to be actively taken up (and
revised) in contemporary anarchist theory and practice. See, for instance, publications such as Anarchy
magazine, that draw on and develop some Situationist ideas.
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to see resistant ways of revising the culture-of keeping the culture alive and resistant to
spectacularization.
The concept of ‘culture,’ for the Situationists, is related to what they describe as the
phenomenon of spectacularization (of society). As the term ‘spectacle’ is used by the
Situationists, it is only through the spectacle that society is presented to its members, and as
such society is reified; because it is presented to its members, it comes as a thing outside of
themselves that they do not create (although they have the illusion of creating it or of
choosing different elements of it from among a truly open range of possibilities). Guy
Debord, who was a member of the Situationist International (S.I.), describes the spectacle
as a “social relation among people mediated by images” ( Society 4). It is “a vision of the
world which has become objectified” (Society 5). The spectacle turns what is otherwise
lived into something that appears, and can only be consumed-consumed as an image. The
concept of the ‘spectacle’ was used by the Situationists:
to come to terms with a society in which lived experience had been supplanted
by the image. The term ‘spectacle’ was deployed to describe the idealized
representation that commodity culture produces of itself and the alienated
position it provides for people as ‘spectators’ separated from the life they are
meant to be living and forced instead to simply consume it (“On the Passage”).
According to the Situationists, a society becomes a society of the spectacle when capitalist
relations turn everything in the society into a commodity, or treat everything as a
commodity. As Debord writes, “[t]he spectacle is the moment when the commodity has
attained the total occupation of social life” (Society 42). For instance, in spectacular
society, life choices become commodities that one “chooses” to consume based upon the
image that they offer. To choose to bear children, for example, is to “choose” to be marked
with the spectacular society’s image of ‘mother.’ In this way, spectacular society forces
people into passivity, for it allows us to do nothing but choose from among the
commodified images—seeming alternatives—that are presented to us. The choice, of
course, is limited because only certain images are offered as possibilities, and the
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Situationists believe that the images dominate to such an extent that we cannot imagine
possibilities outside of their limits. Debord pictures a society of the spectacle as offering
only “[f]alse choice within spectacular abundance” ( Society 62). Under this account,
instead of creating or living our lives, we merely passively consume them. As Carol
Ehrlich puts it, to consume social relationships makes one a passive spectator in one’s
life (67). She speaks of the spectacle as a show (of our lives) which we cannot leave; we
can passively watch it, but we cannot actively choose to create something different. “The
stage is set, the action unfolds, we applaud when we think we are happy, we yawn when
we think we are bored, but we cannot leave the show, because there is no world outside the
theater for us to go to” (67).
What is important in spectacular society is how we appear, for the value of what we
are depends on what we have, which in turn depends on how it appears to have such a
commodity. Debord describes the centrality of “appearing” as characteristic of the phase
which the society of the spectacle has now reached:
The first phase of the domination of the economy over social life had brought
into the definition of all human realization an obvious degradation of being into
having. The present phase of total occupation of social life by the accumulated
results of the economy leads to a generalized sliding of having into appearing,
from which all “having” must draw its immediate prestige and its ultimate
function. ( Society 17)
The Situationist critique of spectacularized society relates to their critique of culture
in the following way: culture is, for the Situationists, that which delimits the particular
forms that the society of the spectacle takes; it is a formulation of the possibilities within a
particular society. That is, culture determines the specific structure and character of the
“alternatives” that are presented in a society as the possibilities from which we can choose.
Debord writes, “[w]hat is termed culture reflects, but also prefigures, the possibilities of
organization of life in a given society” (“Report” 17). Culture, thus characterized, does not
allow people to actively create or live their lives; rather, culture determines and reflects the
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possibilities that are presented to people, who are left only to passively consume or
choose from those possibilities. The S.I. defines culture as: “[t]he reflection and
prefiguration of the possibilities of organization of everyday life in a given historical
moment; a complex of aesthetics, feelings and mores through which a collectivity reacts on
the life that is objectively determined by its economy” (“Definitions” 46). Elsewhere, the
S.I. writes about culture:
The formative mechanism of culture thus amounts to a reification of human
activities which fixates the living and models the transmission of experience
from one generation to another on the transmission of commodities; a reification
which strives to ensure the past’s domination over the future. (Canjuers and
Debord 310)
To summarize, the S.I has argued that there are two problems with culture. First of
all, culture is inherently conservative, in the sense that it favors the preservation of
traditions rather than the creation of new constructions of life; partaking of a culture
requires us to repeat past ways of being instead of creating new ones, despite the fact that
changing social conditions may call for changed ways of being. Secondly, culture itself
has become commodified, such that the existence of culture forces us to be
spectators/consumers of culture itself; Debord writes, “[cjulture turned completely into
commodity must also turn into the star commodity of the spectacular society” (Society
193). Culture, as society’s image of itself, must be consumed as an image.
In response to these problems with culture, Debord calls for a “revolution in
everyday life” which will eradicate all that is termed ‘culture’ and will create in its place “the
conditions in which the present dominates the past and the creative aspects of life always
predominate over the repetitive” (“Perspectives” 75). Because they saw culture as
something that is entirely without value (or rather, of negative value), the S.I. advocated
complete destruction of anything that could be termed ‘culture.’ This revolution in
everyday life is to be begun, the S.I. argues, by what they term the construction of
situations (thus their name—Situationists). Constructing situations involves purposefully
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and experimentally arranging and enacting situations which, as “unitary ensemble[s] of
behavior in time”(“Preliminary” 43), create ambiances which take the “players”~or
livers ’-outside of the situations that are presented in the spectacle of everyday life. “The
situation is . . . made to be lived by its constructors” (“Preliminary” 43). Playing with
these constructed situations is done with the aim of both exposing the nature of everyday
life as defined by the spectacle, and bringing into view possibilities that the spectacle does
not provide, these new possibilities can then be taken into everyday life.
Before I begin to critique the S.I.’s project, it will be helpful to have a more
concrete sense of what the spectacle is and how (and whether) one is really affected by it in
everyday life. To describe everything about one’s life as a consumption of the spectacle—
as the Situationists do-is inaccurate; not everything we do is (or is equally) determined by
the spectacle, and some of what we do involves resistance to the spectacle. Acting
according to the spectacle can be thought of as acting according to a script; our
imaginations, to the extent to which we act according to the spectacle, are limited to run
along the same lines as the scripts that have been presented to us; when we are spectators
watching ourselves act in accordance with this limited imagination, we see ourselves as
enacting the authentic version of some image that we have witnessed. One can think of
these scripts as being imprinted in our minds, our memories, for we have heard and
watched their being acted out before, over and over: in the media, in advertising, in tourist
brochures, in literature or stories, and (perhaps more than anything else) in the interactions
that we see take place between others. All of these are agents of the spectacle: they are all
places where we view others act, and if we do not resist the messages presented to us, we
come to believe that these versions of reality comprise the authentic ways of acting and
being. Some activities in everyday life are more scripted than others, for it is only certain
practices that we see acted out over and over again. Intimate, embodied interactions, for
instance, are especially scripted. We have been presented with many seeming variations on
these interactions, but the variety is limited. One may joke about how “canned” the typical
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sex scene is in a movie or a television show, but these canned scenes form our
imaginations: One knows what to expect after the kiss when one is watching a show, but
when the show is one’s own life one may check one’s actions against the script to see if
one is doing what qualifies as, for instance, “romance.” The minute details of movement in
which people engage often follow the scripts. For instance, it is one minuscule part of a
sexual script for a man, facing a woman, to take his hand and place it on the neck of a
woman, his thumb on her cheek in front of her ear, and to then maintain control by
directing the motions of her head with his hand; in particular, he can direct her head
towards his for a kiss. Such a motion signals “romance.” It is following such scripted
interactions that qualifies an activity as one of romance, erotic play, sex. Those who
deviate too much from the script may no longer believe themselves to be engaging in
authentic romance, erotic play, sex. We act as spectators in our own lives when we step
back from what we are doing and view ourselves with an eye that focuses on how we
appear, on how well what we are doing qualifies us as engaging in a defined practice. One
steps back and from the position of spectator evaluates whether one fits “good mother,” or
“tough dyke,” or “real Jew,” or “radical professor,” or “profound artist” or whatever other
image one might enact. Looking at what is particularly scripted in one’s life helps to reveal
where resistance is needed, and one can interpret serious deviations from the script as
resistance to spectacularization.
The Situationists' project, which is aimed entirely at the creation of new
possibilities, is problematic in several ways. Not only do they ignore the possibility that
something of value could be lost in the process of destroying all “repetitive”-that is,
repetitive of past or traditional-ways of being, but they also fail to recognize that the
project they propose is inconceivable unless the self can somehow exist without culture,
that is, without any culturally specific ways of being. Perhaps they are so embedded in a
hegemonic (French) culture that they never actively recognize or take up the fact that there
exist many distinct cultures, that their own culture is only one among many—that they
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themselves do not, in fact, avoid enacting culturally specific practices. Perhaps their
position as members of a hegemonic culture leads them to mistakenly see as universal those
practices which are really their own culturally specific practices. Failing to recognize
themselves as having a specific culture allows them to ignore what they might have to lose
were their specific culture to be annihilated. 7* Their theory needs to presuppose an
unencumbered self, a self free from social construction, separate from any culturally
specific social context, capable of creating new possibilities out of nowhere. But no
practice-indeed nothing about everyday life-exists outside of a social context, and with the
sociality of all practices necessarily comes their cultural specificity, for all social contexts
are the arenas in which specific cultures define or inform people’s ways of being. There
could be no such thing as living without culture as long as what is meant by ‘culture’ is that
which describes not only the artistic and intellectual expressions of a group of people, but
also their everyday lived practices, including, for instance, their language.
Furthermore, the Situationists do not consider what might be desirable about
cultural survival. I think that the S.I.’s suggestion that we endeavor to destroy culture is a
dangerous one, for it is only certain cultures which really are in danger of being lost or
destroyed, through the assimilation of their members into other, more hegemonic cultures.
It is not possible to live without culturally specific ways of being; however, it is possible to
wipe out particular cultures, to have members of a culture replace their cultural practices
with practices that are specific to a different culture. If one looks at the contexts of
colonization and imperialism-and consequent cultural hegemony-in which
spectacularization takes place, one will see the dangers in trying to do away with any
culture. The danger becomes evident when one recognizes that it is never culture in general
that can be destroyed (the self is always culturally constituted), but only specific (non-
hegemonic) cultures that are destroyed.
76Thanks to Amie Macdonald for this point.
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C. Spectacularization and the Relations between Cultures
The Situatiomsts describe the phenomenon of spectacularization as something of
which we (namely members of a society of the spectacle) are all victims, no matter what
our social position may be within our society and no matter what the relation may be
between our own and other cultures. Debord does mention that imperialist societies have
the power to define the spectacle of other societies (“The society which carries the spectacle
does not dominate the underdeveloped regions only by its economic hegemony. It
dominates them a^the society of the spectacle” [Society 57]), but this observation only
leads the Situatiomsts to see a colonized culture as yet another culture that should be done
away with on account of its being spectacularized. They do not also look at how the loss
of culture for members of colonized cultures can mean loss of identity, or assimilation into
the colonizing society’s culture. Indeed, as long as they assume that a self could exist
without culture, free from social context, they do not have to recognize the loss of one’s
culture as a death of one s self. 77 Their look at how colonized cultures are also
spectacularized leaves them believing that all cultures—including colonized cultures—should
be destroyed. 78 However, it is imperialism and the colonization of some cultures that
intensifies or creates the spectacularization of these cultures; but imperialism and
colonization also intensifies the need for finding a way of living these cultures.
Imperialism demands that colonized cultures be made consumable, and not only in
the sense which the Situationists describe, where members of a society consume their own
culture. Colonized cultures are also often made the object of consumption of the members
77Thanks to Maria Lugones for pointing this out.
78For instance, in their “Address to Revolutionaries of Algeria and of all Countries” the (French)
Situationists write that although the “movement drawing the Arab peoples toward unification and socialism
has achieved a number of victories over classical colonialism,” they should still, for instance, “finish with
Islam, manifestly a counterrevolutionary force as are all religious ideologies” (“Address” 151). What the
Situationists fail to see here are the implications of their (as members of the colonizing society) telling
Algerian revolutionaries to abandon their Islamic [and colonized] culture. While it may be true that Islam,
as a religious ideology, includes beliefs or practices which under some description of what counts as a
revolution would be considered to be counterrevolutionary, it is also true that abandonment of Islam in the
context of colonization would just mean assimilation into the colonizers’ culture—also quite probably a
counterrevolutionary move!
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ot the colonizing culture. Images of some colonized cultures become artifacts; they become
exotic spectacles whose very value derives from their exoticism. For instance, in the U.S.
the prevalence of “ethnic food” restaurants and import stores filled with artifacts from Third
World countries attests to how readily consumable dominated cultures have been made by
U.S. imperialism. The colonized cultures come to be represented by a few symbolic
artifacts and images: Mexico (lumped together with the rest of Latin America) is burritos
and sombreros, sunny days by warm oceans where smiling brown people serve drinks on
a platter, and latin lovers who romance you to the tunes of latin music; China (together with
the rest of the Orient ) is fans and little black shoes, egg rolls, swarms of small yellow
people, and seductive, willing and deferring women. These artifacts and images can be
consumed by members of a dominant society if they are imported (either the actual artifacts,
or images of them in media) or through the practice of tourism.79
But something must be done to a living culture before it is suitable for
consumption. It must be reduced from a continually changing grouping of lived practices-
a grouping whose boundaries are never clear-cut and are always in flux-and made into a
definable set of characteristics and artifacts which can then be said to constitute a particular
culture. Edward Said, in Orientalism , describes the process through which Western
Orientalists have made all of the “Orient” consumable. A practice of Orientalism that serves
this purpose is “to make out of every observable detail a generalization and out of every
generalization an immutable law about the Oriental nature, temperament, mentality, custom,
or type; and above all, to transmute living reality into the stuff of texts” (86). The actual
people who are described by Orientalists must be reduced to spectacles that can be
consumed; they must be describable as, for instance, characters in a play that can be
watched. As Said writes,
79
“Modern mass tourism presents cities and landscapes not in order to satisfy authentic desires to live in
such human or geographical milieus; it presents them as pure, rapid, superficial spectacles (spectacles from
which one can gain prestige by reminiscing about)” (Canjuers and Debord 308).
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Underlying all the different units of Orientalist discourse ... is a set of
representative figures, or tropes. These figures are to the actual Orient ... as
stylized costumes are to characters in a play; they are like, for example, the
cross that Everyman will carry, or the particolored costume worn by Harlequin
in a commedia dell'arte play. (71 )
When all aspects ol a culture can be represented by a few symbolic artifacts and images, the
whole culture can be acted out as a play filled with recognizable characters, and so the
culture can be consumed as a play is watched.
The characters, of course, must wear a particular costume so that they are
recognizable, or the play is ruined. Thus when the Mexican wears a baseball cap instead of
a sombrero and plays rock music instead of Salsa, he is no longer “authentic”; the Anglo-
American consumer of colonized cultures must either fill in the missing sombrero and fail
to see this Mexican as he really is, or must dismiss this character as not really Mexican.
Anglo-American tourists very predictably go for experiencing the “authentic” in the culture
they are out to view/consume. For instance, the town of Antigua, Guatemala is one of the
towns in Guatemala that has been drastically (and visibly) affected by U.S. imperialism:
there are many language schools, shops and restaurants that cater to U.S. (and European)
students and tourists, and the Guatemalans who live there have been changed (in terms of
what they wear, whether they speak English, what goods they produce to sell, etc.) by all
of their interactions with these students and tourists. Seeing this, many students and
tourists who come from the U.S. decide to spend their time in a different Guatemalan
town, one with more “authentic” Guatemalans. The assumption here is that only
Guatemalans who exhibit “pre-imperialist” characteristics are real Guatemalans, and
therefore they are the only ones suitable for consumption as representatives of a
(supposedly disappearing) culture. In another village in Guatemala called Santiago Atitlan,
los indigenas have discovered how to get a tiny bit of money from the tourists’ quest for
the authentic: they dress up in what the tourists consider to be the traditional indigenous
costume (hand woven and embroidered outfits—trajes- complete with exotic headpiece;
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indeed, it is the traditional clothing of the people of this village, but it is not necessarily
what they would continue to wear everyday were it not for the effect that tourism has had in
creating this image as the spectacle of “authentic indigenous,” and in any case, their
wearing it now has a different meaning than it would have had their culture not been
commodified) and charge a few cents for each tourist who wants to take a photograph. The
same person could stand in the same spot in Western clothing and never earn a penny, for it
is only the authentic spectacle that makes a desirable photo, and the photo is the perfect way
of capturing the spectacle for later consumption.
The colonized culture and its members, then, must fit the proper image to be
consumable. Not only is the colonized culture spectacularized to make it consumable by
the colonizers, but the particular spectacle must be one that the colonizers find desirable to
consume. As Jo Carrillo writes,
Our white sisters
radical friends
love to own pictures of us
walking to the fields in hot sun
with straw hat on head if brown
bandana if black
in bright embroidered shirts
holding brown yellow black red children
reading books from literacy campaigns
smiling (63)
But if the spectacle is altered a little—for instance if the people in these pictures are not
smiling-then the image is less consumable. Carrillo goes on:
Our white sisters radical friends
should think again.
No one smiles
at the beginning of a day spent
digging for souvenir chunks of uranium
or cleaning up after
192
our white sisters
radical friends (63)
Of course, the spectacle can co-opt almost anything and make it consumable; thus, even if
the people in the pictures were not smiling, the image might just become a different brand
ot consumable spectacle; for instance, pictures of crying babies on the backs of
overworked, unhappy mothers become a spectacle of “poverty,” which is itself a
romanticized and consumable image. In any case, the colonized culture is represented by
and for the colonizing culture in order to serve the purposes of colonization; the image of
the colonized culture is molded according to its consumability for the members of the
colonizing culture. The demands of imperialism and colonization guide the process by
which colonized cultures are commodified as they are made suitable for consumption by the
colonizers.
One result of the domination and colonization of a culture is an intensification of its
tendency to be spectacularized in the sense of being preservative of the past; ‘culture’ here
can only be the preserved, authentic’ ways of being, ways that are repetitious of the past
to such an extent that they are no longer creative. Albert Memmi describes colonized
society as “calcified”; as he writes in The Colonizer and the Colonized :
Colonized society is a diseased society in which internal dynamics no longer
succeed in creating new structures. Its century-hardened face has become
nothing more than a mask under which it slowly smothers and dies. Such a
society cannot dissolve the conflicts of generations, for it is unable to be
transformed. (98-99)
This stagnation of culture comes about in part because the spectacle captures a stagnant
image to maintain as the commodity. Said argues that this has happened with the cultures
of the Orient; Orientalism “views the Orient as something whose existence is not only
displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West” (108). The images of the
Orient that are consumable by the West are images of the “authentic” and ancient Orient; if a
contemporary, and changing, feature of Oriental culture has not been scripted into the
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spectacle of the Orient, then it will not be sought after for consumption. Like the
indigenous Guatemalan who dons Western clothing, it will not be a proper target of the
tourist’s camera. Furthermore, cultures that are under attack and that face annihilation from
colonization become defensive in such a way that internal criticism may cease to function to
make the culture change and grow .80 Defending a culture from outside attack reinforces
the tendency of culture to be conservative, for it appears that the culture cannot risk being
open to change, lest it be wiped out completely.
Thus the two problems that the S.I. claim exist for all cultures-that they become
commodities under the spectacle, and that they are conservative of past (traditional) ways of
being instead of creative of new possibilities-seem to exist at least for colonized cultures
(although I will later argue that one can also see resistance to these problems from within
colonized cultures). These cultures are particularly commodified for they are constructed to
be consumed by the colonizers, and also by the members of the culture to the extent to
which the commodified image of the culture is internalized by them. And these cultures
may become especially stagnant and conservative both because the spectacle of these
cultures sells only if it presents an image of the “authentic” (that is, ancient and
unchanging), and because being defensive against outside attacks makes members of these
cultures not open to criticizing and changing their cultures. It might seem that because the
S.I.’s critique of culture seems to apply to colonized cultures, their call for the eradication
of culture should be especially pertinent here.
But at the same time, colonized cultures are the only cultures that really do face
possible annihilation. And annihilation of colonized cultures really just means assimilation
of the members of these cultures into a hegemonic culture. What, then, is the harm of
losing one’s culture for members of colonized, or non-hegemonic cultures? The lived
experience of losing one’s culture in the context of colonization, I would argue, is nothing
like what the Situationists imagine to be the liberating possibilities in doing away with
80On this point, see Maria Lugones’ “Hispaneando y Lesbiando.”
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anything that can be termed ‘culture.’ Because they presuppose an unencumbered or pre-
social self, a self that can exist without culture, they see losing any (spectacularized) culture
as an act of liberation. But if, to the contrary, it is the case that the self is constituted in
social contexts, and if the term ‘culture’ describes the everyday practices that form people’s
self-identities in these social contexts, then the lived experience of losing one’s culture is
more an experience of death, death of one’s self or identity. If this is so, then it is in regard
to colonized cultures that there is the most urgent need to conceptualize ‘culture’ without
spectacularization.
D. Cultural Annihilation and Assimilation
When a non-hegemonic culture is annihilated its members are not left without
culture, but rather they become assimilated to the hegemonic culture; this does nothing to
release people from the non-liberatory aspects of culture, and it meanwhile forces the
colonized people through a loss of identity. The hegemonic culture is never annihilated in
this process, it just becomes more thoroughly hegemonic. In this way, the annihilation of
some cultures that takes place (or is in danger of taking place) through colonization does
not help liberate anyone from the spectacle; instead, it is a replacement of one spectacle with
another.
With this in mind, I want to back up now to look at how struggles for cultural
survival come out of the recognition that erasure of colonized cultures is a form of
oppression—of systematic harm done to a people as a way of subjugating them. Given the
effects on people’s lives of losing their cultures—and being assimilated into a dominant
culture-it is clear to me that struggles for cultural survival are necessary, and that the
erasure of colonized cultures is a part of a process of oppression. If one were to fail to see
resistance to spectacularization, as the S.I. does, one would be unable to see culture as
anything but harmful. One might be led to believe that although struggles for cultural
survival constitute ways of resisting colonization and oppression, they are at the same time
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simply struggles for something (i.e. culture) that is itself not at all liberatory. I would like
to argue that this need not be the case; rather, one can see resistance, and one can find a
way of fighting for cultural survival to be fighting for a living culture, not a spectacularized
and consumable one.
I will look briefly at an example of what particular cultures can mean for those who,
in order to be able to practice their cultures, must fight the effects of colonization. One
context where there is an active struggle against cultural colonization and subsequent
assimilation is among Chicanos and U.S. Latinos. Many of the ways in which Chicano
and Latino cultures are under attack by members of the dominant Anglo culture are clear.
Perhaps most obviously, Spanish is not honored as a legitimate language in the U.S . 81
Many Chicano and U.S. Latino children do not learn to speak Spanish. Spanish tends not
to be spoken in public contexts, sometimes even when all present are native speakers.
While Spanish is a part of Chicano and Latino cultures that it seems that Anglos would like
to wipe out completely, other aspects of, for instance, Chicano culture are taken over-
bought up-by Anglos who co-opt them for their own consumption. The Southwest is full
of “art” which is sold as native or traditional, and Chicano artists’ possibilities for artistic
expressions become circumscribed by the anglo definitions of authentic Chicano art . 82
Anglos have taken over (and grossly distorted) a tradition of building with adobe, and
create out of adobe monstrous buildings to accommodate the vast numbers of wealthy
Anglos who are moving to the Southwest. The colonization of Chicano culture creates a
situation where that culture must fight to remain alive-it is fighting against being the dead,
stagnant, co-opted culture that the Anglos would have it be . 83 Loss of culture is
experienced as loss of self. When one cannot eat the food of one’s culture, speak its
language, go about one’s day according to its concept of time, move through space in the
way particular to one’s culture, and so on, one can experience a death of one’s self, one’s
81 Witness, for instance, how many states have passed or are trying to pass “English Only” laws.
82See Sylvia Rodriguez, “Art as Racial Inscription,” Radical Folk . Winter 1993.
83 For a description of the effects of colonization on a Chicano community, see Lugones’ “Hispaneando y
Lesbiando.”
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whole identity. Culture affects every bit of how the self is formed. As Anita Valerio says
of her (Indian and Chicana) cultures, “[i]t’s in my blood, my face my mother's voice it's
in my voice my speech rhythms my dreams and memories it’s the shape of my legs ... it
must even be the way I sweat! Why it’s damn near everything!” (42). And as Gloria
Anzaldua writes, [ejthnic identity is twin skin to linguistic identity— I am my language”
(59). The necessity for cultural survival-and therefore the necessity for finding some way
that cultures can be lived and created rather than consumed-is the necessity of keeping as
living selves the people whose cultures are under attack.
E. Culture as Lived
Because I see enforced assimilation as unacceptable, but I also see the conservative
maintenance of tradition as unacceptable, I am led to think about the potential for a culture
whose possibilities are continually created and recreated out of the lives of the people who
practice it, rather than a culture that defines and limits the lives of these people by
presenting them with “false choice within spectacular abundance.” To do this I will begin
by looking at resistance that people already engage in to cultural death: resistance to the
stagnation and the commodification of culture. Both Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Gloria
Anzaldua present ideas evocative of possibilities for living cultures, particularly cultures
that have already been significantly affected by colonization. They offer ways of thinking
about traditions and/or cultures as constituted by change and ambiguity or multiplicity of
meanings, revisions and indeterminacy, rather than by unchanging essences that allow
cultures to be formulated or defined. I will first discuss Gates.
Gates’ The Signifying Monkey is in part an account of what constitutes the African-
American literary tradition, an account that reflects significant resistance in how the
tradition is developed; Gates’ account leaves this tradition open to staying alive in the sense
of being continually created and recreated, that is, lived by its participants. His account can
be useful here, for what he writes about a literary tradition parallels what might be said
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about the culture to which this tradition is connected (as well as other colonized cultures).
Gates draws on the relation between the black vernacular tradition and the African-
American literary tradition because he is particularly interested in seeing how language
plays a central role in constituting (and being the realm of revisions within) a tradition. I
would like to extend his work by transferring his ideas about what constitutes a literary
tradition to make claims about what might constitute a culture. Indeed, his theory of the
African-American literary tradition comes out of what is a piece of African-American
culture: the black vernacular. As I will argue later, I think that his exclusive focus on
language as the realm that is constitutive of a tradition is problematic, for it blinds him to
other realms that both provide the basis for the cohesiveness of a tradition and provide the
source for changes within a tradition. For instance, social and political forces affecting the
lives of those participating in a tradition manifest themselves as changes in the form and
content of the tradition. To broaden his theory to allow for a focus on the social and
political forces that shape a tradition or a culture, it is necessary to look at more than just
language, and to consider the culture, rather than just the literary tradition that springs from
the culture.
Gates conceives of the African-American literary tradition as constituted by a chain
of revisions that authors make on one another’s work, revisions that may either critique or
honor and pay homage to (or both) a previous author. I am not going to describe in detail
here how (mocking and yet drawing on his academic tradition) he extracts his theory from
the myths of Esu-Elegbara and the Signifying Monkey-figures from African and African-
American (respectively) cultures-but rather will just say that two important features that he
sees about these trickster figures are that they deliver meaning figuratively rather than
literally, and that their myths are characterized by an indeterminacy of interpretation (ch. 1).
The myths reflect on meanings within their cultures, but always leave these meanings
ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations; they never deliver one literal meaning.
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Furthermore, Gates argues, central to the African-American literary tradition is the
practice of “Signifyin(g)
a practice that comes out of the black vernacular and is the focus
of the Signifying Monkey tales. Signifyin(g), as Gates applies it to African-American
literary theory, can be described as “Repetition, with a signal difference” (51). It is “a
metaphor for textual revision” (88). To Signify upon someone else’s work is to repeat it or
redo it both to draw a connection between one’s own work and the other author’s, and to
mark one s own work with a purposeful difference, a difference that might serve as a
critique or that might serve to extend and compliment a feature of the other work.
Signifyin(g) is a playful and yet critical way in which authors—or participants in a tradition,
members of a culture—speak back and forth to one another, repeating and refiguring what
others have said, remaining within one identifiable tradition (or culture) by repeating
specific shared uses of language (or other shared characteristics), but meanwhile not
allowing the tradition (or culture) to be statically defined, for the revision is always done
mth a difference
,
a difference that serves to recreate and change the tradition (or culture), to
perhaps set it off in a new direction. 84
Gates wants the African-American literary tradition to be defined by no more than a
series of revisions: changes and re-creations. He writes:
84
It is interesting that to the extent to which the practice of Signifyin(g)
—or revising with signal
differences—works against a tradition’s (or culture’s) remaining static and preservative of the past while
meanwhile repeating enough of its antecedents to remain identifiably linked, it is very much like what the
Situationists termed ’plagiarism.’ The Situationists saw plagiarism as a way of making ideas progress;
ideas could be taken up by one thinker where another had left off, and the thinking-changing and recreating-
-of the idea could thus continue. They counterposed this practice to the practice of quoting and citing
authors whose words and thoughts then remain static and unchanged in the process. “Plagiarism is
necessary. Progress implies it. It sticks close to an author’s phrase, uses his expressions, deletes a false
idea, replaces it with the right one” (Khayati 171). Similarly, Signifyin(g) takes up an idea and re-presents
it, changed. It allows an author to walk a line between being completely without a tradition or antecedents
(an impossibility) and being confined within a tradition which is defined and presented by the spectacle (a
position which would force the author into producing, for instance, a pre-formulated piece of “authentic”
African-American writing). According to Gates, originality— i.e. lacking antecedents—has been a
complicated issue for African-American writers, who have frequently been accused of being “imitative”
rather than original. It seems that what is really the case is that there is an identifiable tradition within
which many African-American authors write, but if Gates is right about the extent to which revision takes
place, then the tradition is significantly not one of imitation, i.e. stagnation. Gates cites Zora Neale
Hurston: “Hurston proceeds to argue that what we really mean by originality is in fact masterful revision,
because ‘originality is the modification of ideas’” (118).
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Literary succession or influence.
. . can be based on only formal literary
revision, which the literary critic must be able to demonstrate. These discrete
demonstrations allow for definitions of a tradition. Few definitions of tradition
escape the racism, essentialism, or nationalism often implicit in rubrics such as
‘African” or “Jewish” or “Commonwealth” literature. (120)
It is clear that what he wants to avoid is a formulation of the tradition that forces its
participants into an essentially defined set of characteristics or practices. The tradition must
come out of the participants’ lived practices (that is, their revisions upon one another), out
of their shared use of, in this case, language, where that language use is open to change.
Culture, if it is to be conceived along the same lines that Gates conceives a literary
tradition, might be constituted by something like a shared universe of meaning—meaning
whose basis is found in the historical interactions amongst a people-but where that
meaning is open to revision, re-creation and change. Looking at a culture as constituted by
its historical changes (within the boundaries of some connections between people, such as
shared [but changing] language and practices) instead of by an essential set of practices or
characteristics that remain the same over time refocuses one’s attention on living a culture in
order to be the creators of its revisions, instead of consuming the culture as it is given.
^
Gates’ focus on a literary tradition leads him to single out shared language use as
the basis of the tradition. I would argue that if we are looking at other cultural traditions,
language may, to some degree, lose its centrality and become one among many defining
characteristics of a tradition or a culture. In fact, even in literary traditions, I think that it is
a mistake to focus on language to the exclusion of other characteristics; revisions in
content, as well as those in form, serve to change and re-create literary traditions. In any
case, since Gates’ theory calls for revisions, he himself is open to being Signified upon;
^See, for instance, Jewelle Gomez’s description of “negritude” as a historically formed shared
understanding, not an essential set of practices. “During the Harlem Renaissance writers frequently spoke of
their ‘negritude’: a set of values, a style, a subtext that distinguished them culturally from the rest of
American citizens. ‘Negritude’ was never perceived as a mere essence that could be distilled down to a way
of shaking hands or to the food we eat. It was not only a shout in church
,
but the entire history of the
ability to shout out loud” (114-115).
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and so I will repeat him here with a signal difference-the difference of looking at more than
just formal revisions.
Gates provides a theory of how literary works may be indeterminate, without
closure, double voiced; he thus generates an idea of how a tradition of such literature (and
by extension, the culture to which this tradition is tied) makes itself difficult for the
spectacle to present as a packaged, pre-formulated commodity. There are no essential
characteristics that can serve as the basis for a formulation—or an image—of, for instance,
African-American literature or culture. A member of a culture that is conceived of as
constituted by the ambiguity and indeterminacy of revisions upon revisions is not forced to
simply consume the culture, for participation in it calls for active participation in the form of
carrying out revisions, making critical changes in the culture or tradition. It will be helpful
to turn, now, to an example of how such a culture might be lived in practice.
Gloria Anzaldua, in Borderlands/La Frontera. offers a description of living her
Chicano culture in a way that is full of resistance. For her, what began as resistance or
rebellion to her culture—to a culture that she describes as having betrayed her, directing and
limiting her possibilities while ignoring her desires-has transformed into a resistance
within her culture, a resistance that instead of throwing away her cultural practices and
values serves to both preserve and critically revise and sort through these practices and
values. She writes of the initial rebellion: “Repele. Hable pa’ ’tras . Fuimuy hocicona.
Era indiferente a muchos valores de mi cultura. No me deje de los hombres. Nofui buena
ni obediente. ” And then of the transformation of this rebellion:
Ya no solo paso toda mi vida botando las costumbres y las valores de mi cultura
que me traicionan. Tambien recojo las costumbres que por el tiempo se ban
provado y las costumbres de respeto a las mujeres. But despite my growing
tolerance, for this Chicana la guerra de independence is a constant. (15)
Her own resistance within her culture produces for Anzaldua a culture-or perhaps more
accurately, a position in between, amongst, or at the margins of several cultures-that is
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deeply constituted by change and ambiguity. She is a Chicana tejana, and she writes about
a culture of a borderlands world, a community that is located at the Texas-Mexico border.
Working against the tendency of some Chicanos to try to preserve old customs-customs
that she experiences as oppressive as a woman and a lesbian-she embraces the cultural
clashes that continually produce new ways of being. She sees herself as both doing away
with culture (that is, with culture that binds her with tradition-the sort of culture that the
Situationists would like to annihilate) and as creating culture-lived culture: “I am
cultureless because, as a feminist, I challenge the collective cultural/religious male-derived
beliefs of Indo-Hispanics and Anglos; yet I am cultured because I am participating in the
creation of yet another culture.
.
(80-81). Whereas the Situationists advocate the
eradication of all culture because they conceive of culture as, by definition, a pre-
formulated construction of a society of the spectacle, Anzaldua experiences possibilities for
a culture being otherwise.
One aspect of the culture that is kept alive and changing because of the cultural
clashes of the borderlands is its language(s): Chicano Spanish with its many variations, for
instance, or Tex-Mex. Where culture is conceived of as that which preserves “authentic”
and traditional practices, languages must remain pure and unchanged by social and political
forces that affect the nature of people’s lives. Chicano Spanish violates this stricture.
"Chicano Spanish is considered by the purist and by most Latinos deficient, a mutilation of
Spanish (55). Think, for instance, of the Anglo-American who, enamored of the
spectacle of, say, Mexican culture, wants to learn Spanish. This Anglo will typically want
to learn an unadulterated Spanish—a Spanish whose words are not, for instance, mixed
with English words.
But Chicano Spanish is a border tongue which developed naturally. Change,
evolution, enriquecimiento de palabras nuevas por invention o adoption have
created variants of Chicano Spanish, un nuevo lenguaje. Un lenguage que
corresponde a un modo de vivir. Chicano Spanish is not incorrect, it is a living
language (55).
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The language of this Chicano culture, then, is constituted by changes, changes that
correspond to a (changing) way of living. Like Gates’ literary tradition that is constituted
by revisions with signal differences, the language(s) of Chicano culture(s) are constituted
by revisions—new creations and changes-that respond to changing social and political
forces, all within the loose boundary of some historically shared understandings and
practices among a people.
If culture is, as the Situationists put it, a "reflection and prefiguration of the
possibilities of organization of everyday life in a given historical moment” (“Definitions”
46), then what is interesting in the situation that Anzaldua describes is that there is, for
Chicanos, no one given prefiguration of these possibilities; rather, there are several such
prefigurations, which are inconsistent with each other. This can leave a Chicano in the
interesting—and potentially fruitful—position of being able to see one culture from the point
of view of another, and of having to actively create some mestiza culture out of the
clashes.86 As Anzaldua writes:
Cradled in one culture, sandwiched between two cultures, straddling all three
cultures and their value systems, la mestiza undergoes a struggle of flesh, a
struggle of borders, an inner war. Like all people, we perceive the version of
reality that our culture communicates. Like others having or living in more than
one culture, we get multiple, often opposing messages. The coming together of
two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference causes un
choque, a cultural collision
.(78)
The culture that emerges from this collision emerges out of lived experience. Anzaldua
writes that the “numerous possibilities leave la mestiza floundering in uncharted seas” (79).
It seems that such a position—floundering in uncharted seas— is just the position the
Situationists were trying to put themselves in when they went about purposely
“constructing situations” to take themselves out of the preformulated situations presented
by the everyday spectacle. What comes out of this borderlands world is a culture of
86By saying that this is a potentially fruitful position to be in, I do not mean to be denying that this
position might also be an extremely difficult or painful position to be in.
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ambiguity, full of elements that the tourists after the “authentic” will never find described in
their guidebooks, for guidebooks cannot formulate the parameters of such a culture enough
to present it as a spectacle; out of this borderlands world come practices with multiple
meanings, indeterminate origins: “To live in the Borderlands means to / put chile in the
borscht, / eat whole wheat tortillas,/ speak Tex-Mex with a Brooklyn accent” (194).
* * *
It is crucial to welcome the cultural collisions that produce ambiguity and to refuse
to base values on what appears as (but cannot actually be) a distinct, clearly bounded
culture s set of values. Spectacular thinking calls for the production of only one show; we
are asked to believe that there is “no world outside the theater” (Ehrlich 67); but cultural
collisions will force us to see many worlds, worlds that cannot all be in the same theater.
Communities interested in escaping the spectacle need to welcome the experience of the
mestiza.
A culture constituted by continual changes and re-creations, or revisions, is
resistant to being spectacularized, for it cannot easily be delimited or formulated. Cultural
collisions-the effects of cultural domination and colonization-can work to keep a culture
continually undergoing such revisions. It may seem strange that even changes in the
direction of assimilation work to put members of colonized cultures in the position of
having to actively create. There is a line to be walked here between on the one hand
assimilating and undergoing a cultural death (an option that simply leaves one to have to act
out the hegemonic culture’s spectacle), and on the other hand ignoring the reality of the
lived cultures that are produced by social and political forces including forces of
domination, and recognizing, instead, only the spectacle of ancient and “authentic,”
stagnant cultures. I am not saying here that there is anything positive about this
domination; rather, given the fact of colonization, given that bits of the colonizers’ culture
force themselves into colonized cultures, recognizing and affirming these colonized cultures
as living requires recognizing and living the ambiguity of meaning-and the revisions in
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cultural practices--that come out of cultural clashes, even clashes of dominance and
subordination.
The new mestizo copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance
for ambiguity... She learns to juggle cultures. She has a plural personality, she
operates in a pluralistic mode-nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the
u§ly> nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. Not only does she sustain
contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else. (Anzaldua 79)
Looking at the position of those caught in the middle of cultural clashes reveals the
experience of creating a new culture out of contradictions, double-messages, and
ambiguity. One could also work at thinking of how to keep oneself in the position of being
an active participant in the creation and recreation of living cultures, without this necessarily
taking place in a context of colonization. To the extent to which it creates constantly
changing social and political forces and cultural clashes, colonization creates a lived reality
that is at odds with consuming an unchanging, “authentic” culture (although colonization
also may intensely commodify cultures and cause their stagnation, and compel members of
colonized cultures to cling to the unchanging artifacts of their cultures); by throwing those
who experience cultural clashes into “uncharted seas,” it puts them in the position of having
to actively create. But colonization forces the changes in the direction of further hegemony
of the dominant culture. I suggest, then, a strategy of consciously, purposefully being the
creators of revisions in our cultures, and directing these revisions in liberatory directions
without losing the tie between the created culture and the universe of sense from whose
tradition it emerges.
* * *
I argued in earlier chapters that it is necessary to reconceive of group identity in
such a way that (instead of depending on essential characteristics of group members in
order to unify the group) allows or encourages identities to be both hybrid and open to
continual change through all constitutive practices, including the practices that come with
participation in the political community itself. In this chapter I have extended the argument
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so that it applies not only to socially constructed identities, but also to the concept that I
believe is frequently taken to ground such identity, namely the concept of ‘culture.’ As
long as a constitutive community understands its identity or its basis for unity to be found a
priori in its shared culture or even to be describable a posteriori in terms of (or analogous
to) a shared culture, it will not be enough to simply argue that identity is a problematic basis
for political community, for identity may itself by based on another problematic grounds,
namely the concept of ‘culture.’
Culture, however, is not dispensable, assuming that the self is never unencumbered
but is always constituted within a social, and therefore cultural, context (and as long as
culture includes everyday practices and ways of being, to be a social being must be to be
a culturally constituted being). Furthermore, a community that is truly constitutive-that is,
one that affects its members deeply enough to form their practices, their values, and so on-
is necessarily culturally constitutive. Thus it has been necessary to consider how a political
community that aims at liberatory change should conceive of the ways that its members
become constituted culturally within the community. While in earlier chapters I argued that
identity must be conceived in a way that allows for hybridity, here I have argued that in
order for a group identity to be so conceived, the ground for that identity—if it is described
as a cultural ground—must also be significantly revised from the popular understanding of
what a ‘culture’ is.
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CONCLUSION
Sources IV.
With whom do you believe your lot is cast?
From where does your strength come?
I think somehow, somewhere
every poem of mine must repeat those questions
Which are not the same. There is a whom, a where
that is not chosen that is given and sometimes falsely given
in the beginning we grasp whatever we can
to survive
--Adrienne Rich
I have suggested in this dissertation that it is important to maintain a communitarian
conception of the self; following Aristotle and the traditional communitarians, I believe that
an account of the self as socially constituted is descriptively accurate, and I also think that
there is normative value to recognizing the self as so constituted and to encouraging the
development and sustenance of the sorts of communities in which members self-
consciously participate in each other’s moral lives rather than leave one another alone and
isolated in this respect. However, I have also argued against the assumption of or the
demand for unity in constitutive communities, and hence I depart both from Aristotle and
from the traditional communitarians.
But the call for unity does not end with the traditional communitarians; it re-emerges
in contemporary identity politics and also is to be found in the concept of ‘culture’ and the
presumed connection between shared culture and community. I have argued against the
call for unity, whether that unity be based on a shared socially constructed identity, or
207
whether its roots be in a shared culture. In the case of identity politics, the call for unity of
identity can be essentializing; if the basis for membership in the community is the sharing
of certain essential characteristics of identity, then difference can result in marginalization or
expulsion. In the case of a community whose unity derives from its members’ shared
culture, maintenance of the culture itself can be conservatizing; the culture can remain
closed off from changes, preservative of the “traditional” or the “authentic”; furthermore, it
can come to be treated as an object outside of the people who live it and as such the
changing lived realities of these people do not serve to continually offer new, changing,
and ambiguous ways of conceiving of what is shared between members of the community.
What, then, are the alternative models for constitutive community? How can
members of a community engage with one another at the level of shaping each other’s
selves through the practices of the community, and yet allow this process of self
constitution to be continually open to change, impossible to predict a priori
,
and fed by
elements that are not divided into the essential and the inessential, but that mix and create
hybrid selves? The self that is not to be fashioned by a community into a pre-defined “sort”
of a self (for instance, a “real” lesbian, a “real” Black, a “real” Jew-where to be “real” or
authentic is to embody the essential characteristics) is a self who is unpredictable, and as
such, uncontrollable. A community that is not to be based on the conceptual unity of its
members must be willing to relinquish control. I suggest, then, resisting the urge to
control who one’s “people” are, to open wider the possibilities of whom one takes as
“one’s own.”
* * *
Irena Klepfisz contrasts critically what she calls the “inside”-namely inside the
women’s movement-and the “outside”-which she finds herself thinking of as the “real”
world. The contrast is one of control versus lack of control: the inside is created through
carefully controlled choices, or at least there is the illusion of there being such choice,
whereas the outside world is a world in which it is obvious that there is little choice and
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little control. Though Klepfisz recognizes that the contrast is really a false opposition-the
inside is part of the real world too, though characterized by different attitudes-her point is
to critique the illusion that is created on the inside of the movement; the illusion is that one
— contro1 one
’
s world, that one can control who one’s people are, that whom one works
with can be carefully chosen, that one can possibly afford to choose. Klepfisz points out
that on the outside-particularly in the world of working class people-choice and control
are impossible.
Klepfisz first describes the inside of the women’s movement, beginning by
wondering why she thinks of this world as unreal:
Not so much unreal as sifted. To some degree. To a great degree. The
“movement” world-the inside-is created through choices. We choose the
people we want to work with, we choose the causes we want to work on,
we choose the feminist institutions we want to create. None of this is
absolute, but certainly it seems true to a greater degree than in the “real”
world-the outside. Because we are so used to these choices, coalitions are
frequently difficult to make. We think we have a choice about whom we
work with. And there are people we choose not to work with. (20)
In contrast to what goes on in the women’s movement, Klepfisz’s life outside of the
movement is characterized by a lack of control:
I have no control over the circumstances in the office I work in. I look for a
job and usually take what I can get, hoping for a decent salary or benefits or
manageable travelling time—all the considerations surrounding work. But I
do not choose the other people in the office, just as I do not choose other
members of my family, just as I do not select who can be a Jew or a
woman. These all come with birth. And working circumstances come with
the job. (20)
In fact, Klepfisz observes, there is a stronger and more unified “coalition” among the
people who have just been thrown together without choice (office workers, for instance)
than among those in the women’s movement. And the unity of workers in an office does
209
not require sameness, precisely because the office workers are not under the illusion that
they could choose each other; they take each other as they come. Klepfisz writes: “Most of
us [women workers in an office] know, even if we are very different from each other, who
the enemy is. In the office, we rarely mistake what side of the line we are all on” (21). In
the women’s movement, however, the idea that one can control whom one is willing to
take as “one’s own” leads to continual fighting within the movement about who belongs
and who does not:
We act as if we always have a choice. We are insulted when asked to
associate or join with someone we disagree with or dislike. We try as much
as possible to pick and screen those around us.
This is probably an exaggeration.
This is probably not an exaggeration. Look at the in-fighting, the pulling
apart, the trashing and back-stabbing. We confuse who the real enemy is,
frequently fingering each other. We act as if we can afford to pick and
choose. And we can’t. (21)
If Klepfisz is right both in that movements or communities that attempt to control
membership are under a delusion that such control is really possible and that the attempt at
such control has a damaging effect on members of the community, then it will be important
to give up the delusion of and the attempt at control. Having a controlled community, a
community in which members refuse what is just thrown their way but instead want to
choose exactly how to create the community (including exercising choice over who may
belong) requires, as Klepfisz puts it, a sifting. This sifting stands in contrast to the attitude
of Gloria Anzaldua, when she writes that “nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the
ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned” (Borderlands 79). Pre-sifting, or the attempt at
careful control, pre-empts the possibility of standing at the conflux of different cultures-of
different configurations of the constitutive marks of identity; it interferes with the
possibility of identity being made and remade unpredictably in the continued practices of a
community, for all has been decided ahead of time; it stifles the growth of a culture,
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capturing it in history in a moment of supposed authenticity and allowing nothing thereafter
to be real.
Meanwhile, there is another sense in which control cannot be exercised over
identity, and that is the sense in which one inherits a past, a people, a set of practices.
While on the one hand there is the illusion that control can be exercised as it is manifested
in an attempt to preserve a stagnant past and refuse change, on the other hand there is also
the illusion that one has no past at all, that one can choose an identity, as if one came
unencumbered. According to this logic, if one has no past-if one is not the bearer of any
tradition—one is free to self-create. One can entirely choose—and therefore control—one’s
identity and one’s community. “One’s people” are whomever one chooses them to be.
But neither of these illusions are tenable. One is neither free of an inherited past nor
is one captured by that past in such a way that one can only watch it happen, standing as a
spectator as the culture or the defining identity animates itself in oneself.
* * *
It is dangerous to ask the “who are my people?” question if the motivation behind
asking is to know whom to associate with, whom to join with, whom to form a movement
or a community with. In part this motivation reveals that one does not believe oneself to
“come with” any constitutive marks of identity, for it presupposes that all can be chosen.
But secondly, this motivation is suspect because it ignores the damage that the exercise of
such control can do; the control is a control of people, especially those people who will not
fit within the defining limits of a community based on certain essential elements of identity.
Furthermore, to live a life outside of the confines of a community that is so defined is to
find it impossible to predict what the political callings will be, for they are not given in
advance by the defining identity of the community. To live one’s life on what Klepfisz is
calling the “outside” is to be ready to act politically without having complete control. Audre
Lorde makes this point beautifully:
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Sometimes we are blessed with being able to choose the time and the arena
and the manner of our revolution, but more usually we must do battle
wherever we are standing. It does not matter too much if it is in the
radiation lab or a doctor’s office or the telephone company, the streets, the
welfare department, or the classroom. The real blessing is to be able to use
whoever I am wherever I am, in concert with as many others as possible, or
alone if needs be. (A Burst of T ight 120)
Answering the ‘who are my people?” question cannot serve as a guide in a controlled
process of picking one’s political companions, precisely because the process of joining
together with others cannot be completely controlled if it is to take place within a world
where it is necessary to stand and fight wherever one may find oneself and with
whomever.
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APPENDIX
SENTIDOS DE COMUNIDAD/SENSES OF COMMUNITY
M^ko
Sh
l°9
P
93
r°m^ SUmmer encuentro of the Escuela Popular Nortena, Valdez, New
This workshop was prepared by Maria Lugones and Lisa Tessman.
Sentidos de Comunidad:
Herramientas para pensar sobre redes comunitarias
y sobre politica de base comunitaria
Aquf incluimos algunas palabras utiles para pensar sobre distintos sentidos de comunidad.
Varios de los terminos se pueden usar juntos para describir a un mismo grupo de gente
como formando una comunidad. Usted puede usar cualquiera que le resulte util, o crear
otro termino si Usted quiere, para poder caracterizar a la comunidad que Usted tiene en
mente.
Comunidad de apoyo: un grupo de gente que se apoyan unos a los otros: se ofrecen
cntica, ayuda, apreciacion en sus projectos; a veces tienen proyectos en comun, a veces,
los proyectos son individuales. Por ejemplo: un grupo de amigos.
Comunidad de eleccion: un grupo de gente que se junta voluntariamente para un fin
comun. Por ejemplo: un grupo politico, un grupo de intereses comunes. Mas
concretamente. un grupo de trabajo sobre cuestiones de salud de la mujer, un grupo de
ejercicios ffsicos, un grupo de concientizacion, una organization estudiantil latina.
Comunidad de residencia: la comunidad en la cual uno vive y que puede contener
diversos grupos de gente. Los miembros de la comunidad pueden vivir en este lugar por
razones similares o diferentes, por ejemplo, por eleccion, por tradicion, por necesidad
economica o privilegio, pueden estar forzados a vivir en esta comunidad o por otras
circumstancias. Por ejemplo: Valdez, Los Angeles Este, El Norte de Springfield, La
Prision de Mujeres de Framingham.
Comunidad de origen: la comunidad en que una nacio. Puede haber nacido en un lugar
(por ejemplo: Buenos Aires, Valdez, San Juan, el barrio de Phillips, el Bronx), un grupo
cultural, un genero o raza particulares, una religion (por ejemplo: catolica), una familia (por
ejemplo: la familia Garcia), etc. Uno no elige la comunidad de origen.
Comunidad de destino/comunidad politica: una comunidad que Usted puede
formar con otros, o que puede hallar ya formada (aun si Usted entra en una comunidad ya
formada, pero participa criticamente la esta formando, asi que toda comunidad esta siempre
en un proceso continuo de formacion). La comunidad con la cual uno quiere echar su
destino . Puede ser que esta comunidad no tenga conciencia de si-misma como comunidad,
pero al afirmarla como la comunidad de destino de uno mismo, esta afirmando su futuro
como una comunidad, y esta afirmacion es politica. Por ejemplo: las mujeres de color, los
pobres rurales, las lesbianas, los Chicanos, Los Angeles Este.
Ofrecemos estas maneras distintas de pensar sobre comunidad porque creemos que el tener
un sentido de colectividad-de comunidad—es central para hacer politica que no sea
individualista. Al pensar sobre los distintos sentidos de comunidad reconocemos que ya
pertenecemos a comunidades y que somos afectados por nuestra membrecia en comunidad
y reflexionamos sobre como eso nos afecta como personas politicas: ^Que conocimiento
nos da que poder contribuir a la lucha politica? ^Que experiencias hemos tenido dada
nuestra posicion particular en nuestras comunidades? El describimos a nosotros mismos
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dados estos distintos sentidos de comunidad, tambien nos puede ayudar a pensar siqueremos formar nuevas alianzas, o crear y cambiar nuestras propias comunidades.
hstamos pensando al mismo tiempo sobre como es que las comunidades en las cuales
nemos participado nos han formado y como han creado en nosotros un sentido de
ldentificacion, lealtad, etc.
; y sobre que comunidad queremos como comunidad polfticadonde encontraremos a nuestras companeros politicos. Por lo tanto, decir que la polftica
necesita ser comunitaria en vez de individualista no dice lo suficiente, porque aun tenemos
que pensar a que clase de comunidad nos estamos refieriendo. ^.Quienes son los miembros
de nuestras comunidades? ^Cual es la base de la comunidad: un pasado comun? ; Un
proyecto comun? ^Un compromiso politico? ^E1 hecho que los miembros viven juntos^
^Circunstancias o poderes mas alia de su control? iAlguna otra cosa? ^Como nos han
tormado nuestra comunidad? ^Que clase de comunidades queremos afirmar como
comunidades?
Por lo tanto la idea de estos ejercicios es que somos gente polftica y queremos tratar de
percibir lo que esta mal con nuestra sociedad para pensar en como cambiarla. ; Con quien
queremos cambiar a la sociedad?
Nos vamos a dividir en grupos pequenos para hacer estos tres ejercicios que nos van a
hacer pensar y hablar sobre los cinco sentidos de comunidad.
1. Descrfbase a si misma brevemente usando algunos de estos sentidos de comunidad. Por
ejemplo, alguien puede decir, “Una de mis comunidades de origen es la comunidad
Catolica, pero desde ese entonces he rechazado algunos aspectos del ser catolico. O, mi
comunidad de lugar es Valdez. Vivo allf voluntariamente con el proposito de hacer trabajo
politico. Otra gente que vive en esta comunidad incluye a los Hispanos cuyas familias han
vivido aquf por muchas generaciones, y anglos que se han mudado para explotar la belleza
del lugar, etc. Uno de mis comunidades de eleccion es la Escuela Popular Nortena, un
grupo de gente que he elegido como mis companeros politicos. Etc.”
2. ^Quien es Usted en cada una de estas comunidades? como piensa en cada una de
ellas? En particular, ^hay comunidades que promueven su ser resistente mientras que otras
lo atrapan en ser oprimido, en sus roles oprimidos? ^Hay comunidades que tienen en Usted
efectos opuestos a la vez? Por ejemplo, alguien puede decir, “Mi familia es una comunidad
pequena-parte de mi comunidad de orfgen-me ayuda a ser resistente a la opresion pero
tambien me hace participar en mi propia opresion y en la opresion de otros. Es un lugar
donde me volvf la persona que soy culturalmente-mi madre por ejemplo me enseno el
espanol mientras que otros ninos Chicanos no lo estaban aprendiendo-asf que es un lugar
que me da fuerza en mi compromiso de no dejar que se destruya mi cultura. Al mismo
tiempo, es un lugar donde soy testigo de abuso y a veces soy abusada-mi padre maltrata a
mi madre y tambien me ha pegado a mf. Algo que he aprendido de esto es que ser una
mujer significa sufrir una cierta cantidad de abusos y estoy tratando de des-aprender esto.
Por lo tanto, trato a veces de estar lejos de mi familia.”
3. ^Hay alguna comunidad que no tiene en su vida presente que querrfa tener; por ejemplo,
('Tiene Usted una comunidad polfticay -una conciente de si que la ayuda a mantener un
sentido politico de Usted misma y de su lugar en la sociedad? ^A Usted le parece posible
crear tal comunidad o trabajar dentro de una comunidad para cambiarla y que sea mas como
la comunidad de sus suenos? ^Con quien querrfa Usted hacer este trabajo? Que serfa
necesario para completar este trabajo?
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Senses of Community:
tools for thinking about networks & community based politics
Below are some terms for thinking about different senses of community. Many of theterms overlap or can be used together to describe one group of people as forming a
community. You can use whichever ones you find to be useful, or create anotheFterm ifyou want to in order to characterize a community you have in mind.
Community of support: a group of people whose members support each other: offer
critique, help, appreciation in their projects; sometimes their projects are in common,
sometimes they are individual projects. Example: a group of friends.
Community of choice: a group of people that comes together purposefully and
voluntarily for a common end. Examples: a political group, an interest group. More
concretely, a group doing work on health issues for women, an exercise group, a
consciousness raising group, a Latino student organization.
Community of place: the community in which you live and which may, to one degree
or another, contain many diverse groups of people. The members of the community may
live in this place for similar or for different reasons, for instance, out of choice, out of
tradition, out of economic necessity or privilege, out of force, or out of a variety of
circumstances. Examples: Valdez, East L.A., North End of Springfield, Framingham
Women’s Prison.
Community of origin: the community you were bom to. You can be born into a place
(examples: Buenos Aires, Valdez, San Juan, Phillips neighborhood, the Bronx), a cultural
group, a particular gender or race, a religion (example: Catholics), a family (example: the
Garcia family), etc. You do not get to choose your community of origin.
Community of destination/political community: a community that may be formed
or found-already-formed, or both (even if you enter an already-formed community, if you
engage critically with it, you are in part forming it; so it remains continually in the process
of formation). The community with which one wants to throw one’s lot . The community
may not have a consciousness of itself as a community, but in claiming it as your
community of destination you are affirming its future as a community, and this affirmation
is political. Examples: women of color, the rural poor, lesbians, Chicanos, East L.A..
We offer these different ways of thinking about community because we think that having a
sense of collectivity-of community-is central to doing politics which are not
individualistic. In thinking about different senses of community we can come to recognize
ourselves as already belonging to communities and being affected by our community
memberships, and we can think about how this affects us as political people: what kind of
knowledge does it give us to bring to our political struggles? what experiences have we had
because of our locations in our communities? Describing ourselves using different senses
of community can also help us see whether our political visions lead us to want to form
new alliances to create or change our communities. We are thinking, then, both about how
the communities of which we are or have been a part have formed us or created certain
senses of identification, loyalty, etc. in us; and about what community of people we want
as our political companions. So to say that politics need to be communitarian rather than
individualistic does not say enough, for we still need to know what sort of community we
are talking about. Who are the people in our communities? What are the communities
based on: a common background? a shared project? a political commitment? the fact that
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members live together? that members have been thrown together by powers or
circumstances outside their control? something else? What sort of people do our
communities make us into? What sort of communities do we want to affirm as
communities? —
So the idea of the exercises we are about to do is to say, “okay, so we are political people.We want to work on perceiving what is wrong in our society and going about changing it
But who are we going to make these changes with?”
We will work in small groups to do the following three exercises that will get us thinking
and talking about these different senses of community.
1) Describe yourself briefly using a few of the different senses of community. For
instance, someone might say, “One of my communities of origin is as a Catholic, but I
have since rejected many aspects of being a Catholic. My community of place is Valdez; I
live here out of choice, for the purpose of doing political work. Other people who live in
this community include hispanos whose families have lived here for many generations,
anglos who have moved in to exploit the beautiful surroundings, etc. One of my
communities of choice is Escuela Popular Nortena, a group of people whom I have chosen
as my political companions. Etc.”
2) What “self’ does each of these communities or ways of thinking about community bring
out in you? In particular, are there some communities that nurture your resistant self and
others that trap you into acting out an oppressed or oppressive role, that is, into being an
oppressed or oppressive self? Are there some communities that have several different,
perhaps contradictory or opposite effects on you? For instance, someone might say, “My
family is a small community-part of my community of origin-which helps me be resistant
to oppression but also makes me participate in my own and others’ oppression. It is the
place where I became the person I am culturally-my mother saw to it, for instance, that I
learned Spanish even though many other Chicano children weren’t learning it-so it is a
place which gives me strength in my commitment not to let my culture be destroyed. At the
same time, it is a place where I witness and am sometimes subject to abuse-my father
mistreats my mother and has hurt me before, too. One thing I have learned from this is that
being a woman means suffering a certain amount of abuse. I’m trying to unlearn this, so it
helps to stay away from my family.”
3) Is there some community that you lack in your present life that you wish existed; for
instance, do you have a political community, a community which is conscious of itself as a
community and maintains a political sense of itself and its place in society? Can you
envision creating such a community, or working within a community of which you are
already a part so as to change it to be more like the community you envision? Whom would
you do this with? What would it require?
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